Pringle v. Pattis
| Decision Date | 31 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | AC 44830 |
| Citation | 212 Conn.App. 736,276 A.3d 1042 |
| Parties | Barry PRINGLE v. Norman PATTIS et al. |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Barry Pringle, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Cameron L. Atkinson, with whom, on the brief, was Earl Austin Voss, for the appellees (defendants).
Prescott, Clark and DiPentima, Js.
The self-represented plaintiff, Barry Pringle, appeals1 from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, Norman Pattis, Frederick M. O'Brien and Daniel M. Erwin.2 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of the exoneration rule, which generally provides that a legal malpractice claim is not ripe for adjudication unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the relevant underlying conviction has been invalidated. We reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as alleged in the complaint or as otherwise undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. Between February, 2014, and February, 2015, the plaintiff was arraigned on myriad charges, including promoting prostitution, possession of narcotics with intent to sell, sale of narcotics and attempted murder. In connection therewith, the state seized and/or froze approximately $17,000 of the plaintiff's assets. In February, 2015, the plaintiff retained the defendants, of the law firm Pattis & Smith, to represent him in connection with his pending criminal charges and the related asset seizure.3
On February 5, 2016, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to charges of the sale of certain illegal drugs in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 21a-278 (b), tampering with a witness in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-151, assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59, promoting prostitution in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 53a-87 and possession of narcotics with the intent to sell in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 21a-277 (a). The court canvassed the plaintiff, accepted his pleas and sentenced the plaintiff to a total effective sentence of ten years of imprisonment followed by ten years of special parole.
The plaintiff subsequently made several challenges seeking to invalidate his guilty pleas, none of which has been successful. On March 11, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion to vacate his guilty pleas on the grounds that they were involuntary and entered under duress because of the recent death of his mother; that motion was denied. On April 6, 2017, the plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the defendants provided him ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty pleas and that his guilty pleas were not voluntary. The plaintiff's habeas corpus petition remains pending. See Pringle v. Commissioner of Correction , Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-17-4008733-S. Accordingly, despite his attempts,4 the plaintiff's convictions remain valid.
On January 28, 2019, the plaintiff commenced the underlying civil action against the defendants by way of a two count complaint. The crux of the plaintiff's complaint is that the defendants’ representation of the plaintiff in the criminal and forfeiture proceedings caused the plaintiff to suffer monetary damages. The complaint specifically alleges the following: the plaintiff entered into an oral contract with Pattis, whereby Pattis agreed to represent him as to the prostitution, drugs and asset forfeiture matters for the flat fee of $10,000 and as to the attempted murder charge for the flat fee of $25,000; Pattis later orally demanded an additional $20,000 for his representation with respect to the attempted murder charge; and the plaintiff paid the defendants a total sum of $45,000.
As to the forfeiture proceedings, the complaint alleges that O'Brien signed three forfeiture agreements as to the approximately $17,000 of assets that the state had seized from the plaintiff; that the plaintiff was not consulted about these forfeiture agreements and that they were executed without his consent; and that these agreements failed to include $1800 of "unaccounted for" assets that were seized in relation to his prostitution charges.
As to the events leading to his guilty pleas, the complaint alleges the following: because the plaintiff's mother unexpectedly died on the eve of the trial set for his "drug charges," and because he was arrested for tampering with a witness on the day after her burial, he experienced intense grief and psychological trauma, becoming severely depressed; Pattis demanded the outstanding balance of $10,000 prior to the trial of the attempted murder charge and withdrew the plaintiff's request for a speedy trial when he learned of the plaintiff's inability to pay; and the defendants pressured the plaintiff into pleading guilty to "various charges" in exchange for a total effective sentence of ten years of incarceration with ten years of special parole, resulting in his entering guilty pleas on February 5, 2016, despite the fact that he was not competent, given the recent death of his mother and the pressure applied on him by the defendants.
On the basis of these factual allegations, the plaintiff purported to make a variety of legal claims in his complaint. Count one of the complaint is titled "Breach of Contract; Legal Malpractice; Breach of Fiduciary Duty; Fraud; Fraudulent Misrepresentation." Count two of the complaint is titled "Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress." The complaint concludes with a demand for specific amounts of money damages from the defendants.
On April 22, 2019, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's entire complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that it is barred by the exoneration rule. The defendants argued that the exoneration rule bars the plaintiff's complaint because it challenges his criminal convictions that remain valid and, therefore, his action is not ripe. On May 10, 2019, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition, arguing that Connecticut courts have neither adopted nor rejected the exoneration rule and, alternatively, that his complaint contains colorable claims that the court should address.
On September 11, 2019, the court, after oral argument, granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court concluded that This appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his entire complaint on the ground of the exoneration rule. The plaintiff makes two primary arguments in support of his claim. First, he argues that Connecticut courts have not adopted the exoneration rule. Second, he argues, alternatively, that the court improperly applied the exoneration rule to dismiss all of the claims in his complaint.
We begin with the applicable legal principles and standard of review. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tremont Public Advisors, LLC v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority , 333 Conn. 672, 688, 217 A.3d 953 (2019). Our interpretation of the plaintiff's complaint also is a question of law subject to plenary review, and "we are not bound by the label affixed" by the plaintiff to his claims. BNY Western Trust v. Roman , 295 Conn. 194, 210, 990 A.2d 853 (2010). Consistent with our policy of leniency to self-represented litigants, we construe the plaintiff's complaint " ‘broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.’ " Santana v. Commissioner of Correction , 208 Conn. App. 460, 465, 264 A.3d 1056 (2021), cert. denied, 340 Conn. 920, 267 A.3d 857 (2022).
(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Francis v. Board of Pardons & Paroles , 338 Conn. 347, 358–59, 258 A.3d 71 (2021). "[I]n determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dorry v. Garden , 313 Conn. 516, 521, 98 A.3d 55 (2014).
Generally, the exoneration rule provides that "a legal malpractice claim is not...
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