PRINTING SPECIALTIES v. INTERNATIONAL PRINTING

• Decision Date: 20 April 1978
• Docket Number: No. CIV-2-77-98.,CIV-2-77-98.
• Citation: 466 F. Supp. 13
• Parties: PRINTING SPECIALTIES AND PAPER PRODUCTS DISTRICT COUNCIL NO. 2 et al., Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL PRINTING AND GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS UNION et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

466 F. Supp. 13

PRINTING SPECIALTIES AND PAPER PRODUCTS DISTRICT COUNCIL NO. 2 et al., Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL PRINTING AND GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS UNION et al., Defendants.

No. CIV-2-77-98.

United States District Court, E. D. Tennessee, Northeastern Division.

April 20, 1978.

Erma G. Greenwood, Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiffs.

Neal P. Rutledge and Anthony F. Cafferky, Washington, D. C., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

NEESE, District Judge.

This is a civil action by an association of local unions and certain of its officers seeking the resolution by this Court of a dispute between them and the defendant international union with reference to the latter's election of its officers. It was submitted to the Court for a decision on the merits on the basis of the record as it is now constituted. Pretermitting all other issues herein is the necessity for a determination of this Court's jurisdiction of the subject matter; for, without a finding that such exists, this Court is without power to proceed. Memphis Am. Fed. of Tchrs., L. 2032 v. Bd. of Ed., C.A. 6th (1976), 534 F.2d 699, 7011.

The United States district courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; rather, they have only such jurisdiction as has been prescribed by the Congress pursuant to the Constitution, Article III. Graves v. Sneed, C.A. 6th (1976), 541 F.2d 159, 1612, certiorari denied (1977), 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1106, 51 L.Ed.2d 539. Even where, as here, the parties do not appear to question the Court's jurisdiction, this Court has the independent obligation to determine for itself whether its jurisdiction has been invoked properly. Leonard v. Abingdon Motor Company, D.C.Tenn. (1971), 339 F.Supp. 218, 218-2191.

Federal jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties; only Congress can do so. Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals (1973), 412 U.S. 645, 652, 93 S.Ct. 2488, 2493, 37 L.Ed.2d 235, 2413; Tatum v. Mathews, C.A. 6th (1976), 541 F.2d 161, 1631, n. 1. The burden was on the plaintiffs to have demonstrated that such jurisdiction exists, and the presumption is that the Court lacks jurisdiction over a particular case until it has been shown otherwise. Alexander v. Hopkins, D.C. Tenn. (1976), 433 F.Supp. 362, 3631.

The plaintiffs seek first to invoke the Court's jurisdiction under the Labor Management Relations Act, § 301. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Such statute grants the United States district courts jurisdiction over suits for, inter alia, the violation of contracts between labor organizations representing employees in an industry affecting interstate commerce, without respect to the amount in controversy and without regard to the citizenship of the parties.¹ An initial prerequisite to jurisdiction thereunder, however, is the breach of such a contract. United Steelworkers, Etc. v. Jarl Extrusions, Inc., D.C.Tenn. (1975), 405 F.Supp. 302, 3044, affirmed C.A. 6th (1976), 527 F.2d 648 (table). The plaintiffs contend that two such contracts are present herein: i. e., the constitution of the defendant international union and a stipulation entered into by these parties in Secretary of Labor, Etc. v. International Printing Pressmen, Etc., civil action no. 2288, this district and division.

Even if these do constitute "contracts" within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 185(a),² it seems clear that, before federal jurisdiction exists in an action for breach of the same, the intraunion dispute must have some potential external application to industrial peace in the labor-management relations field or some connection with a collective bargaining agreement. Local Union No. 657, Etc. v. Sidell, C.A. 7th (1977), 552 F.2d 1250, 1254-12552, 3, certiorari denied (1977), 434 U.S. 862, 98 S.Ct. 190, 54 L.Ed.2d 135; 1199DC, Nat. U. of H. & H. C. E. v. National U. of H. & H. C. E. (1976), 175 U.S.App.D.C. 70, 72-73, 533 F.2d 1205, 1207-12081; Smith v. United Mine Workers of America, C.A. 10th (1974), 493 F.2d 1241, 1242-12442; Hotel and Restaurant Employees Local 400 v. Svacek, C.A. 9th (1970), 431 F.2d 705, 706; Case v. Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers, Etc., D.C.Alaska (1977), 438 F.Supp. 856, 858-8592.

