Pridgen v. Boston Housing Authority
| Citation | 364 Mass. 696,308 N.E.2d 467 |
| Parties | , 70 A.L.R.3d 1106 Joseph PRIDGEN et al. v. BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY et al. |
| Decision Date | 05 March 1974 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Eugene F. Sullivan and Tanous J. Thomas, Boston (S. Roy Remar and Allan Robinson, Boston, with him), for plaintiffs.
Warren Delaney, Boston, for Boston Housing Authority.
William H. Clancy, Boston (Thomas D. Burns, Boston, with him), for Consolidated Elevator Co., Inc.
Charles J. O'Malley, Cohasset, for Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
Before TAURO, C.J., and REARDON, QUIRICO, BRAUCHER and HENNESSEY, JJ.
This is an action of tort in which Joseph Pridgen, a minor, seeks to recover from the Boston Housing Authority (the authority), the Consolidated Elevator Company (Consolidated) and the Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse) for personal injuries sustained by him while he was trapped in the elevator shaft of a building owned by the authority. His mother, Minnie Lee Pridgen, seeks to recover from the same three defendants for consequential damages. Each plaintiff alleges in a separate count that Joseph's injuries were caused (1) by the authority's negligence, (2) by the authority's wilful, wanton or reckless conduct, (3) by Consolidated's negligence, (4) by Consolidated's wilful, wanton or reckless conduct, and (5) by Westinghouse's negligence.
The case is before us on various exceptions of the plaintiffs, including principally their exceptions to several rulings and orders of the trial judge which resulted ultimately in the entry of verdicts for all defendants on all counts.
On the basis of substantially undisputed evidence, the accident in which the plaintiff Joseph Pridgen was injured may be described as follows. On June 28, 1966, Joseph was eleven years old and lived with his mother at 114 Heath Street, Jamaica Plain, in an apartment building which is part of the Bromley Health housing project owned by the authority. On the afternoon of that day he went to visit a friend who lived at 20 Bickford Street in another apartment building also owned by the authority and located in the same housing project. Joseph, his friend and one other boy entered the elevator in the Bickford Street building, climbed up through an escape hatch opening in the ceiling of the elevator car, and got onto the platform which formed the top or roof of the car. While they were on the car roof, Joseph's friend caused the car to move up and down by pressing a button located on the top of the car. At some point during this process Joseph slipped from the roof platform into the elevator shaft and was caught on metal brackets extending out from the shaft walls. He was trapped with his legs straddling the brackets and he was looking up toward the elevator. While he was in this position, the elevator moved down and struck him, crushing him and injuring him severely. An emergency call was made to the Boston Fire Department whose members arrived, turned off the electrical power to the elevator, removed Joseph from the elevator shaft and took him to the hospital.
Additional evidence bearing on the conduct of particular defendants will be discussed later in this opinion.
At the close of the evidence the judge directed verdicts for the defendants as follows: for Westinghouse on all counts against it (two counts alleging negligence), for Consolidated on all counts against it (two counts alleging negligence and two alleging wilful, wanton or reckless conduct) and for the authority on two counts against it (those alleging wilful, wanton or reckless conduct). By directing these verdicts the judge appears to have ruled that (a) if the plaintiffs were entitled to recover on proof of negligence alone, the evidence was insufficient to permit a finding of negligence on the part of Westinghouse or Consolidated, and (b) if, as a matter of law, Joseph and his two companions were trespassers when they went through the escape hatch in the ceiling of the elevator car and got on top of the car, at that point Consolidated and the authority owed Joseph the duty only to refrain from wilful, wanton or reckless conduct and the evidence was insufficient to permit a finding of such conduct on the part of either Consolidated or the authority. We conclude that the action of the judge in directing the verdicts for the defendants on these counts was not error.
