Printz v. US

Decision Date16 May 1994
Docket NumberNo. CV 94-35-M-CCL.,CV 94-35-M-CCL.
Citation854 F. Supp. 1503
PartiesSheriff/Coroner Jay PRINTZ, Ravalli County, Montana, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Montana

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James A. Haynes, James A. Haynes Law Firm, Hamilton, MT, Stephen P. Halbrook, Halbrook Law Firm, Fairfax, VA, for plaintiff.

Lorraine D. Gallinger, Sherry S. Matteucci, Frank W. Hunger, Office of U.S. Atty., Billings, MT, Dennis G. Linder, Sandra M. Schraibman, Michael Sitcov, Pamela J. Eppli, Robert A. VanKirk, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Div., Washington, DC, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

LOVELL, District Judge.

This matter came before the court for hearing on Plaintiff's applications for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction requesting that the court enjoin enforcement of Section 102(a) of Pub.L. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(s). Plaintiff was represented at the hearing by Stephen P. Halbrook, Esq., and James A. Haynes, Esq., and the government was represented by Michael Sitcov, Esq. At the hearing, the parties stipulated to Plaintiff's request that the hearing be consolidated with the trial on the merits.1 After considering all testimony, affidavits and arguments submitted by the parties, the court enters the following opinion and order on the merits of this case.

BACKGROUND

On November 30, 1993, Congress enacted the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act ("Act"), as an amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968. The interim provisions of the Act require that before a handgun dealer can transfer a handgun to a buyer, he or she must, in certain cases,2 transmit a copy of a statement received from the buyer to the chief law enforcement officer ("CLEO") in the jurisdiction and wait for the earlier of five days or the CLEO's approval of the transfer.3 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(I), (i)(IV), and (ii). During the waiting period, the CLEO is directed to make a reasonable effort to ascertain whether the transferee's receipt or possession of the handgun would violate the law. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2). The Act also directs that if the CLEO does not determine that the transferee is ineligible to receive the handgun, the CLEO must destroy the statement within twenty days. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(B)(i). However, if the CLEO determines that the transferee is ineligible, and the transferee requests, the CLEO must provide the reasons for the determination within twenty days. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(C).

Plaintiff requests that this court enter a declaratory judgment that the Act is unconstitutional and permanently enjoin it on the ground that the commands to the CLEOs are beyond the powers delegated to Congress by the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, and violate the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. In addition, Plaintiff requests the same relief as to 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) on the ground that it is vague and violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

DISCUSSION

This is not a case about the Second Amendment. This case turns on the proper relationship between the federal government and the several states, and in particular, on the constitutionality of federally imposed, unfunded mandates to the states.

STANDING:

At the forefront of the government's argument in opposition is its claim that Plaintiff lacks standing or is not authorized by state law to bring this action. The government asserts that Plaintiff sustains no injury as a result of the Act and therefore, lacks standing to sue and has no authority to bring this action in his official capacity under Montana law. The government also questions whether Plaintiff is the real party in interest, impliedly concluding that the action should have been brought by Ravalli County.4

In response, Plaintiff points out that entities created by state law were plaintiffs in three leading Tenth Amendment civil cases.5 As to the right to bring suit under Montana law, Plaintiff contends it is "hornbook law" that he has the implied right to sue to enforce his legally prescribed duties as a public officer. 63A Am.Jur.2d § 316 Public Officers and Employees (1984).

Standing raises the question whether the "litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). At an "irreducible constitutional minimum," standing is comprised of three elements: an "injury in fact," or an actual or imminent invasion of a concrete and particularized legally-protected interest; a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and the likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351, 364 (1992) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff in his official capacity as sheriff is required to perform those duties prescribed by state law and takes an oath to this effect. Mont.Code Ann. §§ 7-32-2121(12) and 2-16-211(1). Failure to perform legally prescribed duties with respect to a court of justice constitutes malfeasance in contempt of the court's authority. Mont.Code Ann. § 3-1-501(1)(c).

At the hearing hereon, Plaintiff testified that enforcement of the Act forces him to reallocate already limited resources such that he is unable to carry out certain duties prescribed by state law. This results in "injury in fact" to Plaintiff in that the Act requires him to violate his oath and possibly act in contempt of the court's authority.6 In addition, there is no question that there is a causal connection between Plaintiff's injury and enforcement of the Act and that a favorable decision will redress Plaintiff's complaint. Therefore, at an "irreducible constitutional minimum," Plaintiff has standing.