The basic purpose of the jurisdictional grant under 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) is to promote industrial peace by permitting enforcement in the federal courts of contracts made by labor organizations. Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods (1962), 369 U.S. 17, 28, 82 S.Ct. 541, 548, 7 L.Ed.2d 503, 510 (headnote 5); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills (1957), 353 U.S. 448, 455, 77 S.Ct. 912, 917, 1 L.Ed.2d 972, 979 (headnote 3). Therefore, as was stated by the Tenth Circuit, "* * * if Congress intended to turn over to the federal courts the control and supervision of internal union affairs which have no external application to industrial peace or to collective bargaining agreements * * * Congress would have said so explicitly. * * *" Smith v. United Mine Workers of America, supra, 493 F.2d at 1243-12442.

The plaintiffs make no claim herein that the defendants' alleged breach of the aforementioned contracts would have any external connection with industrial or economic peace, or that such would be related to a collective bargaining agreement.³ Neither have they pointed to any evidence in this record showing that their intraunion dispute with the defendants falls into either of these categories, or that it has any impact whatever upon labor management relations.⁴ Rather, the whole purport of this action is an attempt to get this Court to "meddle into" the purely internal affairs of the defendant international union. The plaintiffs, thus, failed to meet their burden of establishing the existence of this Court's jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and their claim thereunder hereby is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. Rule 12(h)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Contending that the defendants' conduct is an attempt to circumvent this Court's orders in the aforenamed civil action, the plaintiffs also seek to invoke this Court's ancillary jurisdiction. It is clear that this Court has the ancillary jurisdiction to take whatever steps it deems necessary to properly enforce and protect its decrees in civil action no. 2288. Dugas v. American Surety Company (1937), 300 U.S. 414, 428, 57 S.Ct. 515, 521, 81 L.Ed. 720, 727-728 (headnote 3); Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co. (1864), 2 Wall. (69 U.S.) 609, 631-635, 17 L.Ed. 886, 894-895; Hamilton v. Nakai, C.A. 9th (1971), 453 F.2d 152, 1575, certiorari denied (1972), 406 U.S. 945, 92 S.Ct. 2044, 32 L.Ed.2d 332, Baker v. Gotz, D.C. Del. (1976), 415 F.Supp. 1243, 12474; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. United States, D.C.D.C. (1976), 410 F.Supp. 354, 3571, affirmed without opinion (1976), 429 U.S. 968, 97 S.Ct. 474, 50 L.Ed.2d 578; Castro v. Beecher, D.C.Mass. (1975), 386 F.Supp. 1281, 12821.

Civil action no. 2288 was commenced in this Court by the Secretary of Labor, challenging the validity of the defendant international union's 1968 election of officers. It was contended by the plaintiff therein that such election had been in violation of certain provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531, esp. 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-483. After several years of litigation, the parties reached a settlement of their controversy, and, under the terms of which stipulated, inter alia, that:

* * * * * *

2. Defendant agrees to amend its Constitution and Laws in accordance with the revisions as agreed upon by the respective parties, a copy of which is attached to this Stipulation as Exhibit A and made a part hereof.

* * * * * *

4. Defendant will conduct its next regularly scheduled election of officers, including nominations, with the technical assistance of the Secretary of Labor, in accordance with the requirements of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, and insofar as lawful and practicable, in accordance with the Constitution and Laws of defendant as amended in accordance with the revisions attached to this Stipulation as Exhibit A and made a part hereof. The extent and nature of said technical assistance will be agreed upon at a future date by the respective parties.

* * * * * *

The foregoing stipulations were approved by the Court on August 31, 1973 and, on September 18, 1974, the Court entered an agreed order of the parties which required the defendant international union to comply with the terms of such stipulations, and particularly paragraph 2 thereof, by adopting in its constitution the provisions relating to the election of its officers, not later than its next scheduled convention. That action was thereupon dismissed.

The aforementioned agreed order, which by its terms incorporated by reference the parties' earlier stipulation, constituted a consent decree.⁵ Accordingly, its scope must be determined within its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it or by reference to the underlying statutes. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co. (1975), 420 U.S. 223, 233, 95 S.Ct. 926, 932-933, 43 L.Ed.2d 148, 1597; United States v. Armour & Co. (1971), 402 U.S. 673, 682, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 1757-1758, 29 L.Ed.2d 256, 2634. "* * * That instrument must be construed as it is written, and not as it might have been written. * * *" Idem.

It having been stipulated herein that the defendant international union did adopt in 1976 at its next scheduled convention the provisions referred to in paragraph 2 of the parties' aforementioned stipulation, the defendants herein have not violated same. It is undisputed herein that the defendant union's next regularly scheduled election of officers is in February, 1980. This being so, the defendants could hardly have violated paragraph 4 of the parties' stipulation, since there has been no such election and will not be one for nearly 2 years.

The thrust of the plaintiffs' claim herein, however, is that the defendants intend to submit to the international...