Pritchard v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:94cv87-D-O (N.D. Miss. 1/30/1995), Civil Action No. 1:94cv87-D-O.
| Decision Date | 30 January 1995 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:94cv87-D-O. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
| Parties | SHIRLEY PRITCHARD, Plaintiff, v. HENKELS & McCOY, INC., Defendant. |
Currently pending before this court in this matter is the motion of the defendant for an entry of summary judgment in its favor. Finding that there exist genuine issues of material fact only as to some of the plaintiff's claims, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
There are many assertions and facts in contention in this case, and for the present purposes of the court it will be better at this portion of the court's opinion to briefly explain facts relevant to the nature of the case without much detail. When other contentions or facts become relevant to the court's analysis, they will be noted. From about April of 1992 until September of 1993, plaintiff Shirley Pritchard was employed in Starkville, Mississippi by the Deviney Company (Deviney). Ms. Pritchard contends that while employed there, she was subjected to sexual harassment by several supervisory employees of the company. The primary business of Deviney at the time was the construction of communication lines for South Central Bell. Deviney subsequently lost the South Central Bell contract, and therefore virtually abandoned the
Starkville operation. Defendant Henkels & McCoy, Inc. (Henkels) took over the South Central Bell contract and the Starkville operation as well. Pursuant to this takeover of the contract, many of the prior Deviney employees were hired by Henkels including the plaintiff.1 Apparently, also among those hired were some of the employees whom the plaintiff claims sexually harassed her. Calvin Mills, who has never worked for Deviney, was employed by Henkels at the same office as Pritchard. The defendant states that Mills was Pritchard's immediate supervisor. The plaintiff denies this, but it appears that the plaintiff answered the phone for Mills and that Mills had the authority to fire the plaintiff.
The plaintiff states that she made various complaints to management concerning the actions of her fellow employees, both while working for Deviney and for Henkels. She eventually filed an EEOC charge against Deviney in December of 1993, and a state court action in the Oktibbeha County Circuit Court in January of 1994. The plaintiff states that these actions were widely discussed around the Henkels workplace. After the filing of her EEOC charges and state court lawsuit, the plaintiff also notes that the work environment became "visibly different and harsher."
Regardless, both the plaintiff and the defendant agree that the quality of the plaintiff's work declined after Henkels took over the Starkville operation. The plaintiff explains that this decline is attributable to a lack of instruction on the part of Henkels and its supervisory staff. This decline led to errors in billing for which Pritchard was responsible.
Pritchard was fired by Calvin Mills on Monday, January 17, 1994. The firing of the plaintiff was a very hostile confrontation, and the parties hotly dispute the circumstances of this incident. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit,2 and asserted the following claims against Henkels:
1) that her firing was in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991 as a retaliatory firing in response to the filing of a claim with the EEOC;
2) that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff under the Mississippi "fighting words" statute for the actions of Calvin Mills during the firing incident;
3) that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for a trespass committed by Calvin Mills during the firing incident; and
4) that the defendant was wrongfully terminated from her employment under Mississippi law.
The defendant has now moved this court for the entry of a judgment as a matter of law in its favor.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. F.R.C.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment carries the burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the non-movant must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Hanks v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 953 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir. 1992). If the non-movant sets forth specific facts in support of allegations essential to his claim, a genuine issue is presented. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. "Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. v. Krajl, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1992). The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. King v. Chide, 974 F.2d 653, 656 (5th Cir. 1992).
As a claim arising under Title VII, the plaintiff's claim of discrimination is subject to the McDonnell Douglas shifting burden of production. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The plaintiff has the initial burden to establish his prima facie case. If the plaintiff does establish a prima facie case, "the employer must articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination." Flanagan v. Aaron E. Henry Community Health Serv. Ctr., 876 F.2d 1231, 1233-34 (5th Cir. 1989); Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980). The employer need not prove the absence of a discriminatory motive, but must show that the discriminatory motive did not play a significant factor in the decision to discharge plaintiff. Whiting, 616 F.2d at 121. Once the employer articulates its nondiscriminatory motive, the burden is again on the plaintiff to prove that the articulated legitimate reason was a mere pretext for a discriminatory decision. Id. The burden of persuasion to establish the statutory violation ultimately rests with the plaintiff, "who must establish the statutory violation by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. Even if the plaintiff succeeds in revealing defendant's reasons for terminating him were false, he still bears the ultimate responsibility of proving the real reason was "intentional discrimination." Saint Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) ()
In order to establish her prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff must show:
1) that she engaged in activity protected by Title VII;
2) that an adverse employment action occurred; and
3) that there is a causal connection between the participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment decision.
Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 42 (5th Cir. 1992). There does not appear to be any dispute that the plaintiff has met the first two of the prima facie requirements. The plaintiff filed an EEOC claim against her employer charging sexual harassment, and thus engaged in activity protected under Title VII. Subsequent to this, she was terminated from her employment, albeit technically from a different employer. The existence of the remaining requirement required to establish her prima facie case — a causal connection — is a contended issue.
The plaintiff filed her EEOC complaint against Deviney on or about December 28, 1993. She was fired by Mills on January 17, 1994, less than three weeks later. This timing itself is inherently suspicious, and this alone is minimally sufficient for the purposes of the motion at bar to establish her prima facie case as to a claim of reprisal discrimination. See, e.g., Shirley, 970 F.2d at 44; Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1994); Evans v. School Dist. of Kansas City, Mo., 861 F. Supp. 851, 858 (W.D.Mo. 1994). The plaintiff has met her burden in this regard.
Having determined that the plaintiff has met her burden under the present motion to establish her prima facie case as to her claim of reprisal discrimination, the court must apply the shifting burden of production and require the defendant to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the action taken against the plaintiff.
The defendant offers unsatisfactory job performance as its legitimate non-discriminatory reason for discharging the plaintiff in this case. The plaintiff herself even admits that her work performance declined after being hired by Henkels, but attributes her deficiencies to lack of instruction and direction. In any event, the defendant has met its burden in this regard.
Now that the defendant has presented its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discharge, the plaintiff must present evidence sufficient for a finder of fact to determine that the proffered reason is a mere pretext for discrimination.
As already discussed by the court, there is a close temporal proximity between the plaintiff's filing of EEOC charges against the defendant and her termination of employment. While sufficient to create a prima facie case, this fact alone is inadequate to provide proof of pretext. Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff must provide more.
Before firing the plaintiff, Mills...
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