As the government notes, however, plaintiff-public officers suing in their official capacity raise additional standing issues, most notably, identification of the real party in interest. The government cites to four United States Supreme Court cases in its brief discussion of this issue but fails to provide any analysis thereof. Although the cases cited support the government's position in that the moving party was found to lack standing, none of the cases is analogous to the present case.7 Rather, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968), is on point.

Appellants there, members of local boards of education who took an oath to support the United States Constitution, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional New York statute. The Court found that Appellants' belief that the statute was unconstitutional forced them to choose between violating their oath or refusing to comply with the statute, the latter of which would likely result in expulsion from office and a reduction in state funding for their school districts. Board of Education, 392 U.S. at 241 n. 5, 88 S.Ct. at 1925 n. 5. Based on these findings, the Court summarily disposed of the standing issue by ruling that "there can be no doubt that Appellants thus have a `personal stake in the outcome of this litigation.'" Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)).

The present case is analogous to Board of Education in that Plaintiff believes he is forced to choose between violating his oath or violating the Act, and in either case, possibly subjecting himself to contempt proceedings.8 In these circumstances, there is no doubt that Plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation such that he has standing in this action.

Having analyzed the constitutional implications of standing, the court turns to the government's remaining contention, namely, that Plaintiff has no authority to bring this action in his official capacity under Montana law.9 The government argues that there is no Montana statute authorizing Plaintiff to bring this action, as required by Mont.Code Ann. § 7-1-2102.10 However, consistent with Plaintiff's position, the Montana Supreme Court has adopted 67 C.J.S. Officers § 250 (1978), which states the general rule that "public officers have capacity to sue commensurate with their public trust or duties without express statutory authority." See State v. School Dist. No. 13, 116 Mont. 294, 151 P.2d 168 (1944).

Plaintiff in School Dist. No. 13 was a county superintendent who sought a writ of injunction against the school district's board of trustees, among others, as a relator for the state of Montana. Defendants contended that Plaintiff lacked standing as a relator because he was not a taxpayer within the district.

The court began its analysis of the standing issue by recognizing that Montana law requires plaintiff to supervise the public schools in his county and that a legal proceeding is plaintiff's only method of responding to resistance to his actions in carrying out this duty. The court then stated, "It may be laid down as a general principle, that the limit of the power of a public officer is that statute conferring the power, and what further power is necessarily implied in order to effectuate that which is expressly conferred." School Dist. No. 13, 116 Mont. at 299-300, 151 P.2d at 170 (quoting In re Farrell, 36 Mont. 254, 262, 92 P. 785, 787 (1907)). The court went on to state the general rule of law that "public officers ordinarily need not be authorized by statute to bring suit, having implied authority to do so co-extensive with their public trusts and duties." Id. (quoting 46 C.J. Officers § 333 (1928)). Based on the authorities cited, the court ruled that "it was the officer's duty and not his right which impels his action, and he need not, like a private citizen, show a personal interest in the controversy...

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13 cases
  • Mack v. U.S., s. 94-16940
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • September 8, 1995
    ...505 U.S. 144, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992). See Mack v. United States, 856 F.Supp. 1372 (D.Ariz.1994); Printz v. United States, 854 F.Supp. 1503 (D.Mont.1994). 2 Neither court enjoined the provisions of the Act requiring CLEOs to explain the reasons for rejecting a purchase applic......
  • City of Phila. v. Sessions, CIVIL ACTION NO. 17–3894
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
    • June 6, 2018
    ...neither addressed the issue of irreparable injury. Mack v. United States, 856 F.Supp. 1372, 1374 (D. Ariz. 1994) ; Printz v. United States, 854 F.Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994). After the Ninth Circuit found no Tenth Amendment violation and vacated the injunctions, Mack v. United States, 66 F.3......
  • Frank v. U.S.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • March 14, 1996
    ...to us that these post-search responsibilities are onerous. Other courts have concluded they are not. See Printz v. United States, 854 F.Supp. 1503, 1517 (D.Mont.1994) (record destruction requirement is de minimis ), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Mack, 66 F.3d at 1034; McGee v. United Stat......
  • Printz v. U.S.
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 27, 1997
    ...from the remainder of the Act, effectively leaving a voluntary background-check system in place. 856 F.Supp. 1372 (D.Ariz.1994); 854 F.Supp. 1503 (D.Mont.1994). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding none of the Brady Act's interim provisions to be u......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Keeping guns out of the "wrong" hands: the Brady law and the limits of regulation.
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 86 No. 1, September 1995
    • September 22, 1995
    ...States, the court held that the criminal penalties contained in [sections] 924 do not apply to the CLEO. Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1510 (D. Mont. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, dismissed in part sub. nom Mack v. United States, 1995 WL 527616, 64 USLW 2169 (9th Cir. 1......

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