Priester v. Vaughn

• Decision Date: 19 August 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-2956.,03-2956.
• Citation: 382 F.3d 394
• Parties: Barry PRIESTER, Appellant v. Donald T. VAUGHN; The District Attorney of the County of Philadelphia; The Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

382 F.3d 394

Barry PRIESTER, Appellant v. Donald T. VAUGHN; The District Attorney of the County of Philadelphia; The Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania.

No. 03-2956.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued May 4, 2004.

Filed August 19, 2004.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Stewart Dalzell, J Johanna E. Markind (Argued), Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.

Thomas W. Dolgenos (Argued), Chief, Federal Litigation, Ronald Eisenberg, Deputy District Attorney, Law Division, Arnold H. Gordon, First Assistant District Attorney, Lynne Abraham, District Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellees.

Before SLOVITER, FUENTES and BECKER, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

This appeal arises from appellant Barry Priester's 1991 state conviction of first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of crime. Priester appeals the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over Priester's habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 19, 1990, Priester and Nathaniel Butler met Tracey Postell at the corner of 8th and Louden Streets in Philadelphia. Priester told Postell that he was meeting a group of people to confront the individuals who had "rolled" Darius Barnes — a mutual friend. Postell agreed to accompany Priester and Butler to locate these individuals. Priester drove one car while Barnes drove another. Two or three other cars containing additional gang members joined the caravan. According to Postell's trial testimony, at one point along the way Priester pulled alongside Barnes' car and said, "[w]hen we get up there, no questions asked, start busting." Trial Tr. at 190 (Sept. 13, 1991).

The cars arrived at the Belfield Recreational Center in North Philadelphia and Barnes began searching the playground for their targets. Once Barnes identified the individuals who "rolled" him, Priester removed a gun from his jacket and handed it to Butler. Butler fired several shots into the crowd. Shots were also fired from the other vehicles. Soon after the shooting, Priester and the others drove away from the scene. As a result of the shooting, Terrence Lucan died, and Ronald Holliman and Walter Jefferson sustained significant injures.

On June 7, 1990, Philadelphia Homicide Detective Frank McGouirk questioned Postell about the shooting. At that time, Postell, who subsequently pled guilty in a negotiated plea, detailed the factual scenario surrounding the shooting as well as Priester's and Butler's involvement. Butler was then arrested and questioned. He stated that Priester was in the car with him and Postell, and that Butler shot twice into the crowd with a .38 caliber pistol.

After further investigation, Priester and Butler were indicted on first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy and possession of an instrument of crime. They were tried together in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas before a jury. During testimony at trial, Postell attempted to recant the story he told the police and stated that he had lied to the police and was asleep in the car when the incident occurred. Having been forewarned by defense counsel about this change, the prosecution sought the trial court's approval to admit Butler's previous statement, which the trial court granted subject to redaction. Thereafter, a redacted version of the prior statement made by Butler, describing the incident, was introduced at trial. This redacted statement replaced Priester's name, and all other names, with phrases such as "the other guy." App. at 91-97. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Priester as well as Butler on all counts. At the sentencing phase, the jury returned a sentence of life imprisonment for each defendant on the murder convictions and the court imposed sentences on the remaining counts, to run concurrently for both defendants.

After the trial court denied post-verdict motions, Priester appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, contending that the Commonwealth breached its agreement not to introduce Butler's prior statement and challenging the sufficiency of the redaction, the admission of Postell's earlier statement as substantive evidence, and the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of first degree murder. The court rejected these claims. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur. Commonwealth v. Priester, 535 Pa. 656, 634 A.2d 220 (1993). Priester then filed a petition for collateral review under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 9541 et seq. (2003) ("PCRA"), which was denied by both the trial court and the Superior Court.

Priester next petitioned for allocatur in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on three issues. He argued that Butler's statement was insufficiently redacted in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); that the trial court erred because it admitted Postell's prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence; and that the jury instructions regarding accomplice liability were deficient. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur.

Thereafter, Priester filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court, which was amended after the appointment of new counsel. The matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who issued an opinion recommending that Priester's claims be denied. The District Court approved and adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, but certified for appeal two of the many claims raised by Priester: the claim that the admission of Butler's redacted statement violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and the claim that trial counsel was ineffective because of his failure to object to the jury instruction on accomplice liability.¹ We now consider these issues on appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

At the outset, we set forth our standard of review. Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"):

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim — (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States....

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added).

Priester argues that because the Pennsylvania Superior Court cited only Pennsylvania law with no reference to federal law, we need not apply AEDPA's deferential standard of review. In granting a certificate of appealability, the District Court stated it believed that the deferential standard was applicable, but cited in a footnote this court's opinion in Everett v. Beard, 290 F.3d 500 (3d Cir.2002), which held otherwise. We need not dwell on this issue² because subsequent opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States have made clear that as long as the reasoning of the state court does not contradict relevant Supreme Court precedent, AEDPA's general rule of deference applies. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002). In Early, the Supreme Court held that qualification for AEDPA deference "does not require citation of our cases — indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court decision contradicts them." Early, 537 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. 362 (emphasis in original). Similarly, in Woodford, the Supreme Court held that the California Supreme Court's "shorthand reference" to the ineffective assistance of counsel standard, while imprecise, did not render the decision unworthy of deference. Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24, 123 S.Ct. 357; see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (applying the deferential AEDPA standard of review where the state court had relied only on its own precedent to reject the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel allegation); Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying AEDPA deference to Pennsylvania court's determination of petitioner's allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel despite the court's failure to expressly cite to the Strickland standard).

Accordingly, we hold that the deferential standard of AEDPA applies even if the state court does not cite to any federal law as long as the state court decision is consistent with federal law.

B. Bruton Issue

In order to protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and cross-examination, trial courts that admitted statements of non-testifying co-defendants would routinely instruct jurors that the statements were not to be considered evidence against the defendant at trial. In Bruton, the Supreme Court recognized the inadequacy of such instructions, stating that "there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great ... that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored." Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620.

The Court held that "because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining petitioner's guilt, admission of [the co-defendant's] confession in this joint trial violated petitioner's right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 126, 88 S.Ct. 1620. The Court...