Prinn v. De Rice

• Decision Date: 15 March 1930
• Citation: 149 A. 580
• Parties: PRINN v. De RICE.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

149 A. 580

PRINN

v. De RICE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 15, 1930.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Cumberland County.

Action by Gertrude M. Prinn against Frank De Rice. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions and moves for new trial.

Exceptions and motion overruled.

Argued before PATTANGALL, C. J., DUNN, STURGIS, BARNES, FARRINGTON, JJ., and MORRILL, A. R. J.

Edmund P. Mahoney, of Portland, for plaintiff.

Wm. B. Mahoney, of Portland, David H. Fulton, of Boston, Mass., and John B. Thomes, of Portland, for defendant.

PER CURIAM.

This was an action for the recovery of damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff while riding as a gratuitous passenger in an automobile owned by her sister, the wife of the defendant driver.

The accident occurred in the commonwealth of Massachusetts while the parties were en route from Portland, Me. By agreement and stipulation the case was tried under the Massachusetts rule with the burden on the plaintiff of establishing the gross negligence of the defendant, as defined in Altman v. Aronson et als., 231 Mass. 588, 121 N. E. 505, 4 A. L. R. 1185; Burke v. Cook, 246 Mass. 518, 141 N. E, 585; and Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487; 118 N. E. 168, L. R. A. 1918C, 264, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1088, and her own due care, as defined in Shultz v. Old Colony Street Railway Co., 193 Mass. 309, 79 N. E. 873, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 597, 118 Am. St. Rep. 502, 9 Ann. Cas. 402; Oppenheim v. Barkin, 262 Mass. 281, 159 N. E. 628, 61 A. L. R. 1228; Lambert v. Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway Co., 240 Mass. 495, 134 N. E. 340, 22 A. L. R. 1291.

At the close of the evidence the defendant filed a written motion for a directed verdict This motion was denied by the presiding justice, and to this refusal the defendant took exceptions.

A verdict in favor of the plaintiff, in the sum of $6,558.75, was found by the jury, and a general motion for a new trial, on the usual grounds, was seasonably filed by the defendant.

The exception and the motion, except as far as the latter relates to the amount of damages, depend on the answer to the same fundamental question as to whether, under the Massachusetts rule as stipulated, the verdict in this case is so plainly contrary to the evidence that manifestly the jury was influenced by prejudice, bias, passion, or mistake.

Without recital of testimony, but after a most careful reading and weighing of the entire record in the case, we are convinced that...