Prince v. Crow
Decision Date | 09 August 1991 |
Citation | 589 So.2d 161 |
Parties | Robert E. PRINCE and Carolinda L. Prince v. Margaret I. CROW and Betty P. Kamphius, as co-executrixes of the Estate of Helen Warder, deceased. 1900621. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
John W. Parker and L. Bratton Rainey III, Mobile, for appellants.
Charles S. Willoughby of McFadden, Lyon, Willoughby & Rouse, Mobile, for appellees.
The plaintiffs, Robert E. Prince and his wife Carolinda L. Prince, appeal from a summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Margaret I. Crow and Betty P. Kamphius, as executrixes of the estate of Helen Warder.
In January 1982, Helen Warder conveyed, by a vendor's lien deed, a large tract of land to Gary L. Breen. Breen subdivided the land into smaller parcels. In March 1982, one of the smaller parcels was conveyed to the Princes. The deed from Breen recited that the conveyance was subject to the "[v]endor's lien granted in deed from Helen S. [Warder] to the Grantor [Breen], ... which Grantor hereby agrees to pay as the installments thereon fall due." In April 1982, Breen conveyed the remainder of the property to Dorothy Caron; Caron assumed the Warder vendor's lien and was assigned Breen's vendor's lien from the Princes.
The Princes purchased another parcel from Caron in September 1982. After Caron's death in February 1987, the Princes purchased two more parcels from her estate, one in June 1987 and another in June 1988. All deeds from Caron and, later, her estate recited that the conveyance was subject to the Warder vendor's lien. In January 1988, the Caron estate defaulted on the Warder vendor's lien, and the Warder estate foreclosed on its lien in December 1988.
The Princes sued Crow and Kamphius, as executrixes of the estate of Helen Warder, seeking to impose an equitable lien against the property for improvements alleged to have been made before foreclosure. 1 The Warder estate filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted, and a summary judgment was entered in favor of Crow and Kamphius as executrixes of the estate of Helen Warder. The Princes appealed to this Court.
A party is entitled to a summary judgment upon a showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, A.R.Civ.P. In reviewing a trial court's entry of a summary judgment, this Court will view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and will resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Fincher v. Robinson Brothers Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 583 So.2d 256 (Ala.1991). The movant must carry his burden by presenting "substantial evidence." " 'Substantial evidence' is 'evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.' " West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Robert E. Prince filed an affidavit that averred that he had made improvements in good faith. He stated that the improvements, which he valued at approximately $31,000, were made under the mistaken impression that payments were being made on the underlying indebtedness. He also alleged that the defendants had been aware of the purchase by the Princes of the several parcels and that the defendants had been aware of the improvements made by the Princes. Mr. Prince stated:
The issue in this case is whether the Princes, the purchasers of property that was subject to an underlying vendor's lien, can withstand a motion for summary judgment on a claim for an equitable lien on the property, when it is uncontroverted that the purchasers had knowledge of the underlying vendor's lien and that the estate of Helen Warder, the holder of the underlying vendor's lien, is alleged to have had knowledge that improvements were being made.
Vendor's liens are of three kinds: (1) a lien imposed by law in favor of a vendor who conveyed his property without taking a security interest for the payment of the purchase price; (2) a lien reserved by express contract, otherwise described as a "grantor's lien by express reservation"; and (3) "the so-called lien which a vendor has before conveyance and which consists of his retention of title as security for the performance of the contract by the vendee." Wingard v. Randall, 269 Ala. 420, 425, 113 So.2d 674, 677-78 (1959). The Warder vendor's lien was expressly reserved in the deed from Warder to Breen.
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Sims v. Moore, 288 Ala. 630, 637, 264 So.2d 484, 489 (1972). For purposes of this case, the Warder vendor's lien will be treated as if it were an existing mortgage at the time the Princes purchased their parcels from Breen and later Caron and the Caron estate.
The Princes sought an equitable lien for the value of improvements made to the ...
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