The judge allowed the two counts alleging negligence on the part of the authority to go to the jury. However, by his instructions he limited the jury to the consideration and determination whether the authority was guilty of negligence by reason of anything which it or its agents, servants or employees did or failed to do after learning that Joseph had slipped off the roof of the elevator car and had become trapped in the elevator shaft. The jury apparently found that the authority was guilty of such negligence and they returned a verdict for Joseph in the amount of $175,000 and one for his mother in the amount of $25,000. The judge took the two verdicts under leave reserved (G.L. c. 231 § 120), and later, on motion of the authority, he ordered that they be set aside and that a verdict be entered for the authority on each of these two counts. We conclude that the action of the judge in setting aside the verdicts on these two counts was error. The reasons for our conclusions will be discussed spearately as to each defendant. In determining whether the judge correctly directed or entered verdicts for the several defendants, we must consider the evidence separately as to each defendant, in its light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Carr v. Arthur D. Little, Inc., 348 Mass. 469, 471, 204 N.E.2d 466 (1965); Randolph v. Five Guys From Boston, Inc., 354 Mass. 730, 731, 242 N.E.2d 402 (1968).
1. The Direction of Verdicts for Westinghouse. The plaintiffs argue that Westinghouse should have foreseen that children as well as adults would use the elevator in question and that it was negligent in the manufacture of the elevator with particular reference to the installation of the escape hatch in the ceiling and roof of the elevator car and the failure to provide adequate safety devices on the roof. We do not agree.
There was undisputed evidence which showed the following. Westinghouse designed, manufactured and installed the elevators in the Bromley Heath housing project, including the elevator in the Bickford Street building, according to specifications which were approved by the architect for the project. The elevators were installed in 1954, were accepted by the general contractor for the project and were last serviced by Westinghouse in January, 1955. There was an emergency operating or stop switch on the roof of the elevator in the Bickford Street building the day after Joseph Pridgen's accident, but no railing. A stop switch was called for in the elevator's design, and manufacturing specifications required such a switch, but they did not require a railing or other type of safety device on the roof. The specifications did provide for an emergency exit or 'escape hatch' in the ceiling of the elevator car, and required it to have a cover, but gave no details concerning the method of fastening such cover. The cover was missing the day after the accident. The Department of Public Safety elevator code regulations in effect on June 28, 1966, the day of the accident, required that 'top emergency exit' covers be removable from both inside and outside the elevator.
The design and manufacture of the elevator by Westinghouse complied with the architect's specifications and also with the Department of Public Safety's elevator regulations in effect at the time of the accident. The evidence would not warrant a jury in finding Westinghouse negligent. There was no error in the direction of the verdicts for Westinghouse.
2. The Direction of Verdicts for Consolidated. In 1964 Consolidated contracted with the authority to provide maintenance service for the twenty-one elevators in the Bromley Heath housing project until April, 1967. The contract provided that '(t)he work required to be performed . . . shall be done to and for each elevator and everything which was furnished with each of them except car enclosures (emphasis supplied) . . . provided, however, that . . . (Consolidated) shall not be required to: (1) repair, maintain, replace, or refinish car enclosures . . .' (emphasis in original). The contract defined the words 'car enclosure' to mean the elevator car and there appears to be no dispute that the car includes, as a part thereof, the escape hatch and hatch covers in the car roof. The contract thereafter provided that '(i)t shall be the duty of . . . (Consolidated) to arrange for all necessary replacements and to make all repairs that may develop irrespective of their nature or causes.'
The plaintiffs argue that the provision appearing later in the contract superseded the earlier provision excluding the 'car enclosure,' and that the contract as thus interpreted made Consolidated responsible for seeing to it that the escape hatch cover on the car was in place, and for replacing the cover if it was found missing. They then argue that since the cover was missing from the car where the plaintiff Joseph Pridgen was injured on the day of the accident, the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that Consolidated was liable to the plaintiffs. We do not agree.
The language of the contract is clear on the point that Consolidated was not responsible for the elevator cars or the escape hatch covers. The correct interpretation of the two quoted contract provisions is that the earlier definitional limitations and exclusions applied equally to the later provision relating to repairs and replacements.
We hold as a matter of law that Consolidated was not contractually responsible for the condition of the elevator car or 'car enclosure' involved in this case.
The plaintiffs...
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