Pries v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd.
| Decision Date | 03 August 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-3569,93-3569 |
| Parties | Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,980 Patricia A. PRIES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, LIMITED, and American Honda Motor Company, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Donald W. Rice, Matthew D. Soliday, Rice & Rice, Portage, IN, David Vandercoy (argued), Valparaiso University Law Clinic, Valparaiso, IN, for plaintiff-appellant.
Ariane Schallwig Johnson, Randall Riggs (argued), Locke, Reynolds, Boyd & Weisell, Indianapolis, IN, for defendants-appellees.
Before COFFEY, FLAUM, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
Patricia Pries lost control of her 1988 Honda CRX automobile, which rolled over. She was thrown clear of the car, broke her neck, and became a quadriplegic. Pries sued the car's manufacturer and distributor (collectively Honda) under the diversity jurisdiction, contending that the car was defective because the seat belt mechanism permitted the belt to become slack when the car rolled over. Indiana, whose law governs, permits owners of automobiles to recover when defective safety apparatus increases the injury suffered in a crash. Miller v. Todd, 551 N.E.2d 1139 (Ind.1990). See also ALI, Restatement of the Law--Torts: Products Liability Sec. 6 (Tent.Draft No. 1, 1994). The district court granted summary judgment for Honda in this diversity case, ruling that Pries had not been wearing a seat belt and therefore could not complain about the design of the seat belt mechanism.
During her deposition, Pries testified that, when asked at the scene whether she had been wearing a seat belt, she answered "no." This answer deserves commendation--the plaintiff provided strong evidence against herself even though none of the rescuers could remember asking that question of her. Having given an honest answer, Pries supplied a reason: "I told them no, because I didn't think I could have got out of the car if I had it on". Pries lacks an independent recollection whether she buckled her seat belt that day. There was another potent bit of evidence from the accident scene: a deputy sheriff testified that he observed the driver's seat belt retracted against the door pillar as if it had not been used. An emergency medical technician agreed that the seat belt was "just there hanging". This evidence led the district judge to conclude that Pries was not using her belt.
Against this evidence, Pries submits testimony that she habitually fastened her seat belt. See Fed.R.Evid. 406. Her children testified that she insisted that everyone in the car buckle up. Wear on the seat belt assembly suggests that the belt was used frequently. A physician testified that some of Pries' injuries were consistent with the kind of bruises caused by seat belts during rapid deceleration. The district court discounted this evidence: how can habit overcome the hard fact that the belt was found in a retracted position? That Pries used the seat belt 99% of the time does not prove that she fastened it on the day of the accident. Beliefs and memories cannot contradict physical facts, the judge believed. But the position of the seat belt when the car was found is not one of the laws of physics. We have two reports of observations about the condition of the belt, but these observations may be incorrect. The deputy sheriff and medical technician may have misunderstood (or misremembered) what they saw. Memories play tricks on the best observers.
The car itself may be the best witness about conditions at the time of the accident. Strong forces leave telltale signs in physical objects, signs that can be read by people who know what to look for and have the right instruments. Gerald Rosenbluth, a consultant in industrial design, testified by deposition that the seat belt bore signs of the stress that use during an accident would have produced:
As I recall, the pattern was indicative of the loading, of high frictional coefficient, and was consistent with the belt web fabric provided enough pressure, generating enough heat, to form the striated pattern in the D ring.... I construe these to be indicative and consistent with loading; therefore, I would concur that it was proof that [Pries] was wearing the seat belt at the time of this incident.
Later Rosenbluth testified that the striations in the belt are inconsistent with normal use. The district court did not mention this testimony, which is stronger "physical" evidence of seat belt use than the witnesses' observations are of non-use. It might be possible to reconcile the observations if the car had been in another accident, but there is no evidence of that. We conclude, therefore, that there is a bona fide factual dispute about whether Pries was wearing a seat belt when her car rolled over. Reasonable jurors could decide either way--which means that the jurors must choose, after trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment was improper.
The district court found otherwise in part because he believed that Pries should not be allowed to have things both ways. After conceding in her deposition that she did not fasten her seat belt, the judge believed, Pries should not be allowed to take it back. We have held that a conflict between a party's deposition and a later affidavit does not create a material dispute requiring a trial. E.g, Lovejoy Electronics, Inc. v. O'Berto, 873 F.2d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir.1989). A party may not wriggle out of a concession after its legal consequence becomes clear. But that is not what occurred here. Pries has said from the outset that she cannot remember whether she fastened her belt at the beginning of her fateful drive; she recounts that in a dazed state she told her rescuers that she was not belted only because she could not imagine how she could have been thrown from the car if she had worn one. Now she believes she knows how that could happen. New knowledge is a good reason for new views. Anyway, the principal evidence that Pries wore her seat belt is physical, and the striations in the webbing need not explain why they contradicted the driver's remarks.
Although Pries' principal theory was that she was belted at the time of the accident and slipped out when the seat belt apparatus allowed undue slack, she presents several other issues. Because these may come up again, we discuss them briefly.
1. An alternate theory of how Pries got out of her seat belt is that the latch opened during the accident. Rosenbluth testified that the latch was properly designed and functional. Anthony...
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