Prichard v. Lockhart

• Decision Date: 29 March 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-2013,92-2013
• Citation: 990 F.2d 352
• Parties: Charles Dee PRICHARD, Appellee, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 352

990 F.2d 352

Charles Dee PRICHARD, Appellee, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellant.

No. 92-2013.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 12, 1993.

Decided March 29, 1993.

T. Jeff Vining, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, AR (Winston Bryant, Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellant.

Demaris A. Hart, Texarkana, AR, for appellee.

Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

A.L. Lockhart, the Director of the Arkansas Department of Correction, appeals the magistrate judge's ¹ grant of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) habeas relief to Charles D. Prichard, an Arkansas prisoner convicted and sentenced for state drug offenses. The magistrate judge found that Prichard's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the sentencing court's use of an out-of-state marijuana conviction to enhance Prichard's sentence for possession of marijuana. We affirm.

Prichard was convicted by a jury of one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, Ark.Code Ann. § 5-64-401(a)(1)(iii) (Michie 1987), and one count of possession of marijuana, third offense, Ark.Code Ann. § 5-64-401(c) (Michie 1987). During the sentencing portion of a bifurcated trial, the State produced evidence of Prichard's two previous convictions for possession of marijuana, one from Texas and one from Arkansas. Prichard was sentenced to consecutive terms of thirty years for the methamphetamine offense and fifteen years for the marijuana offense. The marijuana offense was sentenced as a Class C felony because the trial court deemed it a third offense under section 5-64-401(c) of the Arkansas Code. ² The convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal.

After exhausting his state remedies, Prichard brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, raising several grounds for relief. The magistrate judge granted the writ, holding that Prichard's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to use of his Texas marijuana conviction to justify Prichard's "third offense" status on the marijuana conviction. ³ The judge ordered Prichard discharged from the conviction and sentence for possession of marijuana, third offense, unless he was resentenced within sixty days. Lockhart appealed, and the magistrate judge granted Lockhart's motion for stay pending appeal.

In order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, a prisoner must demonstrate "that counsel's performance was deficient" and that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). An attorney's performance is deficient when it falls below "an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. The defendant is prejudiced by the subpar performance if "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.

We agree with the magistrate judge that the performance of Prichard's trial counsel was deficient and that Prichard was thereby prejudiced. Under the plain language of section 5-64-401(c), a defendant's previous out-of-state conviction is not a violation of "this subsection" of the statute and therefore could not be used to increase Prichard's offense level under the statute. ⁴ Lockhart objects to the magistrate judge's reliance upon Sossamon v. State, 31 Ark.App. 131, 789 S.W.2d 738 (1990), in reaching that same conclusion. The Sossamon court held that a defendant's previous out-of-state marijuana conviction was not a violation of section 5-64-401(c) of the Arkansas Code and therefore could not be used to increase his offense level under the statute. Id. at 742.

Lockhart asserts that, because Sossamon was decided after Prichard's sentencing, the magistrate judge should not have relied upon it. Further, the Arkansas case upon which the Sossamon court relied construed a different statutory enactment and that, according to Lockhart, makes the analysis inapplicable to the circumstances in Sossamon and here. Lockhart also notes a factual distinction in Sossamon that, he argues, makes it inapposite to Prichard's case. We are not persuaded by Lockhart's arguments.

Although Sossamon was decided after Prichard's sentencing, and thus was not available to Prichard's trial counsel at sentencing, it was objectively unreasonable for counsel to ignore the plain language of the statute and to fail to object when the trial court inappropriately used Prichard's Texas marijuana conviction to enhance his sentence. We find that counsel did not need the Sossamon opinion to conclude that the court was making a mistake in its application of section 5-64-401(c). Further, classifying the offense as a third offense and thus a more serious Class C felony, instead of the lesser Class D felony for a second offense, clearly prejudiced Prichard, as there is a reasonable probability that Prichard's sentence would have been different but for counsel's ineffectiveness. We hold that the writ was properly granted.

Lockhart's remaining line of argument, that other provisions of state law support Prichard's enhanced sentence, lack merit. The Controlled Substance Act enhancement provision relied upon by Lockhart specifically states that it does not apply to offenses under section 5-64-401(c). Ark.Code Ann. 5-64-408(c) (Michie 1987) ("This section does not apply to offenses under § 5-64-401(c)."). Further, assuming without deciding that Prichard was properly sentenced as a habitual offender under Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-501 (Michie 1987), ⁵ he nevertheless suffered prejudice because the sentencing range for the marijuana offense was bumped up by erroneous application of section 5-64-401(c). Section 5-64-401(c) enhances a sentence...