Prichard v. National Protective Ins. Co.

• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: BOYER
• Citation: Prichard v. National Protective Ins. Co., 200 S.W.2d 540, 240 Mo.App. 187 (Kan. App. 1947)
• Decision Date: 03 February 1947
• Parties: George Prichard and Robert Prichard, Respondents, v. National Protective Insurance Company, a Corporation, Appellant

200 S.W.2d 540

240 Mo.App. 187

George Prichard and Robert Prichard, Respondents, v. National Protective Insurance Company, a Corporation, Appellant

Court of Appeals of Missouri, Kansas City

February 3, 1947

Delivered

Appeal from Circuit Court, Daviess County; Hon. James W. Davis Judge.

Affirmed.

Chas D. Brandom, James P. Aylward, George V. Aylward, Terence M O'Brien, for Appellant.

(1) The building was not an "office building" as defined and characterized by the courts. The courts have given this term a clear and definite meaning. Dunn v. National Casualty Company, 5 N.Y.S. (2d) 699, 700, 255 A.D. 52, 125 A. L. R. 1441; F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Davis, 41 F.2d 342, 344. (2) a policy is not ambiguous where the language thereof has acquired, by judicial construction, a clear and definite meaning. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Knorr, 112 F.2d 679, 682; Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York v. Lowenstein, 97 F. 17, 19, 46 L. R. A. 450, 453; U.S. Fidelity Company v. California-Arizona Construction Company, 21 Ariz. 172, 186 P. 502; Frederick Hotel Company v. National Surety Company, 113 W.Va. 609, 169 S.E. 327, 328; American Life Insurance Company of Alabama v. Russell, 229 Ala. 467, 158 So. 307; Moore v. Life and Casualty Insurance Company, 162 Tenn. 682, 40 S.W.2d 403, 404; 25 Corpus Juris, p. 1092, sec. 3, note 30; 32 Corpus Juris, p. 1158, sec. 267, note 30; 44 Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 1154, sec. 293, note 88. (3) Existing statutes and the settled law of the land at the time of the contract become a part of it as though written therein, unless a contrary intention is shown in the contract. Curators of Central College v. Rose, (Mo.) 182 S.W.2d 145, 148-9 (4); appeal dismissed 323 U.S. 678, 65 S.Ct. 269, 89 L.Ed. 550; rehearing denied 323 U.S. 818, 65 S.Ct. 429, 89 L.Ed. 650; Hubbard v. Hubbard, (Mo. App.) 264 S.W. 422, 423 (1, 2); 12 Am. Jur., p. 769, sec. 240, note 6. (4) There being no ambiguity in the policy as to what is an "office building," there is no room for construction, and the term must be taken and understood in its usual and natural meaning and as characterized by the courts. Courts cannot rewrite contracts for the parties, nor create an ambiguity where none exists. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Ghio, 111 F.2d 307, 310, (3, 4); State ex rel. Commonwealth Casualty Co. v. Cox, 322 Mo. 38, 41, 14 S.W.2d 600, 602-3 (1); Prange v. National Life Insurance Co., 329 Mo. 651, 661, 46 S.W.2d 523, 526 (5), 80 A. L. R. 950, 957; Wendorff v. Missouri State Life Insurance Co., 318 Mo. 363, 370, 1 S.W.2d 99, 101-2 (4, 5, 7), 57 A. L. R. 615, 619; Swanson v. Central Surety, 343 Mo. 350, 357, 121 S.W.2d 783, 786 (1-3); Prudential Insurance Co. v. King, 101 F.2d 990, 991 (2-3); St. Louis Police Relief Association v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 236 Mo.App. 413, 421, 154 S.W.2d 782, 787 (1-3); Vail v. Midland Life Insurance Co., (Mo. App.) 108 S.W.2d 147, 151 (3-7); Dunn v. National Casualty Co., supra; F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Davis, supra. (5) A policy is not to be considered ambiguous because it might be possible to give a double construction thereto, but only if it is fairly or reasonably open to two constructions. Parker-Russell M. & M. Co. v. Insurance Company of North America, 209 Mo.App. 503, 511 (last paragraph), 240 S.W. 248, 251; America, Indemnity Co. v. Carney, 54 F.Supp. 273, 275-6 (1-4); Spaunhorst v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 88 F.2d 849, 850 (1). (6) Parties to insurance contracts have the right and power to contract for what accidents and risks the company shall, and for what accidents and risks it shall not, be liable, and the courts may not make new or different contracts for them. Commonwealth Casualty Co. v. Aichner, 18 F.2d 879, 882 (2, 3, 5) and 883 (first paragraph); Adams v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 228 Mo.App. 915, 918, 921 (last paragraph), 74 S.W.2d 899, 902 (2) and 903 (last paragraph). (7) The intention of the parties as expressed in the policy must prevail; and in ascertaining that intention the courts will give to the language used its natural and obvious meaning, as gathered from the whole instrument. Sulzbacher v. Travelers Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 386, 390, 391 (5-9, 10); Wendorff v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 318 Mo. 363, 370, 1 S.W.2d 99, 101-102 (4-5,7), 59 A. L. R. 615, 619; Prange v. International Life Ins. Co., 329 Mo. 651, 661, 46 S.W.2d 523, 526 (5), 80 A. L. R. 950, 957; St. Louis Police Relief Assn. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 236 Mo.App. 413, 421, 154 S.W. 2d 782, 787 (1-3); Hale v. Central Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co., (Mo. App.) 93 S.W.2d 271, 274 (3, 4); Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Ghio, 111 F.2d 307, 310 (3, 4). (8) The contract must be given a fair and reasonable construction in the light of the purpose sought to be accomplished by the parties in making it. 12 Am. Jur., p. 761, sec. 236, note 15; Kentucky and W.Va. Power Co. v. Gilliam, 210 Ky. 820, 276 S.W. 983, 984 (4); Harper's Admr. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 19 Mo. 506, 510; White v. Missouri Ins. Co., (Mo. App.) 103 S.W.2d 514, 520 (3); Burrus v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 225 Mo.App. 1129, 1132, 40 S.W.2d 493, 494 (1, 2).

