Prince v. Peterson

• Decision Date: 22 July 1975
• Docket Number: No. 13765,13765
• Citation: 538 P.2d 1325
• Parties: Dennis PRINCE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Darlene PETERSON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 1325

538 P.2d 1325

Dennis PRINCE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Darlene PETERSON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 13765.

Supreme Court of Utah.

July 22, 1975.

Gary D. Stott, of Stott & Young, Provo, for defendant and appellant.

Dave McMullan, Payson, for plaintiff and respondent.

CROCKETT, Justice:

Dennis Prince sued Darlene Peterson for slander uttered and libel published against him. ¹ Upon issues joined and a plenary trial by jury a verdict was rendered for $5,537 compensatory and $3,000 punitive damages. From judgment entered thereon and the court's refusal to interfere with the verdict or grant a new trial, defendant appeals.

Defendant contends (1) that the statements made were not slanderous; (2) that the verdict of $5,537 as compensatory damages was not justified by the evidence, and especially so because the complaint sounded only in general damages and failed to plead expressly for special damages; and (3) that the award of $3,000 punitive damages was not justified, and in any event was an excessive award resulting from passion and prejudice of the jury.

Property upon which Denny's Cafe was situated had originally belonged to the Williams family. Defendant Darlene Peterson and the plaintiff's deceased wife were sisters therein. Grandpa and Grandma Williams had deeded the property to the four children of plaintiff and his wife (thus the Williams' grandchildren), but with a life estate therein to the plaintiff's wife, their daughter, Marion W. Prince, who died before the occurrences of concern here. The evidence is that for good and valuable consideration, satisfactory to the children, the latter had each conveyed their interest in the property to their father, plaintiff Dennis Prince. ²

It is also shown that plaintiff had taken over the business 37 years before when it was a small lunch stand and worth about $500. By his work, management, and upbuilding of the business, including several renovations and additions, had increased its value so he thought it was worth about $75,000, which is the price he finally got on the sale contract. It was in June 1973, after he began efforts to sell, that he learned that the defendant was telling his prospective buyers and others that he was crooked and dishonest in his business dealings and was cheating his own children.

Whether motivated by family jealousy, or simply by innate spite or some other provoker of ill will we need not determine. That the jury could have believed that defendant was unrestrained in attempting to malign and injure plaintiff by making both oral and written untrue and defamatory statements about him is not open to question. ³

One significant paragraph from the record, part of the testimony of Mrs. Lola Ostler, to whom plaintiff was trying to sell his cafe, is:

A She referred to him as 'Pa put it the way it was because he knew what kind of a person Dennie was.' And she said he was a 'no good, drunken, woman-chasing, crooked bastard, . . .' it shocked me, because I though Darlene and Marion and the whole family got along just fine. And she said, 'There's going to be a latter in the mail to you regarding some property that's not right.' And she says, 'You'd better watch you step because he's a crook.'

The letter was sent; it contained, inter alia, the following:

'I feel you people should be warned as to the clever crook you are dealing with. That property belonged to the late Thos. Williams and his wife Nora Williams. They deeded that property to their four grandchildren, Marilyn, Carma, Tom and Nadine Prince, but Marion their daughter was to have it as long as she lived. But Dennie in his crooked clever way has taken it away from his kids.'

We have no disagreement with the defendant's contention that simply making some general statement about another being a crook, or even using profanity against in a general way, may not be actionable slander. It may well depend on the circumstances. ⁴ If words of that character are used in such a context or under such circumstances as they would reasonably be understood to come within the traditional requirement of libel or slander: that is, to hold a person up to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to injure him in his business or vocation, they are deemed actionable per se; and the law presumes that damages will be suffered therefrom. ⁵ Reflection upon the expressions uttered here: calling the plaintiff names, including that he was a 'clever crook,' etc. 'who is stealing from his own children. . . .' referring to his operation of a business, and his efforts to sell it, leaves no doubt that they could reasonably be regarded as falling within the rule of law just stated.

