Prince George's County v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, MARYLAND-NATIONAL

• Decision Date: 05 June 1973
• Docket Number: No. 269,MARYLAND-NATIONAL,269
• Citation: 306 A.2d 223,269 Md. 202
• Parties: PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, Maryland v.CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 202

269 Md. 202

306 A.2d 223

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, Maryland v. MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION.

No. 269.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 5, 1973.

James F. Sharkey, Associate County Atty. (Walter H. Maloney, Jr., County Atty., Upper Marlboro, on the brief), for appellant.

Sanford E. Wool, Deputy Gen. Counsel and Harry W. Lerch, Silver Spring (Robert H. Levan, Gen. Counsel, Silver Spring, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and BARNES, SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES and LEVINE, JJ.

BARNES, Judge.

In this appeal from a declaratory decree of October 2, 1972, of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, in Equity, (Bowen, J.)-filed October 3, 1972-three determinative questions are presented to us for decision, i. e., did the chancellor err (I) in holding that the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, appellee (the Commission), had standing to sue; (II) in holding that there was a justiciable issue ripe for a declaratory decree; and, (III) in holding that Chapter 780 of the Laws of Maryland of 1959, as amended (the Regional District Act), was a public general law rather than a public local law, and thus not subject to amendment nor to be superseded in part by the Prince George's County Charter.

The Commission filed its suit against the appellant, Prince George's County, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County on May 5, 1971, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The chancellor on June 7, 1971, after a hearing, issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the County from interfering with the activities of the Commission, protecting the Commission's budget and tax revenues and maintaining the status quo of the parties, pending the final determination of the issues and controversies involved in the litigation. Trial was held by the chancellor on March 27, 1972. The chancellor, after finding that the Commission had standing and that justiciable issues were presented ripe for controversy, passed a final decree, dated October 2, 1972, in which he held the Regional District Act to be a public general law and made a number of declarations. The full next of the final decree is set out in an Appendix filed with this opinion. From this final decree, the County perfected a timely appeal to this Court.

The General Assembly originally created the Commission by Chapter 448 of the Laws of 1927 (Chapter 448). By this extensive statute, the Commission administered certain park development, planning and zoning functions within those portions of Prince George's and Montgomery Counties adjoining the District of Columbia. Designated as the Maryland-Washington Metropolitan District (Metropolitan District), this original area was roughly located between the District of Columbia and what is now the Capital Beltway. The Commission was given the power to sue and be sued, issue bonds, implement land use and subdivision regulations and generally effectuate the purpose of Chapter 448 which was the 'co-ordinated, comprehensive, adjusted, systematic and harmonious development of the (Metropolitan) District.' Exclusive power over planning and zoning was vested in the Commission and the Boards of County Commissioners of the two counties.

Chapter 714 of the Laws of 1939 created the Maryland-Washington Regional District (Regional District) under the jurisdiction of the Commission. The Regional District included basically the Metropolitan District with some additions. Under this Chapter, the Commission's 'park and planning functions in the district were separated, and the Maryland-Washington Regional District . . . was created as the planning and zoning district.' Prince George's Co. v. Laurel, 262 Md. 171, 174, 277 A.2d 262, 264 (1971).

In 1943, the General Assembly by Chapter 992 repealed Chapter 714 and re-enacted it 'with amendments as a bi-county act applicable to the Maryland-Washington Regional District in Montgomery and Prince George's Counties and not as a public local law of either county . . ..' Likewise, in 1943, the General Assembly indicated its intent to clarify the status of the law pertaining to the Metropolitan District by enacting Chapter 1008 'as a single bi-county Act . . . and not as a public local law or laws of either county.'

In 1959, the General Assembly consolidated all of the provisions relating to the Commission by enacting Chapter 780 of the Laws of Maryland. It repealed certain sections of the Codes of Montgomery and Prince George's Counties pertaining to the Commission, repealed all earlier Chapters (discussed above) and enacted in lieu thereof a new subtitle 'Park and Planning Commission.' The law basically continued the Commission, expanded the areas under its jurisdiction and redesignated its functions under the subheadings 'Metropolitan District' and 'Regional District.' It is the Regional District Act which is in controversy here.

