Prince v. Lockhart

• Citation: 971 F.2d 118
• Decision Date: 24 July 1992
• Docket Number: Nos. 92-1203,92-1287,s. 92-1203
• Parties: Carl Dwayne PRINCE, Appellee, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellant. Carl Dwayne PRINCE, Appellant, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 118

971 F.2d 118

Carl Dwayne PRINCE, Appellee, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction,

Appellant.

Carl Dwayne PRINCE, Appellant, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellee.

Nos. 92-1203, 92-1287.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted May 12, 1992.

Decided July 24, 1992.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied in No. 92-1203 Sept.

22, 1992.

Kelly Hook Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., argued, for appellant.

Gary Person Fort Smith, Ark., argued, for appellee.

Before JOHN R. GIBSON, MAGILL, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

The government appeals the district court's grant of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988), to Carl Dwayne Prince. Prince was convicted in state court of burglary of a pharmacy, Ark.Code Ann. § 5-39-201 (1987), and the underlying felony of theft of property. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-36-103 (1987). The district court granted the writ, finding that the trial court's refusal to allow Prince to introduce evidence of a previous acquittal rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Prince, on cross-appeal, argues that the introduction into evidence of pharmaceutical drugs from his previous possession trial constituted double jeopardy and the government was collaterally estopped from introducing it. ¹ After careful review of the record, particularly the transcripts of the two trials at issue, we reverse the district court's grant of the writ on due process grounds and affirm the district court's denial of the writ on Prince's double jeopardy and collateral estoppel grounds.

I.

On February 7, 1989, a burglary occurred at Medi-Sav Pharmacy in Fort Smith, Arkansas (Sebastian County). A number of controlled, pharmaceutical drugs were taken. On February 22, police executed a search at a cabin owned by Prince's girlfriend's parents in Crawford County, Arkansas. In a small, unlocked outbuilding the police found and seized numerous controlled, pharmaceutical drugs including a bottle of Val-release that was positively identified as one that was taken from the Medi-Sav Pharmacy.

Prince was initially tried and acquitted in Crawford County for possession with intent to deliver and simple possession of drugs seized at the Crawford County cabin. Prince was then tried in Sebastian County for the burglary of the Fort Smith Medi-Sav Pharmacy and for the underlying felony of theft of property (pharmaceutical drugs). At that trial, most of the evidence that had been introduced in the Crawford County trial was again introduced as evidence of the burglary/theft. Prince, who was pro se, objected to the introduction of the drugs and other evidence seized in Crawford County on collateral estoppel grounds. Alternatively, he argued that he should be allowed to inform the jury of his acquittal in the Crawford County trial. The trial court held that the introduction of the evidence was not collaterally estopped and that the acquittal was irrelevant to the burglary/theft charges. It therefore admitted the evidence and denied Prince's request to tell the jury of his acquittal. The jury found Prince guilty of both burglary and theft. At the sentencing portion of the trial, Prince was found to be a habitual offender and sentenced to the maximum term on each charge.

The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. Prince v. State, 304 Ark. 692, 805 S.W.2d 46 (1991). Prince attempted, unsuccessfully, to pursue state collateral relief. ² Prince then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The case was referred to a magistrate judge. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge issued her report and recommendation denying Prince's double jeopardy, collateral estoppel, Brady and sufficiency of the evidence claims. ³ The magistrate judge found, however, that Prince's trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by the trial court's refusal to permit him to tell the jury of his acquittal. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report in full. It therefore granted the writ and ordered that Prince either be released or retried. Prince v. Lockhart, No. 91-2051 (W.D.Ark. Dec. 9, 1991). The government now appeals the grant of the writ on due process grounds. Prince cross-appeals the denial of the writ on double jeopardy and collateral estoppel grounds.

II.

We review findings of fact for clear error, and conclusions of law de novo. See, e.g., Brown v. Wallace, 957 F.2d 564, 566 (8th Cir.1992).