In addition to the consideration of general damages which the law presumes will follow from such a defamation, the plaintiff testified with respect to particular losses he sustained: that from the time he learned of defendant's wrongful conduct, in June, 1973, until he was finally able to close the bargain on August 8th, he spent a good deal of his time in trying to overcome the harm being done by the defendant, viz.:

I spend all of this time . . . proving to my clients, that I wanted to buy the place, that I was not a crook and that I had all the papers.

I figured it took practically all of my time for 25 days.

. . . notbody else, I think, would work for less than $30 a day.

Q So you have discussed this matter with your customers--

A I have talked about it. I had to. We were asked questions about it. Everybody that came in wanted to know. It was common gossip throughout the whole town.

In regard to the claimed deficiencies in the pleading and proof of damages, these observations are to be made: the purpose of pleadings is to advise the opponent and give him an opportunity to meet the issues and the contentions. ⁶ If that purpose is served, the requirements of the law are met.

The distinction between general and special damages was pointed out by Justice Ellett in our recent case of Cohn, etc. v. J. C. Penney Co. et al. ⁷ It will be seen therefrom that general damages are those which, from the common sense and experience of mankind, would naturally be expected to result from that type of a wrong to any person so injured. Whereas, 'special damages' means particular items of damages which result from circumstances peculiar to the case at hand. It is this type of damages which should be specially pleaded and proved by evidence showing such circumstances in the individual case. Measured by the standards herein discussed, and as applied to the issues joined and tried in this case, we see no error or impropriety which resulted in any substantial prejudice to the defendant.

It is of course to be appreciated that there are difficulties involved in placing an exact dollar-and-cents valuation on damages caused by an injury of this character. However, when physical injury is involved, courts have no hesitancy in allowing and approving substantial awards as general damages which include pain and suffering. The pain and suffering inflicted upon the mind and the emotions by such wrongful act of another is no less real; and should be no less entitled to be compensated for.

We frequently declare our commitment to the jury system, under which it is the prerogative of lay citizens to determine questions of fact, both as to liability and the fixing of damages; and in cases of this character their varied experiences and their closeness to the reality of everyday affairs qualify them to fix damages as well as or perhaps better than judges. ⁸ The court should give the jury system more than lip service, by honoring the jury's prerogatives; and by declining to interfere therewith unless the determinations made are entirely without foundation in evidence, or are so fragmentary and unsubstantial that no reasonable minds acting fairly on the evidence could have so concluded. In addition to what has been said concerning the fact that the jury seems to have sensed what had occurred and to have done justice concerning it, the trial court also indicated his approval by refusing to interfere with the verdict or to grant a new trial. ⁹

Notwithstanding what we have said above concerning the compensatory damages, the fixing of punitive damages presents a somewhat different type of problem. These damages can be awarded if the jury finds that such an injury was wilful and malicious. ¹⁰ They are awarded not so much to reward plaintiff for loss as to punish the defendant for a wilful and malicious wrong and to serve as a wholesome warning to others not to engage in similar wrongful conduct. In doing this the jury exercises a quasi-judicial function. ¹¹ The rule is that such damages must bear some reasonable relationship to the actual damages found. In applying that standard here we think the $3,000 damages was excessive, and should be reduced to $1,000. Except for that modification the judgment is affirmed. In view of the substantial modification of the judgment, the parties shall bear their own costs.

ELLETT and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.

HENRIOD, Chief Justice (dissenting):

Appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict of $5,537 compensatory and $3,000 punitive damages for an alleged libel (which counsel for both sides called an action for libel and slander). ¹ The chronology of events that vitriolized the atmosphere in which this case found itself, and the attendant facts, fairly may be stated briefly, without any serious dispute, as follows:

Many years before the negotiations for sale of a restaurant ripened into a contract the defendant's father and mother, named Williams, had deeded the property to their four grandchildren, Thomas, Carma, Marilyn and Nadine Prince, who were children of plaintiff Prince and his wife, reserving a life estate to the wife, Williams' daughter, who died before the sale of the restaurant mentioned above. Over the years and prior thereto, the plaintiff and father of the four children referred to, obtained deeds to the...