Prince Wm County Supervisors Board v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 16 January 2002
• Citation: 276 F.3d 1359
• Parties: (Fed. Cir. 2002) BOARD OF COUNTY SUPERVISORS OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VIRGINIA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellant. 01-5030 DECIDED:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

Page 1359

276 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

BOARD OF COUNTY SUPERVISORS OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VIRGINIA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellant.

01-5030

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

DECIDED: January 16, 2002

Appealed from: United States Court of Federal Claims, Senior Judge Moody R. Tidwell, III

Gifford R. Hampshire, Office of the County Attorney, Prince William County, Prince William, Virginia, argued for plaintiff-appellee. With him on the brief were Sharon E. Pandak, and Ross G. Horton.

Robert H. Oakley, Attorney, Environment and Natural Resources Division, Department of Justice, of Washington, DC argued for defendant-appellant. With him on the brief was John C. Cruden, Acting Assistant Attorney General.

Before MICHEL, RADER, and SCHALL, Circuit Judges.

SCHALL, Circuit Judge.

The United States appeals from the final judgment of the United States Court of Federal Claims in Bd. of County Supervisors v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 714 (2000). The judgment awarded the Board of County Supervisors of Prince William County, Virginia, compensation in the total amount of $1,153,578.00 for the 16.05 acres of land which the federal government took from the County by eminent domain. The government took the land pursuant to the Manassas National Battlefield Park Amendments of 1988, Title X of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3810 (1988) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 429b(b) (1988)). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

This case has been before us on two previous occasions. See Bd. of County Supervisors v. United States, 48 F.3d 520 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Bd. of County Supervisors I"); Bd. of County Supervisors v. United States, 116 F.3d 454 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Bd. of County Supervisors II"). For a detailed account of the facts, the reader is referred to our previous opinions in the case. Only those facts material to our present decision are discussed in this opinion.

I.

In 1986, a developer purchased an undeveloped 550-acre tract of agricultural land in Prince William County, Virginia. Bd. of County Supervisors I, 48 F.3d at 522. In order to obtain rezoning of the tract (which it called the "William Center"), the developer submitted "proffers" to the Prince William County zoning authority. Bd. of County Supervisors v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 339, 340 (1992). Proffers are commitments made by a developer to mitigate anticipated development impacts. Id. The developer's proffers in this case included a number of obligations, one of which was the developer's agreement to convey to the County five narrow strips of land, totaling 16.05 acres, and then to build on the transferred land a road. Id. The road was to be named the "William Center Boulevard."

When the developer proposed to construct a much larger development on the tract than originally anticipated, a citizens' coalition persuaded Congress to enact the Manassas National Battlefield Park Amendments of 1988 (the "Act"). 16 U.S.C. 429b(b)(1988). The Act vested in the United States all rights to the developer's tract and to the 16.05 acres owned by the County. Bd. of County Supervisors I, 48 F.3d at 522. The Act concomitantly obligated the United States to pay just compensation for the land. Id.

In due course, the developer and the County filed separate suits in the Court of Federal Claims seeking compensation under the Act. Id. at 523. The United States settled the developer's suit, but declined to pay the County the $2 million it sought for the 16.05 acres. Id. After a trial, the Court of Federal Claims issued an opinion holding that the strips of land were burdened with a road-use condition and that the strips' dedication to a non-profitable use rendered them essentially valueless. Bd. of County Supervisors v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 339 (1992). The County appealed the decision to this court.

We reversed the Court of Federal Claims decision, holding that absent an express requirement that the land be used for roads, the "County took in fee simple . . . and was free as a matter of property law to do with the land what it wished." Bd. of County Supervisors I, 48 F.3d at 527. We remanded to the trial court "for further proceedings to determine the just compensation due the County for the taking of its land which it held in unencumbered fee simple." Id. at 528.

