Prillaman v. Com.
| Decision Date | 14 October 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 4718,4718 |
| Citation | 199 Va. 401,100 S.E.2d 4 |
| Parties | TILLMAN LAUREAN PRILLAMAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. Record |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
John D. Epperly and W. R. Broaddus, III (Broaddus, Epperly & Broaddus, on brief), for the plaintiff in error.
D. Gardiner Tyler, Assistant Attorney General (J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General, on brief), for the Commonwealth.
Tillman Laurean Prillaman was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle in the County of Henry after his operator's license had been suspended in violation of § 46.347.2, Code 1950, as amended. The jury fixed his punishment at a fine of $200 and confinement in jail for a period of ninety days. The trial court overruled Prillaman's motion to set aside the verdict and entered final judgment thereon. We granted accused an appeal.
On September 1, 1953 the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles entered an order, effective September 15, 1953, suspending appellant's driving license. The validity of the order of suspension is not questioned and it was outstanding and effective on June 8, 1956, the date on which he was admittedly operating his wife's automobile.
On that night at approximately 10 P.M., four state troopers were assembled at Master Forks Service Station, owned and operated by Basil Setliff, at Bassett Forks in Henry County. The lot upon which the service station is located is 'V' shaped and is bounded on one side by Route 220 and on the other by Route 57. The officers testified that they first observed appellant's vehicle on the lot approximately 20 feet off Route 220 headed south and that he proceeded a distance of about 50 feet, parked the car in front of the service station building and entered it. At no time was appellant seen driving by the officers or any one else other than on the service station property.
Appellant stated that his wife had driven the automobile to the station that afternoon and he was to come by later and have the spare tire 'fixed'. He further testified that a boy named Rakes drove him to the station and he moved the car from the rear of the station to the front to have the tire repaired; that before driving the automobile he saw the officers standing in front of the station, and that he knew his operator's license had been suspended, but did not think he was prohibited from driving on private property.
Setliff related that the Prillaman car had been parked in the rear of his establishment 'for quite a while' before he saw appellant drive it to the front of the station.
The ultimate and controlling question to be decided is whether appellant, whose operator's license had been suspended, violated § 46-347.2, Code 1950 as amended, when he drove a motor vehicle on the private property of Master Forks Service Station.
Section 46-347.2 provides:
In order to determine the applicability of § 46-347.2, supra, to the facts in the case at bar, it is necessary to consider whether the provision therein 'drive any motor vehicle in this State' was intended by the General Assembly to be limited to driving on any 'highway' as defined in § 46-1(8), Code 1950. If this limitation was the intent of the General Assembly, then it must be decided whether a privately owned lot used in the conduct of a service station business is a 'highway' within the meaning of § 46-1(8).
An 'operator' is defined in § 46-343(3), Code 1950, as 'Every person, other than a chauffeur, in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on a highway.'
The requirement of a license to operate a motor vehicle is provided for under § 46-347, Code 1950, and reads as follows:
'No person, except those expressly exempted in §§ 46-348 to 46-352, shall drive any motor vehicle on any highway in this State until such person shall have made application for an operator's or chauffeur's license, as hereinafter provided, and satisfactorily passed the examination required by § 46-365 and obtained either an operator's or chauffeur's license, unless such person shall have been issued an operator's or chauffeur's license prior to June nineteenth, nineteen hundred and forty-six that is renewable in the discretion of the Division.'
The 1952 General Assembly repealed § 46-211, which was in Chapter 4 under Regulation of Traffic. This section specified the penalty for a person operating any motor vehicle upon any highway in this State while his license is suspended or he is forbidden to drive. At the same session of the General Assembly §§ 46-347.1 and 46-347.2 were enacted in lieu of § 46-211 and were placed in Chapter 5 under the appropriate heading, Operators' and Chauffeurs' License Act, following § 46-347, supra.
Section 46-347.1 provides as follows:
Section 46-211, which was repealed, follows:
'If any person shall drive any vehicle upon any highway while his license is so suspended or while so forbidden to drive or operate a motor vehicle in this State, he shall be punished by imprisonment in jail for a period not less than two days nor more than six months and there may be imposed in addition thereto a fine of not more than five hundred dollars.'
Appellant contends that even though the phrase 'public highway' is not mentioned in § 46-347.2, it is evident from the basic requirement contained in § 46-347 that a person obtain an operator's license to drive a motor vehicle 'on any highway in this State' and from other parts of the Act, that the forbidden operation is upon the public highways in this State.
On the other hand the Commonwealth argues that when the General Assembly enacted §§ 46-347.1 and 46-347.2, it intended to put teeth in the law and deprive the operator whose license had been suspended or revoked of the right to drive any motor vehicle anywhere in this State, whether it be on or off a highway. It is further argued that if this were not true, there would have been no useful purpose in enacting these new sections since § 46-211, which was repealed, had a provision which already prohibited a person whose license was suspended from driving on any 'highway'.
Section 46-1(27), Code 1950, defines 'vehicle' as 'Every device in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.'
The definition of 'Motor vehicles' is set forth in § 46-1(13), Code 1950, which provides as follows: 'Every vehicle as herein defined which is self-propelled or designed for self-propulsion.'
It will be observed that by repealing § 46-211 and adding §§ 46-347.1 and 46-347.2, the General Assembly made a distinction between the punishment for driving before the suspension or revocation period has expired and the punishment for driving after the suspension or revocation period has terminated but before the license has been reinstated or a new license issued. In the former case (§ 46-347.1) a violation carries a penalty for the first offense of confinement in jail not less than ten days nor more than six months, and for the second or subsequent offense confinement in jail not less than two months nor more than one year, and may in addition thereto be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars. In the latter case (§ 46-347.2), a violation is a misdemeanor and the punishment, as fixed by § 46-385, is by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six months in jail, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Thus we see the minimum sentence for driving before the suspension or revocation period has expired was increased for the first offense and provision made for a greater penalty for a second or subsequent violation.
The general rule is that statutes may be considered as in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, the same class of persons or things or to the same subject or to closely connected subjects or objects. Statutes which have the same general or common purpose or are parts of the same general plan are also ordinarily...
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