Pritchett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 22 February 2002 |
Citation | 834 So.2d 785 |
Parties | Theodore PRITCHETT et al. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Alexander W. Jones, Jr., and Frank H. Tomlinson of Pritchard, McCall & Jones, L.L.C., Birmingham; Wyman O. Gilmore, Jr., Grove Hill; and Syliva Davidow, Anita Kawaja, and DéLisa Simmons of Fleming & Associates, L.L.P., Houston, Texas, "of counsel," for appellants.
Edward S. Sledge III, Walter T. Gilmer, Jr., and Todd P. Resavage of McDowell, Knight, Roedder & Sledge, L.L.C., Mobile, for appellee.
Alabama Supreme Court 1011129.
Theodore Pritchett (hereinafter "Pritchett"), as a putative class representative,1 filed an action against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (hereinafter "State Farm") alleging breach of contract. The facts that give rise to Pritchett's claim are as follows:
In August 1996, Pritchett was involved in a traffic accident that caused damage to his automobile. State Farm paid Pritchett $2,378.22 for the cost to repair the damage to the automobile. In his complaint in this action, Pritchett sought to recover from State Farm that amount representing the diminished value of his automobile, or the difference in the value of the automobile before the collision and the value of the automobile after the repairs made necessary by the collision. See Joiner v. Holland & Woodard Co., 652 So.2d 261, 262 (Ala.Civ.App.1994) ( ); Alabama Pool & Constr. Co. v. Rickard, 418 So.2d 149, 151 (Ala.Civ.App.1982) ( ). Pritchett maintained in his complaint that loss attributable to diminished value is inherent in every instance in which an automobile is damaged in a collision.2 State Farm denied that the terms of the applicable insurance policy required it to compensate its insured for any alleged inherent diminished value of a repaired automobile. We note that the parties did not on appeal present to this court the issue whether loss attributable to diminished value is inherent in any automobile that has been damaged and subsequently repaired; therefore, we do not address that issue.
The automobile insurance policy that Pritchett purchased from State Farm provides in relevant part3:
(Emphasis omitted.)
Pritchett moved for a partial summary judgment on the issue of State Farm's liability. The trial court denied that motion. State Farm then moved for a summary judgment. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of State Farm. Pritchett appealed to the supreme court, which transferred the appeal to this court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.
A motion for a summary judgment is properly granted where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P.; Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860 (Ala.1988). After the moving party makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794 (Ala.1989). To carry that burden, the nonmoving party is required to present substantial evidence, i.e., "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). In reviewing a summary judgment, this court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and must resolve all reasonable doubts concerning the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in favor of the nonmovant. Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.2d 412 (Ala.1990).
In its summary judgment in favor of State Farm, the trial court determined that the above-quoted policy language unambiguously provided that Pritchett could recover only the cost of the repair to his damaged automobile and that the policy did not provide coverage for any alleged loss in addition to the cost of those repairs. Thus, the trial court found that the policy language precluded Pritchett's recovery of any compensation from State Farm for the alleged diminished value of his automobile. In support of its judgment, the trial court cited as persuasive authority cases from other jurisdictions that hold that an insured may not recover from his insurer an amount representing the diminished value of an automobile that has been repaired after having been damaged.
In Alabama, diminished value has been recognized as a measure of damages when an action is brought by a third party. See King Motor Co. v. Wilson, 612 So.2d 1153 (Ala.1992) ( ); Coffee County Comm'n v. Smith, 480 So.2d 1194 (Ala.1985) ( ); Robbins v. Voigt, 280 Ala. 207, 191 So.2d 212 (1966) ( ). Those third-party cases are governed by the tort principle that damages should compensate the injured party for his or her loss or injury and should make the injured party whole. Ex parte Moebes, 709 So.2d 477, 478 (Ala.1997) ().
This case, however, involves a first-party breach-of-contract claim in which the plaintiff sought damages under the collision coverage of his insurance policy with State Farm. Therefore, contract principles govern the award of any damages in this action, and the language of the insurance policy determines the measure of damages to be recovered.
In his brief on appeal, Pritchett maintains that whether an insured may recover from his insurer for diminished value under an automobile insurance policy is an issue of first impression in Alabama. State Farm, however, contends that Alabama caselaw establishes that an insured may not recover under his insurance policy for the diminished value of his repaired automobile. In support of its position, State Farm cites Home Insurance Co. of New York v. Tumlin, 241 Ala. 356, 2 So.2d 435 (1941).
In Home Insurance Co. of New York v. Tumlin, supra, Tumlin sought to recover the cost of repairing his wrecked automobile from his insurer. Tumlin had purchased the automobile on credit, and the creditor was also named as an insured on the insurance policy under which Tumlin sought to collect damages. The trial court entered a judgment on a jury verdict in Tumlin's favor. The insurer appealed, arguing that the creditor should have been a party to the action, and that Tumlin was not entitled to recover damages without proving that he had discharged the indebtedness to the creditor, thereby obtaining a full interest in the automobile. Our supreme court reversed, holding that the trial court had erred in...
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