Prince v. Alabama

• Decision Date: 09 November 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15CV634-WKW
• Parties: WILLIE PRINCE, JR., Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF ALABAMA, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

WILLIE PRINCE, JR., Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF ALABAMA, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15CV634-WKW

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

November 9, 2015

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Willie Prince, Jr., proceeding pro se, brings this action against the State of Alabama seeking reparations for injuries allegedly arising from the enslavement of his ancestors. The presiding district judge has referred this matter to the undersigned magistrate judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, for all pretrial proceedings and entry of any orders or recommendations as may be appropriate. (Doc. # 2). This action is presently before the court on the motion to dismiss filed by the State of Alabama on October 9, 2015. (Doc. # 7). Upon consideration of the motion and plaintiff's response in opposition (Doc. # 10), the court concludes that the motion to dismiss is due to be granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a descendant of Alabama slaves, alleges that "[t]he state of Alabama, under the leadership of, Jefferson Davis, and the Confederacy, in the year of 1861, March, conspired to place [plaintiff's] ancestors under perpetual slavery[,]" and that the defendant is liable to him for any injury that it caused or sanctioned (Complaint, pp. 2, 3). He seeks compensation for the "work performed under forced, unlawful, servitude in the state of Alabama" by his ancestors, and for injury caused by the "unconstitutional names" - "such as Black, Negro, and Colored" - that were "purposely placed upon [his] ancestors to hide and change, the descent nature of who they were[,]" while they were "under the oppression of the Confederacy[.]" (Complaint, pp. 1-2). He further complains of "the attaching of Sir Names, of slave holders, upon [his] ancestors[,]" including his own surname of Prince, which was "passed down to [him] under the document titled 'Birth Certificate'" from his "second Grandfather, John Prince, born in 1875, ten years after the Emancipation Proclamation, by the State of Alabama." (Id., p. 2). Plaintiff alleges that slave holders, and the Confederacy, promoted their own prosperity at the expense of his ancestors. (Id.). Plaintiff seeks a judgment against the State of Alabama awarding him fifty million dollars in damages, twenty-five thousand acres of land, and enjoining the State of Alabama (and the United States) to recognize his "true identity."

DISCUSSION

In its motion to dismiss, the State of Alabama does not specifically analyze - or even refer to - any of plaintiff's allegations. (See Doc. # 7). Instead, it contends, in general terms, that (1) plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (id., ¶ 1); (2) this court lacks jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's claims (id., ¶ 2); (3) the State of Alabama enjoys absolute, sovereign immunity under the Alabama constitution "regarding the state court causes of action" (id., ¶¶ 3-16); and (4) it "is entitled to immunity for any federalclaims alleged and this Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims" under the Eleventh Amendment (id, ¶¶ 17-18). Defendant seeks dismissal of plaintiff's complaint "with prejudice." (Id., p. 5).¹

Article III Jurisdiction

Defendant contends that "[t]his court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Plaintiff's claims." (Complaint, ¶ 2). It raises no express contention regarding this court's Article III jurisdiction but, instead, argues only that its sovereign immunity under the state constitution deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction (id., ¶¶ 9, 16), as does the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (id., ¶¶ 17-18). Before the court may reach defendant's immunity contentions, it must be satisfied that plaintiff's complaint presents a "case or controversy" that Article III empowers this court to decide. See Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745 (1998) ("We granted certiorari on both the Eleventh Amendment and the First Amendment issues, but in keeping with our precedents, have decided that we must first address whether this action for a declaratory judgment is the sort of 'Article III' 'case or controversy' to which federal courts are limited.") (citations omitted); id. at 745 n. 2 ("While the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a limitation on the federal court's judicialpower, and therefore can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, we have recognized that it is not coextensive with the limitations on judicial power in Article III."). In view of the independent obligation to assess its own jurisdiction, the court addresses whether the plaintiff has standing to prosecute his claims - an issue clearly presented by his allegations and demands for relief - even in the absence of argument on this threshold issue from the defendant. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011) ("Under [our adversarial] system, courts are generally limited to addressing the claims and arguments advanced by the parties. Courts do not usually raise claims or arguments on their own. But federal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press.") (citations omitted); See Bischoff v. Osceola County, Florida, 222 F.3d 874, 877-82 (11th Cir. 2000)("As the Supreme Court made clear in United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995), '[t]he question of standing is not subject to waiver ... . "The federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction, and standing is perhaps the most important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines."'").²

Plaintiff's allegations of fact - accepted as true, and construed liberally³ and in thelight most favorable to the plaintiff - do not demonstrate that plaintiff has standing to pursue all of his claims for relief.⁴

It is by now well settled that "the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact' - an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of ... . Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision."

United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995)(citations omitted).⁵ In short, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).

To the extent that plaintiff seeks relief for the "inferior names of Negro, Black, Colored, and the Sir names ... abuses, and mistreatments that were put upon [his] ancestors by the state of Alabama" (Complaint, p. 3) (emphasis added), including the fact that they were never "compensated for the work performed under forced, unlawful, servitude in the state of Alabama" (id., p. 2), plaintiff's allegations fail to demonstrate that he has sufferedan injury in fact as required for purposes of constitutional standing. With the sole exception of his own surname - which plaintiff alleges to be objectionable as that of a former slaveholder, "attach[ed] ... upon [his] ancestors" and "passed down to [plaintiff]" by the State of Alabama by way of his birth certificate - plaintiff does not allege facts suggesting he has himself suffered an injury as a result of the wrongs committed against his ancestors a century and a half ago, "[w]hile under the oppression of the Confederacy[.]" (Complaint, p. 2). See In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 471 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir. 2006) ("[T]here is a fatal disconnect between the victims and the plaintiffs. When a person is wronged he can seek redress, and if he wins, his descendants may benefit, but the wrong to the ancestor is not a wrong to the descendants."); id. at 760 ("[H]ow could the wages that the ancestor would have earned as a free laborer be shown to have influenced the wealth of his remote descendant? Economists actually study such issues ..., but these are studies of aggregate effects, not of the effects of particular acts, affecting particular individuals, on the wealth of specific remote descendants. There is no way to determine that a given black American today is worse off by a specific, calculatable sum of money (or monetized emotional harm) as a result of the conduct of one or more of the defendants.")(citations omitted); In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 304 F. Supp.2d 1027 , 1048 (N.D. Ill. 2004) ("[P]laintiffs' claim to the economic wealth of their ancestors' labor is conjectural. While most would like to assume that they will be the beneficiaries of their ancestors' wealth upon their demise, this is a mere assumption. Plaintiffs can only speculatethat their ancestors' estates would have been passed on to them, and cannot say that they would have inherited their ancestors' lost pay. This is insufficient to show a personal injury to Plaintiffs."); Hamilton v. United States, 2012 WL 760691, * 6 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2012) ("[P]laintiff's injuries are sheer conjecture and he wholly fails to connect any personal injury he has suffered at the hands of the defendants. ... Plaintiff seeks relief based on the alleged effects of enslavement, segregation and discrimination over history. Even taking all of Hamilton's statements as true, the direct victims of slavery and segregation are his ancestors, not himself."), Report and Recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 760877 (Mar. 8, 2012).

In his response in opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff argues that "the State of Alabama imposed injuries," and that "these injuries are open and active as they have been passed from my second grandfather to me." (Doc. # 10, ...