A. Evidence of Prior Acquittal

The government argues that the district court erred in granting the writ because the exclusion of the evidence of Prince's acquittal on the possession charges did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. The first assertion of error the government makes is that Prince did not raise this evidentiary due process issue before either the state court on direct appeal or the federal district court. Thus, the government claims, Prince has procedurally defaulted on this issue and the district court should not have addressed it. ⁴

Prince replies that his federal habeas corpus petition was filed pro se and so must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Thompson v. Missouri Bd. of Parole, 929 F.2d 396, 398 n. 2 (8th Cir.1991). He argues that grounds four and five of the petition are broad enough to encompass this claim. These grounds provide:

Ground Four. The trial court erred in denying Appellant's Motion In Limine and admitting into evidence evidence which violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Did mislead the jurors and confuse the issues at stake.

Fact:

Approx. 3000 loose pills were submitted at trial, over the Appellant's objection.

....

(3) This prejudicial evidence did inflame the jury.

....

Ground Five. Conviction was obtained in violation of the protection against double jeopardy.

Fact:

The State re-litigated a material fact which had previously been decided in favor of the Petitioner (Crawford Co. CS# CR-89-58(I) [sic].

The trial court errored in not allowing Petitioner to admit relevant evidence that he was acquitted of the (Crawford County Case). This error did deprive the Petitioner [sic] the right to raise an affirmative defense. The end result was a bad-faith collateral estoppel in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

App. at A-6. The district court did not address the procedural default issue and simply ruled on the merits. Prince argues that his pro se petition, read liberally, gives the government sufficient notice that a due process argument is being raised because he is challenging an evidentiary ruling. Since the only possible federal constitutional challenge to an evidentiary ruling is that the ruling was so prejudicial as to result in a denial of due process, see Mercer v. Armontrout, 844 F.2d 582 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900, 109 S.Ct. 249, 102 L.Ed.2d 238 (1988), Prince asserts that the government had notice of this claim. We disagree.

A careful reading of grounds four and five of Prince's habeas petition reveals two claims. One is a claim that the double jeopardy clause was violated in the Sebastian County trial by the admission into evidence of the seized drugs. The second is that the trial court's refusal to permit Prince to inform the jury of his acquittal in Crawford County deprived him of an affirmative defense under Arkansas state law. There is no general claim that refusing to admit the acquittal evidence was error. Therefore, even if read liberally, the petition does not give the government notice of this particular claim. ⁵ Accordingly, we find that Prince has procedurally defaulted on this claim.

A petitioner can overcome procedural default by showing cause for the default and prejudice resulting from it. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2508-09, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). Prince has not even attempted to show cause for his default. Therefore, the district court should not have addressed this issue. ⁶

Even if Prince had not procedurally defaulted on this claim, however, we agree with the government that the district court erred on the merits. Our review is limited to determining whether Prince's constitutional due process rights have been violated. Mercer, 844 F.2d at 587. We must decide whether there was an error so conspicuously prejudicial that it fatally infected the trial and failed to afford Prince the fundamental fairness that is the essence of due process. Id.

The general rule is that

[a]lthough a judgment of acquittal is relevant with respect to the issues of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel, 'once it is determined that these pleas in bar have been rejected, a judgment of acquittal is not usually admissible to rebut inferences that may be drawn from the evidence that was admitted.'

United States v. Kerley, 643 F.2d 299, 300 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981) (citing United States v. Viserto, 596 F.2d 531, 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841, 100 S.Ct. 80, 62 L.Ed.2d 52 (1979)); see also United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 561, 566-67 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1006, 107 S.Ct. 1630, 95 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987); United States v. Sutton, 732 F.2d 1483, 1493 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1157, 105 S.Ct. 903, 83 L.Ed.2d 919 (1985); United States v. Riley, 684 F.2d 542, 546 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1111, 103 S.Ct. 742, 74 L.Ed.2d 962 (1983). There are two primary reasons why a judgment of acquittal is not generally admissible to rebut inferences that may be drawn from evidence that was the basis of a previous trial. First, judgments of acquittal are hearsay. Sutton, 732 F.2d at 1493; Viserto, 596 F.2d at 537. Second, judgments of acquittal are not generally relevant, Riley, 684 F.2d at 546, because they do not prove innocence; they simply show that the government did not meet its burden of proving...