Under Chapter 780, the Commission was to consist of ten members-five from each county. Section 11 provides:

'The Commission has the right to exercise all powers and functions granted to it in this Article. It has the right to use a common seal, to sue and be sued, and to do any and all other corporate acts for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Article.' (Emphasis supplied)

In regard to budgetary matters, Section 16 provides:

'None of the provisions of any public general law governing the preparation and filing of budgets by agencies of the State of Maryland shall be applicable to the budgetary procedure of the Commission. The budget programs and procedures heretofore followed by the Commission are ratified and confirmed and approved for use by the Commission hereafter, together with such improvements therein as in the discretion of the Commission shall be deemed necessary or appropriate in the public interest. . . .'

Section 17 provides:

'The term 'municipal corporation' in Article 11E of the Constitution of Maryland does not embrace or include the Commission or the Maryland-Washington Metropolitan District or the Maryland-Washington Regional District. The Commission and the Metropolitan District and the Regional District cannot be classified in any group of municipal corporations as required by Article 11E, and Article 11E (has) no application to the Commission or to the Metropolitan District or to the Regional District.'

Section 56-99 pertain to the Regional District as originally created by Chapter 714 and continued by Chapter 992. The entire area of Montgomery County was placed within the Regional District, subject to certain provisions relating to municipalities. Section 57(E) included additional areas of Prince George's County within the District and provided in paragraph (4) that:

'No municipal corporation within the areas added . . . shall be authorized, by means of an amendment to its charter or otherwise to exercise any of the powers relating to planning, subdivision control and/or zoning now or hereafter granted by the said Maryland-Washington Regional District Act to the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission or the County Commissioners of Prince George's County. . . .'

A similar provision in Section 57(d)(3) applies to municipal corporations in Montgomery County.

I.

We are of the opinion that the chancellor correctly ruled that the Commission had standing to maintain the suit for declaratory relief. As we have already pointed out, Section 11 of Chapter 780 specifically granted the Commission the right to exercise all powers and functions granted to it by Chapter 780 and the right 'to sue and be sued, and to do any and all other corporate acts for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of' Chapter 780. (Emphasis supplied) The appropriateness of declaratory relief is indicated by the controversies between the Commission and the County which go to the heart of the ability of the Commission to carry out the provisions of Chapter 780.

In this regard, we consider our decision in Liss v. Goodman, 224 Md. 173, 167 A.2d 123 (1961), involving the dispute between the City Council of Baltimore City and the Board of Estimates of Baltimore in regard to certain budgetary matters, to be determinative. The Board of Estimates in Liss contended (as does the County in the present case) that there was no 'actual controversy' between the parties, no indication of 'imminent and inevitable litigation' and that the members of the City Council had no 'concrete interest' in the rights or privilege asserted by them, as required for declaratory relief under Code (1957) Art. 31A, § 6 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. In rejecting these contentions and in holding that declaratory relief was properly given, Judge Henderson, for the Court, aptly stated:

'This Court has stated that the declaratory procedure should not be used to decide purely theoretical questions or questions that may never arise. See Tanner v. McKeldin, 202 Md. 569, 97 A.2d 449, and Kirkwood v. Provident Savings Bank of Baltimore, 205 Md. 48, 106 A.2d 103. We have also stated that declarations should not be made where they would not serve a useful purpose or terminate a controversy. Cf. Staley v. State Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 189 Md. 447, 56 A.2d 144, and Commissioners of Cambridge v. Eastern, etc., Co., 192 Md. 333, 64 A.2d 151. We think the question here is not theoretical but practical. The Council has asserted a right to reject or return the ordinance when submitted. To do so in the closing days of the year without a prior adjudication might well cause an impasse and seriously affect the City's financial needs and obligations. It would seem to be peculiarly appropriate to have the issue resolved in advance. Other courts have indicated that declaratory relief is appropriate where public agencies are at loggerheads. See Marshall County Gas District v. City of Albertville, 263 Ala. 601, 83 So.2d 299; Personnel Board of Mobile County v. City of Mobile, 264 Ala. 56, 84 So.2d 365...