Pride v. Pride
Decision Date | 22 October 1993 |
Citation | 631 So.2d 247 |
Parties | Henry C. PRIDE v. Janette L. PRIDE. AV92000473. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Randal S. Ford, Tuscaloosa, for appellant.
Ralph E. Slate, Decatur, for appellee.
This is a divorce case.
Henry C. Pride (husband) and Janette L. Pride (wife) had been married approximately three years when the wife filed for divorce in March 1992. No children were born of the marriage. After no appearance was filed by the husband, a default judgment was entered in June. A timely motion was filed and the default judgment was set aside. Thereafter, in July, the husband filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the parties had reconciled after the commencement of the action. Following an August hearing, the trial court denied the husband's motion to dismiss and it scheduled a pendente lite hearing.
Following the husband's answer and other pleadings, the case was scheduled for pre-trial in March 1993 on motion of the wife. At a pre-trial conference, the husband's attorney filed a motion to withdraw. That motion was granted and the case was set for trial March 17. When the case was called for trial, the husband's request for a continuance to obtain legal representation was denied. Following ore tenus proceedings, the trial court divorced the parties and divided their property and obligations. The husband appeals.
On appeal, the husband asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based upon a reconciliation; that it abused its discretion in refusing his request for a continuance to obtain legal counsel; and that it grossly abused its discretion in the division of property.
At the outset, we note that in divorce cases where evidence has been presented ore tenus, the trial court's judgment is presumed correct and will not be set aside unless it is shown to be plainly and palpably wrong. Hall v. Hall, 598 So.2d 960 (Ala.Civ.App.1992).
The husband first contends that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the wife's complaint for divorce because subsequent to the filing of the complaint, the parties resumed living together as husband and wife. There was evidence that the wife resumed living with the husband from April following the filing of her complaint until the end of the following May, after which time the parties again separated. A reconciliation of the parties while a suit for divorce is pending will abrogate the cause of action, and the trial court usually must dismiss it. Rikard v. Rikard, 387 So.2d 842 (Ala.Civ.App.1980). Whether there has been a reconciliation, however, is a question of fact which the trial court must determine from all the evidence before it since "[r]econciliation is largely a state of the minds of both of the parties to be determined from all of the evidence and reasonable and proper inferences therefrom." Rikard at 846. The wife testified that she continued to live with the husband until the end of May "on terms of us trying to work out the marriage." We find no error in the determination by the trial court that there had been no reconciliation of the parties. " 'The intention of the parties must be to resume married life entirely, and not merely to enjoy each other's society temporarily, for limited purposes, or as a trial of whether they want to be reconciled.' " (Citation omitted.) Rikard at 844.
The next issue is whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant the husband's request for a continuance on the day of trial in order for him to obtain legal counsel. As a general rule, continuances are not favored, and the trial court's denial of a motion for continuance will not be reversed unless palpable error or abuse of discretion is shown. Barran v. Barran, 431 So.2d 1278 (Ala.Civ.App.1983). The record in this case indicates that the trial of this case was held approximately one year after the complaint was filed. Various pre-trial motions were filed and hearings were held. Although the husband contends that he was not at the pre-trial conference where his counsel was allowed to withdraw, nevertheless, there is evidence that the husband was aware of his counsel's intention to withdraw prior to the pre-trial conference. The husband also testified that he was present in the courthouse on the date of the pre-trial conference but did not attend. Additionally, the husband was aware of the trial date and he had two weeks to obtain other or different counsel prior to trial had he so chosen. On the day of trial when the husband requested a continuance, the trial court replied, viz:
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