Price v. Wall

• Decision Date: 09 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. CA05-389S.,CA05-389S.
• Citation: 464 F.Supp.2d 90
• Parties: Craig C. PRICE Plaintiff v. Ashbel T. WALL, R.I.D.O.C. Director, et al Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

464 F.Supp.2d 90

Craig C. PRICEPlaintiff v.Ashbel T. WALL, R.I.D.O.C.Director, et al Defendants

No. CA05-389S.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

November 9, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Craig Price, Punta Gorda, FL, pro se.

Patricia Anne Coyne-Fague, Department of Corrections, Cranston, RI, for Defendants.

ORDER

SMITH, District Judge.

The Report and Recommendation of Senior United States Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian filed on September 26, 2006 in the above-captioned matter is accepted pursuant to Title 28 United States Code § 636(b)(1).Plaintiffs objection to the Report and Recommendation is DENIED and DefendantsMotion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Report and Recommendation

HAGOPIAN, Senior United States Magistrate Judge.

Craig C. Price("Price" or "plaintiff"), pro se, an inmate in the custody of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 naming as defendantsAshbel T. Wall, II, Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, Jake Gadsden, Jr., Assistant Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, and Joseph A. DiNitto, Associate Director of Classification at the Rhode island Department of Corrections(collectively "defendants").In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the defendants retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights.

Presently before the Court is the motion of the defendants for summary judgement pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.Plaintiff has opposed the motion.This matter has been referred to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for a report and recommendation.For the reasons that follow, I recommend that the defendants' motion for summary judgement be GRANTED.

Background

The following are the undisputed facts, unless otherwise noted, gleaned from the parties' submissions:

A Rhode Island state court judge sentenced the plaintiffCraig C. Price to a term of imprisonment at the Rhode Island Department of Corrections("RI DOC").As an adult, Price has been convicted of numerous offenses, including inter alia criminal contempt of court, assault on a correctional officer, and extortion and blackmail.¹Price also has had 47 disciplinary infractions while confined as an adult offender.

In August 2003, Price, with the assistance of counsel, filed a Motion in the state courts seeking an order directing the RI DOC to provide psychological and psychiatric treatment.²The plaintiff claimed that the RI DOC was required — pursuant to a previously issued state court order — to provide this rehabilitation, and that the RI DOC was not so providing.

During the pendency of the state court proceedings, counsel for Price and counsel for the RI DOC engaged in settlement discussions.The settlement discussions were fruitful, with Price agreeing to withdraw the motion to compel and "agree[ing] and consent[ing] to be voluntarily transferred to a correctional facility outside the State of Rhode Island."SeePlaintiff's Exhibit B(a), Stipulation filed in State of Rhode Island Family Court, FC # P94-087CR, Dckt # 1-4, pp. 3-4.

The impetus for the transfer for both Price and the RI DOC was essentially the same.Both sides sought to confine Price in a location where he could potentially participate in rehabilitation programs.Indeed, the Department of Corrections sought to "give [Price]. a new start in a system unfamiliar with his background," because Price's "movement" within the Rhode Island prison was limited due to his notoriety and the widespread knowledge among the inmate population of his crimes.SeeAffidavit of Joseph DiNitto, Dckt # 23-2, p. 2, ¶ 6;see alsoPlaintiff's Exhibit C, Dckt # 37-4, Defendants' Answers to Interrogatories, # 6.

While plaintiff preferred to be confined in a facility located in California, New jersey, Illinois, Ohio, South Carolina, or a facility operated by the Federal government, this was not part of the agreement, nor does it appear that the RI DOC made any promises to transfer Price to any of those locations.Additionally, plaintiff's attorney communicated with the RI DOC and indicated that Price was "not amenable to a transfer to New Mexico, Virginia or any New England states."SeePlaintiff's Exhibit C, Dckt # 1-4, Letter from Price's former attorney to RI DOC Legal Counsel.In any event, the state court matter was dismissed, and the RI DOC embarked on finding a new confinement facility outside of Rhode Island to house the plaintiff.

