Prioli v. Cnty. of Ocean

• Decision Date: 30 September 2021
• Docket Number: 2:18-cv-00256 (BRM) (ESK)
• Parties: SARAH PRIOLI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF OCEAN, et al. Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

SARAH PRIOLI, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
COUNTY OF OCEAN, et al. Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-00256 (BRM) (ESK)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

September 30, 2021

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI, United States District Judge

Before this Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 52) filed by Defendants Joshua Dickinson (“Dickinson”) and John Haberbush (“Haberbush”) and another Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 53) filed by Defendants County of Ocean (“Ocean”), Sandra Mueller (“Mueller”), Joseph Valenti (“Valenti”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs Sarah Prioli (“Prioli”), Elizabeth Clarke (“Clarke”), Nicole Horan (“Horan”), Theresa Wallace (“Wallace”), and Jody Neilson (“Neilson”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) opposed Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.^[1] (ECF No. 55.) Defendants filed Replies. (ECF Nos. 56, 57.) Having reviewed the submissions filed in connection with the motions and having declined to hold oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause appearing,

1

Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

I. Background

Plaintiffs are or were female employees of Ocean, a county in the State of New Jersey, at Ocean County Department of Corrections (“OCDC”). (ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 6-10; ECF No. 55-2 at 8.) OCDC employs Dickinson, Haberbush, Mueller, and Valenti. (ECF No. 11 ¶ 11.) OCDC is an inmate correction facility owned and operated by Ocean. (ECF No. 55-2 at 8.) OCDC houses both male and female inmates in separate units, with female officers attending female inmates and male officers attending male inmates. (Id.) The reporting structure in OCDC follows a basic chain of command: officers report to sergeants, sergeants report to lieutenants, lieutenants report to captains, captains report to deputy wardens, and deputy wardens report to wardens. (ECF No. 11 ¶ 22.) Prioli and Horan are sergeants. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.) Clarke was a sergeant at the beginning of this action (id. ¶ 7) and retired in 2019 (ECF No. 55-3 ¶ 35). Wallace is a captain. (ECF No. 11 ¶ 9.) Neilson, who is no longer employed with OCDC, was an officer at the beginning of this action. (Id. ¶ 10; ECF No. 55-2 at 8.) Plaintiffs are or were supervised by Warden Mueller, Deputy Warden Valenti, Captain Haberbush and Lieutenant Dickinson. (ECF No. 55-2 at 8.)

On or about October 16, 2017, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued a Right to Sue letter to Prioli, Clarke and Horan (collectively, “Title VII Plaintiffs”), after they filed a charge with the EEOC on November 2, 2016. (Id. at 12, 22.) With this, Title VII Plaintiffs have exhausted administrative remedies as required to assert a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII, ” as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e). (Id. at 23.) On January 9, 2018, Title VII Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination

2

(“NJLAD, ” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10-5, et seq.), and the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA, ” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-1, et seq.). (ECF No. 1.) On May 4, 2018, Title VII Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, which joined Wallace and Neilson as additional Plaintiffs, asserting: (1) § 1981 claims under Counts 2, 4, 7, 11, 14, 16, 19, 21, 24, 26, and 29; (2) Title VII claims against Mueller, Valenti, Haberbush, and Dickinson (collectively, “Individual Defendants”) under Counts 12, 15, 17, 20, 22, 25, 27, and 30; (3) Title VII claims against Ocean for intentional discrimination under Count 1, hostile work environment under Count 5, and retaliation under Count 8; (4) NJLAD claims against Ocean for intentional discrimination under Count 3, hostile work environment under Count 6, and retaliation under Count 9; (5) NJLAD claims against Individual Defendants for aiding and abetting under Counts 13, 18, 23, and 28; and (6) a CEPA claim under Count 10. (ECF No. 11.) Wallace and Neilson need not exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to § 2000e, because they do not assert Title VII claims. (Id. ¶ 5.) In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege there has been “a systematic, continuous pattern and practice of gender discrimination, hostile work environment and/or retaliation against” them caused by Ocean's employees at OCDC. (Id. ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs further allege Individual Defendants “knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted Ocean in its discriminatory policies and practices which have deprived Plaintiff[s] of equal employment.” (Id.) Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages due to Defendants' alleged violations of federal and state laws. (Id.)

On January 11, 2021, Dickinson and Haberbush filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 52.) On January 14, 2021, Ocean, Mueller, and Valenti filed another Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 53.) On February 15, 2021, Plaintiffs opposed Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No.

3

55.) On March 1, 2021, Dickinson and Haberbush filed a Reply. (ECF No. 56.) On March 2, 2021, Ocean, Mueller, and Valenti filed another Reply. (ECF No. 57.)

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A factual dispute is genuine only if there is “a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party, ” and it is material only if it has the ability to “affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting id. at 255).

The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the basis for its motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “If the moving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, that party must support its motion with credible evidence . . . that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.” Id. at 331 (citing 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727 (2d ed. 1983)). On the other hand, if the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the nonmoving party, the movant may satisfy Rule 56's burden of production by either: (1) “submit[ting] affirmative evidence that negates an

4

essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, ” or (2) demonstrating “that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim.” Id. (citations omitted). Once the movant adequately supports its motion pursuant to Rule 56(c), the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324.

In deciding the merits of a party's motion for summary judgment, the court's role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Credibility determinations are the province of the factfinder. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). There can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact, ” however, if a party fails “to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. Local Rule 56.1(a) imposes an additional procedural requirement for the movant: “On motions of summary judgment, the movant shall furnish a statement which sets forth material facts as to which there does not exist a genuine issue, in separately numbered paragraphs citing to the affidavits and other documents submitted in support of the motion.”^[2] L.Civ.R. 56.1(a).

5

III. Decision

A. Summary Judgment Is Granted for Defendants on the § 1981 Claims

Defendants argue Plaintiffs cannot assert § 1981 claims, because Plaintiffs do not allege any discrimination against them based on their race. (ECF No. 52-2 at 33; ECF No. 53-3 at 35.) The Court agrees.

“Because the statute, on its face, is limited to issues of racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts, courts have concluded that sex-based claims are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.” Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 98 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); see also Hodgkins v. Kontes Chemistry & Life Sci. Prod., Civ. A. No. 98-2783, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2293, at *33 n.6 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2000) (“[Section] 1981 does not provide a remedy for sex discrimination.” (citing Smith v. Laborers Int'l, Civ. A. No. 87-2187, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11296, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 1987)); Jackson v. Right Stuff, Civ. A. No. 97-555, 1998 U.S. Dist....