Sam T. Evans, for Respondents.

(1) The term "office building" is determined either by the test of construction, cost, size, height, location and architectural design or by use or mode of occupancy. Fortesque v. Carroll, 75 A. 923, 924, 76 N.J.Eq. 583. White v. Schwartzbacker, 110 N.J.Eq. 115, 159 A. 311. (2) An office is a place where a particular kind of business or service for others is transacted. Webster's New International Dictionary, pp. 1493, 1494; Anderson v. State, 17 Texas Ct. of App. 306, 310, 311. (a) What is a building. Webster's New International Dictionary, p. 288; Great Eastern Casualty Co. v. Blackwelder, 94 S.E. 843, 21 Ga.App. 586; Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Warfield, (Ark.) 292 S.W. 129, 130 (1) (S. Ct.). (3) Ejusdem generis, being a rule in aid of construction of policy, is applicable. Burrus v. Insurance Co., 40 S.W. 2d 493, 495 (1, 2), 225 Mo.App. 1129; Fulkerson v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 75 S.W. 2d 844, 847 (1, 2); State ex rel v. Holekamp, 151 S.W.2d 685, 690 (6, 7). (4) A policy provision is ambiguous if meaning is doubtful or susceptible of different constructions. Generalities usually make ambiguities. Henderson v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 84 S.W. 2d 922, 924, (1-3), 337 Mo. 1-6; Blank v. Lennox Land Co., 174 S.W. 2d 862, 868 (8). (5) The word office has two meanings -- the one popular and the other legal and technical. In Matter of Dorsey, 7 Port (Ala.) 293; 46 C. J. 921, Sec. 1. "building" is ambiguous, Great Eastern Cas. Co. v. Blackwelder, 94 S.E. 843, 844, 21 Ga.App. 586; "dwelling" is ambiguous, Sanders v. Dixon, 114 Mo.App. 229, 247. "not employed by" is ambiguous, State ex rel. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hughes, 164 S.W. 2d 274, 277 (1-6). "premises" is ambiguous, Fulkerson v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 75 S.W. 2d 844, 846 (1-2). "pole," when used alone is ambiguous, Ky. & W.Va. v. Gilliam, 276 S.W. 986. "within a railroad car" is ambiguous, Schmohl v. Travelers Ins. Co., 189 S.W. 597, 600 (1-2). Mackay v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 34 S.W. 2d 564, 567 (1-4). "by the wrecking or disablement of automobile" is ambiguous, Kimbrough v. National Protective Insurance Association, 35 S.W. 2d 654, 657 (2), 225 Mo.App. 913; Stewart v. North Amer. Acc. Ins. Co., 33 S.W. 2d 1005, 1007 (2). "motor driven car" is ambiguous, Burrus v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 40 S.W. 2d 493, 495 (1, 2), 225 Mo.App. 1129. "horse drawn car" is ambiguous, Hall v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 71 S.W. 2d 762, 764 (3-5). (6) Policy being ambiguous, it must be construed strictly against insurer and most liberally in favor of insured. Henderson v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., supra; Kimbrough v. Natl. Pro. Ins. Ass'n, 35 S.W. 2d 654, 657, 658 (3-10); Mathews v. Modern Woodmen, 236 Mo. 326, 342, 343, 344 (1), 139 S.W. 151; Schmohl v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra; Corder v. Morgan Roofing Co., 195 S.W. 2d 441, 446 (4, 5, 6); (7) In construing "office building," whether the test be one of architectural design or occupancy, in whole or in part, of building owned by bank, or room No. 2, in which insured occupied as her insurance office, whichever theory is most favorable to insured should be adopted. Henderson v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., supra; Kimbrough v. Natl. Pro. Ins. Ass'n, supra; Mathews v. Modern Woodmen, supra; Schmohl v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra. (8) Policy should be construed in the light of insured's understanding of coverage. Kimbrough v. Natl. Pro. Ins. Ass'n, supra; Henderson v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., supra; Mathews v. Modern Woodmen, supra; Schmohl v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra; Cooper v. Natl. Life Ins. Co., 253 S.W. 465, 467 (3), 212 Mo.App. 266. (9) Insured met death in an office building within meaning of policy. Kimbrough v. Natl. Pro. Ins. Ass'n, supra; Henderson v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., supra; Schmohl v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra; Burrus v. Continental Life Ins. Co., supra; Mathews v. Modern Woodmen, supra. (10) Room No. 2, being inured's insurance office, was an office building. Smith v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 16 So. 123, 126, 104 Ala. 315; Stearns v. Vincent, 15 N.W. 86, 91, 92, 50 Mich. 209; Anderson v. State, 17 Texas Ct. of App. 306, 310, 311; Bowditch v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Society, 193 Mass. 565, 79 N.E. 788; Cerf v. Ins. Co., 44 Cal. 320; State v. Clark, 89 Mo. 423, 431, 432; Sanders v. Dixon, 114 Mo.App. 229, 254. (11) Where trial court sits as jury in jury-waived case, finding of lower court will not be disturbed on appeal, if there is any reasonable theory to sustain judgment. K. C. Jockey Club v. U. S. F. & G. Co., 86 S.W. 2d 371, 372 (1); Gronoway v. Markham, 115 S.W. 2d 136, 137 (1, 2); Buford v. Moore, 177 S.W. 865, 872.

Boyer John S., C. Sperry, C.,...