On remand, following briefing and oral argument, the Court of Federal Claims decided the compensation issue based upon the record developed in the prior proceedings. The court awarded the County compensation at a rate of three dollars per square foot. Bd. of County Supervisors, 34 Fed. Cl. 678, 681 (1996). Three dollars per square foot was the rate Mr. Hanie Trotter, an attorney with the County Service Authority, used at trial in estimating the value of the entire 550-acre tract. Id. at 680. The court also awarded the County an additional $100,000 for road improvements made to the land prior to the taking, bringing the total award to $2.2 million. Id. at 681. The United States appealed a second time, challenging the methodology that the Court of Federal Claims had used in valuing the narrow strips at the same rate as the surrounding property and objecting to the $100,000 award for road improvements.

We again reversed the trial court, holding as follows:

[T]he Court of Federal Claims erred as a matter of law in reading our decision as foreclosing an inquiry into whether the value of the 16.05 acres was different from the value of the surrounding land.

The point is that the property at issue here consists of strips of land, rather than one large, easily developable tract. The question the Court of Federal Claims must answer is, what is the fair market value of such odd pieces of land, taking into account their potential uses, current condition and the improvements thereon, and considering the most profitable uses to which the pieces of land can probably be put in the reasonably near future. The fair market value of the surrounding land is only one factor to be considered. The burden rests on the County to prove to the court's satisfaction what the fair market value of the 16.05 acres is.

Bd. of County Supervisors II, 116 F.3d at 458.

We also vacated the award of $100,000 for road improvements. We concluded that the award was not a component of the fair market value of the property and amounted to impermissibly compensating the condemnee for its investment. Id. We remanded the case to the Court of Federal Claims for a new determination of the fair market value of the property. Id.

II.

On remand, the Court of Federal Claims ordered the parties to agree upon one neutral appraiser to value the 16.05 acres at issue. The parties agreed on William C. Harvey, II. The court accepted the parties' recommendation, and issued an Order appointing Mr. Harvey as its neutral appraiser. Bd. of County Supervisors v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 714, 717 (2000).

A two-day trial was held in February of 2000, at which several witnesses testified. Mr. Harvey, appearing as an expert witness in his court-appointed capacity, testified that he valued the 16.05 acres at $1.65 per square foot for a total value of $1,153,578. Mr. Harvey's appraisal was based on his conclusion that the highest and best use of the 16.05 acres when it was taken by the government was to assemble it with the surrounding land and then develop the resulting parcel for the mixed uses that were allowed by the planned mixed development zoning classification then in effect. He further testified that this proposed use was reasonably probable.

Susan Roltsch, the Chief of Development Services for Prince William County, also testified. Ms. Roltsch stated that her office was responsible for overseeing all of the new land development applications submitted to the County. She testified that the locations of streets in new developments often change from their originally planned locations, as initially shown in a general development plan.

Testifying for the government were an independent government-hired appraiser, David C. Lenhoff, and the chief developer of the William Center, John T. Hazel. Mr. Lenhoff testified that he valued the 16.05 acres at $205,000, based on his conclusion that the property could only be used as a road. Mr. Hazel testified regarding the time and money spent constructing and choosing the optimum location for the William Center Boulevard (the 16.05 acres at issue).

The Court of Federal Claims accepted Mr. Harvey's conclusion that the highest and best use of the 16.05 acres was to assemble it with the surrounding land and then complete a development for mixed uses. From there, the court held that, at the time the 16.05 acres was taken, the fair market value of the land, taking into account its potential uses, its condition, and the improvements on it, and considering the most profitable uses to which it could probably be put in the reasonably near future, was $1.65 per square foot, consistent with Mr. Harvey's appraisal. Bd. of County Supervisors, 47 Fed. Cl. at 727 (2000). The government timely appealed the court's decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

I.

In reviewing a decision of the Court of Federal Claims after a trial, we review conclusions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Shelden v. United States, 7 F.3d 1022, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

The government contends that the Court of Federal Claims erred in finding that the highest and best use of the 16.05 acres was assemblage with adjoining properties. Attacking the sufficiency of the evidence, the government argues that there was no factual basis for the court's conclusion that assemblage of the 16.05 acres with the adjoining property was reasonably probable.

To support its argument, the government contends that a Virginia statute, Virginia Code 33.1-151, only allows a road to be abandoned if alternate routes are available. The government...