Price v. UTI

• Decision Date: 05 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 4:11-CV-1428 CAS,4:11-CV-1428 CAS
• Parties: JENNIFER PRICE, Plaintiff, v. UTI, UNITED STATES, INC., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

JENNIFER PRICE, Plaintiff,

v.UTI, UNITED STATES, INC., Defendants.

No. 4:11-CV-1428 CAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

Dated: March 5, 2013

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on defendantUTi, United States, Inc.'s ("UTi")motion for summary judgment as to all counts against it.Plaintiff opposes the motion, which is fully briefed and ripe for review.For the following reasons, the Court will grant defendant's motion in part, and deny the motion in part.

I.Background

In her complaint, plaintiff alleges claims of gender and pregnancy discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964("Title VII")(Count I); disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the American with Disabilities Act("ADA")(Count II); gender, pregnancy, and disability discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA")(Count III); violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act("FMLA")(Count IV); and breach of implied contract, promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel under Missouri law (Count VI).¹

Defendant UTi argues it is entitled to summary judgment as to all claims against it.It moves for summary judgment arguing that: (1)plaintiff received full benefits and protections under theFLMA in that she was granted 12 weeks leave; (2)plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination under Title VII and the MHRA because she was not pregnant at the time she was terminated, and she has not identified persons who were not pregnant who were more favorably treated; (3)plaintiff cannot establish that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA because even taking the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, she only had pregnancy-related complications that did not exist after she gave birth or at the time of the termination of her employment; (4) there is no evidence that UTi failed to accommodate plaintiff's alleged disability, because plaintiff failed to participate in an interactive process, and the company did not have adequate information as to when plaintiff could return to work; and (5)plaintiff's claims of breach of implied contract, promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel fail because plaintiff's claims require the Court to disregard plaintiff's employment at-will status and enforce a contract of employment for a definite term that did not exist.

II.Standard

The standards applicable to summary judgment motions are well-settled.Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court shows "there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."SeeCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986).

The initial burden is placed on the moving party.City of Mt. Pleasant, Ia. v. Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273(8th Cir.1988)(the moving party has the burden of clearly establishing the non-existence of any genuine issue of fact that is material to a judgment in its favor).Once this burden is discharged, if the record shows that no genuine dispute exists, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party who must set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts showingthere is a genuine dispute on a material factual issue.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249(1986).

Once the burden shifts, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations in its pleadings, but by affidavit and other evidence he or she must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);Herring v. Canada Life Assur. Co., 207 F.3d 1026, 1029(8th Cir.2000).The non-moving party"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586(1986).A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."Herring, 207 F.3d at 1029(quotingAnderson, 477 U.S. at 248).A party resisting summary judgment has the burden to designate the specific facts that create a triable question of fact.SeeCrossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1114(8th Cir.2004)."Self-serving, conclusory statements without support are not sufficient to defeat summary judgment."Armour and Co., Inc. v. Inver Grove Heights, 2 F.3d 276, 279(8th Cir.1993).

In passing on a motion for summary judgment, it is not the court's role to decide the merits.The court should not weigh evidence or attempt to determine the truth of a matter.Rather, the court must simply determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.Bassett v. City of Minneapolis, 211 F.3d 1097, 1107(8th Cir.2000).

III.Discussion

In her memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff concedes summary judgment on Count IV for violations of the FMLA.She also states that she is not proceeding under "a discriminatory disparate treatment" theory under the ADA.The Court willgrant defendant UTi summary judgment as to these two claims.As for the remaining claims, after reviewing the record and the parties' memoranda in support and opposition to summary judgment, the Courts finds there remain disputes of facts that preclude summary judgment.

A.Gender and Pregnancy Discrimination

Based on the record before the Court, plaintiff has met her burden of establishing that there are facts in the record to create a genuine issue of material fact that she was disparately treated based on her gender and pregnancy.²The fact that plaintiff was not pregnant at the time of her termination does not preclude her claim under Title VII or the MHRA."[S]ex-based discrimination under Title VII includes discrimination based on "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).Wierman v. Casey's General Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 993(8th Cir.2011)(citing to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).SeealsoSnyder v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 321 F.Supp. 2d 1127, 1131(E.D. Mo.2004)(Title VII pregnancy discrimination applied to woman who was fired while she was recovering from a difficult pregnancy);Self v. Midwest Orthopedics Foot & Ankle, P.C., 272 S.W.3d 364, 371(Mo. Ct. App.2008)(discharged related to pregnancy is covered under MHRA).There is evidence in this case to establish a prima facie case of gender and pregnancy discrimination in that: 1) plaintiff was a member of a protected group; 2) she was qualified for her position; 3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) she was discharged under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04(1973);Forrest v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 285 F.3d 688, 691(8th Cir.2002);Spencer v. Stuart Hall Co., 173 F.3d 1124(8th Cir.1999).Plaintiff is not required to show that a comparable non-protected employee was treated better, Wierman, 638 F.3d at 993;she need only show that she was discharged under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, which plaintiff has done in that she was terminated approximately three weeks after she gave birth and while she was still recovering from a cesarean section.Smith v. Allen Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 835(8th Cir.2002)(holding that a two-week interval between an employee's FMLA leave and subsequent discharge was "sufficient, but barely so, to establish causation," and noting that the McDonnellDouglas framework "requires only a minimal showing before requiring the employer to explain its actions").UTi has offered a nondiscriminatory reason for her discharge, but plaintiff has also pointed to evidence in the record to suggest that UTi's stated non-discriminatory reason for her discharge was pretexual in that the company has given conflicting information regarding her leave and the reasons for her discharge.Id.There is also evidence in the record to suggest that plaintiff's pregnancy was a contributing factor in the decision to terminate her employment.SeeDaugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 821(Mo.2007)("contributing factor" standard is appropriately applied to a summary judgment analysis in employment discrimination cases).

B.Disability Discrimination - Failure to Accomodate

Defendant is also not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's ADA claim for failure to accommodate.The ADA mandates that companies like UTi provide "reasonable accommodations to the known physical . . . limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an . . . employee, unless [it] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship."42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)(1994).

Contrary to defendant's argument, there is evidence in the record that plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.The term "disability" includes a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).The ADA Amendments Act expanded the standard for determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110-325, § 8,122 Stat. 3553-54, 3559(2008).³The regulations specify that "substantially limits" is to be "construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage" and "is not meant to be a demanding standard."29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).Under these regulations, an impairment "need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity" to be substantially limiting.Id.§ 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)(abrogatingToyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198(2002)).

In addition, an impairment need not be permanent or long-term, and it meets the definition of "substantially limits" under the ADA if it is "episodic or in remission . . . [and] would substantially limit a major life...