Priest v. State

Citation5 Ala.App. 171,59 So. 318
PartiesPRIEST v. STATE.
Decision Date19 June 1912
CourtAlabama Court of Appeals

Rehearing Denied July 11, 1912.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Barbour County; M. Sollie, Judge.

Will Priest was convicted of violating the prohibition laws, and he appeals. Affirmed.

A. H. Merrill & Son, of Eufaula, for appellant.

R. C. Brickell, Atty. Gen., and W. L. Martin Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

PELHAM J.

The defendant was convicted for violating the prohibition laws. The indictment charged that the defendant sold, offered for sale, kept for sale, or otherwise disposed of, spirituous vinous, or malt liquors. The proof was that eight casks of beer had been shipped by boat to the defendant from Florida and, while they were in the warehouse on the river at Eufaula, Ala., addressed or marked to "W. E. Priest Eufaula, Ala.," the defendant, Priest, sent a note, signed by him, to one Mercer, who ran a public dray line in Eufaula, directed to the wharfman, one Owens, instructing Owens to deliver to the bearer of the note the eight casks. This note was turned over by Mercer to one of his draymen, who went to the wharf and received the eight casks on the defendant's written order, loaded them on the dray, and, while on his way to a place, sometimes known and called the "Country Club," where he had been instructed to carry the casks, the drayman was intercepted by the city officers of Eufaula and the beer seized. The defendant was shown to be the owner of and to have had charge of the place called the "Country Club," and it was shown that the place was used as a pleasure resort. The casks of beer were seized by the officers on the road to the Country Club, about 150 yards from the defendant's house. The eight casks contained 960 bottles.

The principal contention made by the defendant's counsel is that there is not sufficient proof to show that the defendant kept for sale the prohibited beverage, as charged in the indictment. The first proposition advanced by counsel in brief is that the prohibition laws passed at the special session of the Legislature of 1909, and commonly called the Carmichael Bill (Acts 1909, p.

8) and the Fuller Bill (Acts 1909, p. 63), should be construed strictly against the state and in favor of the defendant. These laws are companion acts, and must be construed in connection. Grace v. State, 1 Ala. App. 211, 56 So. 25. And it is specifically provided that they "shall be liberally construed so as to accomplish the purposes thereof, which is to promote temperance and reduce and discourage the use and consumption of the said prohibited liquors and beverages." Acts 1909, p. 12, § 7.

It cannot be doubted but that the delivery of the casks of beer to the drayman on the defendant's order was the same, in legal effect, as a delivery to the defendant. At the time of the seizure, then, the beer was in the possession of the defendant. The delivery of the casks by the defendant in a resort known as the "Country Club" was prevented by the action of officers of the law against the will of the defendant; and, construing the prohibition laws liberally, as we are required to do, the defendant's intention of delivering the prohibited beverage in a place where the laws make such delivery prima facie evidence of sale or other unlawful disposition (Acts 1909, p. 64, § 5) is shown; and this, even if not to be considered as being taken as prima facie evidence of a sale or other unlawful disposition because the casks were not actually delivered to the resort, could be looked to as a circumstance in determining whether the defendant had the prohibited beverage in possession for sale. There can be no distinction, under a fair and reasonable construction of the prohibition statutes, as the terms are there used, between having in possession for sale and keeping for sale. In section 3 of the Carmichael Bill (Acts 1909, p. 9), it is manifest that " keep or have in possession for sale" is used as meaning the same thing. If one has a possession of the prohibited liquors for the purposes of sale, he is keeping for sale such liquors in the clear intent and meaning of these statutes; and the fine distinctions drawn by dictionaries between the meaning of the words "to have" and "to keep," with reference to the use of these...

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15 cases
  • State v. K.E.L.
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • July 10, 2020
    ...be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intent of the legislature. Walton v. State, 62 Ala. 197 [(1878)] ; Priest v. State, 5 Ala. App. 171, 59 So. 318 [(1912)]. A literal interpretation which would defeat the purpose of a statute will not be adopted, if any other reasonable const......
  • Palmer v. State, 5 Div. 262
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • March 18, 1975
    ...laws are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intent of the legislature. Walton v. State, 62 Ala. 197; Preist v. State, 5 Ala.App. 171, 59 So. 318. A literal interpretation which would defeat the purpose of a statute will not be adopted, if any other reasonable construct......
  • Martin v. Watts
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • April 10, 1987
    ...bills were 'companion laws ... to be construed together.' Grace v. State, 1 Ala.App. 211, 56 So. 25, 26 (1911); Priest v. State, 5 Ala.App. 171, 59 So. 318, 319 (1912). Consequently, the express provision of the Carmichael Act stating that it did not apply to 'the social serving of ... liqu......
  • Rhodes v. McWilson
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Appeals
    • November 20, 1917
    ...... the rulings of the court on the demurrers to these pleas. seriously. The case of Childers v. State, 156 Ala. 96, 47 So. 70, was a prosecution for an assault and battery,. and the only question decided in that case was: First, that. the ......
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