Prince v. State

• Decision Date: 21 December 1893
• Citation: 100 Ala. 144,14 So. 409
• Parties: PRINCE v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

14 So. 409

100 Ala. 144

PRINCE v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

December 21, 1893

Appeal from circuit court, Walker county; James J. Banks, Judge.

George S. Prince was convicted of murder in the first degree, and appeals. Reversed.

Mr Coleman, Mr. Sowell, and W. H. Smith, Jr., for appellant.

Wm. L Martin, Atty. Gen., for the State.

COLEMAN J.

The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment in the penitentiary for life. There was evidence introduced by the defendant which tended to support the defense of an alibi. In its oral charge the court instructed the jury "that if the defendant has failed to establish his alibi through the perjury or through the want of recollection of his witnesses, it is a circumstance against him," etc. We presume the court intended to declare the proposition that where a defendant attempts to sustain the defense of an alibi by resorting to perjury, etc., that is a circumstance against him; but the charge as given admits of the construction that, if the defendant's witnesses had sworn truly, the alibi would have been established, and the defendant entitled to an acquittal, but, as they perjured themselves to disprove the alibi, the defendant must suffer for it. If there was credible evidence tending to sustain the alibi, the fact that defendant's witnesses may have perjured themselves in testifying to a contrary state of facts cannot be a circumstance to his prejudice. Courts should be careful to refrain from language calculated to convey to the minds of the jurors its own impressions as to the credibility of the witnesses examined on the trial of a case before it.

The court further charged the jury "that the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish his alibi, and that it must be done to your satisfaction." The proof exacted of the defendant in this charge to sustain the alibi is too high, in that it omitted the word "reasonable." If the jury were reasonably satisfied, from the evidence, that the defendant was elsewhere, and not at the place where the offense was committed, at the time it was committed, the burden cast upon him by the law is fully met. Pellum v State, 89 Ala. 28, 8 So. 83; Pate v. State, 94 Ala. 14, 10 So. 665; Albritton v. State, 94 Ala. 76 10 So. 426. The defense of an alibi is as legitimate and effective as any other; and whenever the evidence introduced supports this defense, and its effect is to create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury of the defendant's guilt, he is as much entitled to an acquittal as if the reasonable doubt had been created or produced by any other legitimate evidence. We would not be understood as saying that the jury may disregard other evidence in the case, and consider only that in relation to the alibi. The whole evidence should be duly considered and weighed; and if, after considering the whole evidence, the jury have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, arising out of any part of the evidence, they should acquit. Hurd v. State, 94 Ala. 100, 10 So. 528; Albritton v. State, 94 Ala. 78, 10 So. 426; Pate Case, supra. Courts should avoid as far as possible the singling out and unduly emphasizing any one or more facts, in their instructions to the jury.

The court properly refused a charge which instructed the jury, "if there is a probable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, the jury must acquit." This charge does not require that the jury shall have a doubt, in order to acquit, but that a probable doubt is sufficient; that is, if there is a probability that there is a doubt arising from the evidence, that is sufficient. The charge admits of this interpretation, which is certainly not the law.

The court erred in refusing to charge the jury "that, if there is a probability of the defendant's innocence, they must acquit." This question has been passed upon frequently by this court. Cohen's Case, 50 Ala. 108; Bain's Case, 74 Ala. 38; Williams' Case, (Ala.) 12 So. 808.

The witness Whitfield testified that he was a practicing physician of many years, and during that time he had been called to see a few cases of gunshot wounds. He testified that he "could not by any means, by looking at the wound on Bill Lee, [the deceased,] tell whether it was made by a rifle ball or a pistol ball." In view of this statement, we do not think it was competent for this witness to give his opinion that the wound was caused by a rifle ball. He was competent to describe the character of the wound, but, according to his own evidence, he was not competent to give an opinion as evidence that a rifle ball caused the wound.

A witness was permitted to testify, against the objection of ...