Prieto v. Quarterman

Citation456 F.3d 511
Decision Date18 July 2006
Docket NumberNo. 05-70035.,05-70035.
PartiesArnold PRIETO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and WIENER and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner-Appellant Arnold Prieto appeals the district court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. For the following reasons, we reverse the district court's ruling that Prieto's petition was untimely, as well as the district court's sua sponte application of the procedural-default rule to Prieto's jury-misconduct claim. We therefore remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS

Prieto was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in March 1995. He appealed both his conviction and sentence, and on December 16, 1998, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both. Prieto declined to seek review from the United States Supreme Court, and his conviction and sentence became final ninety days later, on March 17, 1999.1

Prieto filed an application for state post-conviction relief on October 8, 1999, asserting 66 grounds for relief. In July 2001, the state court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that Prieto's application be denied. On November 28, 2001, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Prieto's petition.

Prieto then sought habeas corpus relief in federal court. The district court issued an order appointing counsel for Prieto and setting filing deadlines. Under the court's scheduling order, Prieto's habeas petition was due by May 3, 2002. On April 16 Prieto moved for, and the district court granted, an extension of time to file his habeas petition. Under the district court's order, Prieto's petition was due by September 6, 2002. On August 2, 2002, more than a month before that deadline, Prieto filed his habeas petition. The State responded with a motion to dismiss on the ground that Prieto's petition was untimely because he filed it after the applicable limitations period expired.

Following extensive additional briefing, the district court dismissed Prieto's habeas petition as untimely. Ruling in the alternative, the district court dismissed Prieto's petition on various substantive grounds. The court then granted Prieto a certificate of appealability ("COA") on two issues: First, whether the court erred in dismissing Prieto's petition as untimely; and second, whether Prieto procedurally defaulted on his claim of jury misconduct. The district court denied Prieto's COAs on his other claims, and we affirmed the district court's decision to deny those COAs in an unpublished opinion.

II. TIMELINESS
A. Statutory Tolling

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") provides a one-year limitations period for the filing of a federal petition for post-conviction relief.2 Specifically, a petitioner must file his petition within one year from the date that his conviction becomes final. The one-year statute of limitations, however, is not absolute. AEDPA provides that the limitations period is tolled while a properly-filed application for state post-conviction relief is pending.3 We review a district court's decision on statutory tolling de novo.4

As noted, Prieto's conviction and sentence became final on March 17, 1999. Prieto filed his state habeas petition 215 days later, thus tolling the AEDPA limitations period. This tolling ceased on November 28, 2001, when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his application. At that time, Prieto had 150 days remaining in which to file his federal habeas petition. Therefore, to be timely, Prieto had until approximately the end of April 2002 to file for federal post-conviction relief. Instead, Prieto filed his habeas petition almost 100 days late, on August 2, 2002. The district court's well-reasoned opinion addresses and properly rejects Prieto's claims that he is entitled to additional statutory tolling. Accordingly, we adopt the district court's opinion with respect to statutory tolling.

B. Equitable Tolling

In addition to statutory tolling, we have recognized that the AEDPA limitations period is subject to equitable tolling in "rare and exceptional circumstances."5 We review a district court's decision on equitable tolling for abuse of discretion, remaining ever mindful, however, that "[w]e must be cautious not to apply the statute of limitations too harshly."6 Dismissing a habeas petition is a "particularly serious matter."7 This is why we look to the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in declining to apply equitable tolling.8

Although Prieto is not entitled to additional statutory tolling, we conclude that his circumstances are sufficiently rare and exceptional to warrant equitable tolling. In mid-April 2002, Prieto filed a motion in the district court for an extension of time to file his petition at a later date. The district court granted Prieto's motion, stating "[b]efore the Court is Petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to [File] Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Court finds that the motion is meritorious and it is GRANTED. Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus shall be filed no later than September 6, 2002." Under this order, Prieto's petition appears to have been due long after his time to file expired under AEDPA. Although AEDPA applied to Prieto's application, the district court's order granting him additional time for the express purpose of filing his petition at a later date was crucially misleading. Prieto relied on the district court's order in good faith and to his detriment when he filed his petition. As Prieto submitted his petition within the time expressly allowed him by the district court, he is entitled to equitable tolling.

This case is an almost perfect analog to Davis v. Johnson.9 Like Prieto, the petitioner in Davis was sentenced to death and, like Prieto, moved for and was granted extensions of time that set the deadline for filing his habeas petition beyond the AEDPA limitations period.10 We recognized that a district court's grant of motions for extensions of time beyond AEDPA's limitations period is likely a "rare and exceptional circumstance[ ]" that justifies equitable tolling.11 We therefore assumed without deciding that the district court erred in declining to grant equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations period.12 A decision directly on the merits of the issue was unnecessary because we then determined that Davis was not entitled to a COA on any of his substantive claims.

On the facts of this case, Prieto is even more deserving of equitable tolling than was Davis. Prieto was much more diligent in securing his extension of time. Specifically, Prieto requested and received his extension of time before the deadline to file his habeas petition passed. In contrast, Davis failed to move for an extension of time until more than seven months after his petition was due.13

In United States v. Patterson, we equitably tolled the limitations period for a petitioner because he, too, relied on the actions of the district court when he filed his habeas petition after the AEDPA limitations period had expired.14 Specifically, Patterson had moved the district court to dismiss his then-pending petition so that he could obtain professional legal aid and re-submit his case to the court.15 Ironically, the day that the court granted Patterson's motion to dismiss was the final day of the AEDPA limitations period; after that date, any future filings were untimely.16 As Patterson "relied to his detriment on the district court's granting of his [motion to dismiss]" we were "persuaded that these circumstances are sufficiently rare and extraordinary to warrant equitable tolling."17

The government's only response to Prieto's contention that he is entitled to equitable tolling on these facts is its discussion of Fierro v. Cockrell.18 In Fierro, the district court issued a scheduling order at the government's request, and the order set the deadline for Fierro's habeas petition outside the AEDPA limitations period.19 Thus, Fierro argued that the scheduling order induced him to file late.20 The scheduling order, however, was issued three weeks after the AEDPA limitations period expired.21 Accordingly, we declined to apply equitable tolling because "the state's request and the district court's order could not have contributed to Fierro's failure to comply with the one-year statute of limitations."22

The likelihood that a district court's order will actually mislead a petitioner into believing that his petition is due beyond the AEDPA limitations period is the critical distinction between Fierro and Patterson. There was evidence in Patterson that the district court's order led the petitioner to believe that the court would entertain his petition at a later date, i.e., a date that was necessarily beyond AEDPA's limitations period. This is why, in Fierro, we recognized the propriety of granting equitable tolling when "the prisoner relied to his detriment on the district court's decision to dismiss for the express purpose of allowing later refiling."23 In contrast, there was no possibility that the Fierro court's scheduling order contributed to the petitioner's tardiness because that order was issued after the AEDPA deadline had already expired.

Like Patterson, Prieto relied to his detriment on the district court's order issued for the express purpose of granting him additional time to file his writ of habeas corpus. Significantly, as quoted above, the district court's order granting Prieto's motion stated: "Before the Court is Petitioner's Motion for...

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