To that end, Joseph A. DiNitto, Associate Director of Classification at the RI DOC, a defendant here, prepared plaintiffs transfer application as required by the Interstate Corrections Compact.SeeR.I. Gen. Laws 13-11-1 through 13-11-3;see alsoDefendants' Exhibit B, Dckt # 23-3, Intergovernmental Agreement for the Implementation of the _Interstate Corrections Compact ("Compact").The Compact requires the RI DOC to include various information regarding the inmate in the inmate's transfer application, such as the inmate's criminal history, disciplinary history, escape history, enemy lists, and the reasons for the transfer.

After preparing Price's application, DiNitto forwarded it to some thirteen jurisdictions, including most of the jurisdictions requested by the plaintiff.³Price's application, however, was rejected by eleven of the jurisdictions for various reasons.The only jurisdictions to accept Price were New Mexico and Florida.The Director of the RI Department of Corrections, defendant A.T. Wall, decided that the Florida correctional system was more suitable for Price's rehabilitative and security needs.Accordingly, the RI DOC transferred Price to the Florida correctional system, where he is presently confined.

While confined in Florida, officials at the RI DOC hold plaintiff's Rhode Island classification proceedings in absentia.The RI DOC has classified Price as a "C" status inmate but recently upgraded his status to "B".SeePlaintiff's Exhibit DI), Dckt # 35-7, pp. 1-4.Notwithstanding the Rhode Island classification proceedings, Florida may confine Price in any of its prisons at any classification level as it determines, with the exception that Florida may not classify Price lower than a Medium Security inmate unless written approval is received from RI DOC.

Initially, Florida classified Price as a "Close Management I" status, a restrictive classification that apparently did not permit Price to participate in rehabilitation programs.Price's initial classification in Florida was due to "the violence contained in [his] prison record" but Price has since been classified as "Close Management II" status, a less restrictive classification.SeePlaintiffs Exhibit M, Dckt # 1-14.Thus, Price has begun his "movement" through the Florida prison system.As Price progresses through the levels of classification in the Florida correctional system, he will have access to more rehabilitation programs and privileges.Seeid.

Plaintiff filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking relief.Plaintiff contends in his complaint that the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, particularly the named defendants here — Wall, Gadsden, and DiNitto, intentionally transferred him to the Florida correctional system in an effort to frustrate his rehabilitation, in retaliation for filing the motion to compel in the state courts.Plaintiff also alleges that these defendants continue to classify him in the most restrictive manner while at the Florida prison, frustrating his rehabilitation, in retaliation for filing the motion to compel in state courts.

Defendants have moved for summary judgement pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) on plaintiffs claims, asserting that the undisputed facts demonstrate that plaintiffsFirst Amendment rights were not violated.Plaintiff has opposed the motion.

Discussion

a. Summary judgment Standard

Summary judgment's role in civil litigation is "to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial."Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc.,895 F.2d 46, 50(1st Cir.1990).Summary judgment can only be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on me, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Rule 56 has a distinctive set of steps.When requesting summary judgment, the moving party must "put the ball in play, averring `an absence of evidence to support a nonmoving party's case."`Garside,895 F.2d at 48(quotingCelotex v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986)).The nonmovant then must document some factual disagreement sufficient to deflect brevis disposition.Not every discrepancy in the proof is enough to forestall summary judgment; the disagreement must relate to some issue of material fact.SeeAnderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986).

On issues where the nonmovant bears the ultimate burden of proof, he must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion.Seeid. at 253-257, 106 S.Ct. 2505.This evidence "can not be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a fact finder must resolve at an ensuing trial."Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac., Tea Co.,871 F.2d 179, 181(1st Cir.1989).Evidence that is merely colorable or is not significantly probative cannot deter summary judgment.Anderson,477 U.S. at 253-257, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

b. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First Amendment

Plaintiff has brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person...