Pritts v. Ritchey

• Citation: 29 Pa. 71
• Parties: Pritts versus Ritchey.
• Decision Date: 01 January 1857
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

29 Pa. 71

Pritts versus Ritchey.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Franklin county.

McClellan and Nill, for plaintiff in error.—Joseph Pritts, by his agreement and entering into possession under it, became the equitable owner. Does this equity embrace the whole estate, or is it limited by the amount of purchase-money paid? In Richter v. Selin, 8 S. & R. 440, Justice DUNCAN says, Equity looks upon things agreed to be done, as actually done. Consequently, when a contract is made for the sale of land, equity considers the vendee as the owner of the estate sold, and the purchaser a trustee for the vendor for the purchase-money: Ives v. Cress, 5 Barr 121; Jones v. Patterson, 2 Jones 153. In these cases, the interest remaining in the vendor is regarded more as a security for the unpaid purchase-money than as an estate in the land. From this we conclude, that a vendee who goes into possession under articles and pays part of the purchase-money, the estate in the land is vested in him, and the vendor's legal title possesses only the incidents of an estate for action and remedy. If a new interest was acquired by a vendee, upon a conveyance being made, would it not be necessary to revive a judgment to make it a lien? In Longwell v. Bentley, 11 Harris 99, it is said that a contract for the sale of real estate converts the land into money; that the vendor's interest ceases to be real estate; that the legal title is only held as security for the purchase-money, and the vendee becomes substantially the owner of the estate. The widow, where the husband aliened in his lifetime, can only recover one-third the land itself according to value at the time of the transfer by the husband: Ellmaker v. Ellmaker, 4 Watts 91; Reed v. Morrison, 2 S. & R. 20; Galbreath v. Green, 1 Id. 95; Brown v. Adams, 2 Wh. 188; Remig's Appeal, 8 Watts 415; McMasters v. Carothers, 1 Barr 324; Morgan v. Scott, 2 Casey 51; Siter, James & Co.'s Appeal, Id. 178.

The argument that the estate of the husband was insolvent, can make no difference: Lineweaver v. Stoever, 1 W. & S. 160; Riddlesberger v. Mentzer, 7 Watts 141.

In this state, the Supreme Court has enlarged the principle of the English law as to dower. In Shoemaker v. Walker, 2 S. & R. 556, it is held that by the law and usage of Pennsylvania a woman is entitled to dower in a trust estate; and in Reed v. Morrison, Id. 18, that she may be endowed of an equity of redemption.

Reilly and Sharp, for defendant in error.—It is not essential to our argument, nor do we impugn the authority of Longwell v. Bentley, 11 Harris 99, and the cases which precede it, which rule that a contract of sale is considered in equity, as a conversion of the land into money. The vendor's interest ceases to be real, and becomes personal estate. The vendee becomes substantially the owner of the estate. But there are circumstances in this case, we submit, which makes it an exception. Equity considers as done what the parties have agreed shall be done. But equity will not consider that as done which the parties did not intend to have done. The agreement shows that the parties regarded the agreement as an executory and not an executed contract. They did not intend to pass a present interest, but only a future estate. Whether an article of agreement shall be construed as a conveyance, or an agreement for a future conveyance, must depend on the intention of the parties as collected from the whole instrument, and if that be doubtful, from the attending circumstances: Kenrick v. Smick, 7 W. & S. 45; Stouffer v. Coleman, 1 Yeates 398; Dawson v. McGill, 4 Wh. 239.

The article, although containing words of present transfer, did not convey the title to Pritts. There still was something to be done before the estate would vest in him, and he stood in the mean time in the light of a trustee for the vendor: Bear v. Whistler, 7 Watts 144. The payment of one-half the purchase-money was a condition precedent to the vesting of the estate in him. He was not seised of the estate either in fact or law during coverture, and therefore his widow is not entitled to dower: Shoemaker v. Walker, 2 S. & R. 556.

The demandant ought not to recover, because the defendant in error did not derive his title from her husband. At the date of the assignment by Pritts to Ritchey, he had forfeited all his right by failing to pay at the stipulated time. If an ejectment had been brought by McKnight and wife, and they had obtained a conditional verdict, and he had failed to pay at the time they would have become the absolute owners, and could have as such gained possession: Treaster v. Fleisher, 7 W. & S. 137; Gable v. Hain, 1 Penn. Pep. 264. In that case it will not be pretended that the demandant would have been entitled to dower.

Moreover, Pritts was insolvent at the date of the assignment to Ritchey. An execution against him was in the sheriff's hands. This was paid out of the purchase-money, paid to Pritts by Ritchey. If the land had been sold on it, her dower would have been gone: Groff v. Smith, 1 Dall. 404; Scott v. Crossdale, 2 Dall. 127; 1 Yeates 75; Deshler v. Beery, 4 Dall. 281; Helfrich v. Obermyer, 3 Harris 113. The plaintiff is therefore not injured. The proceeds went as much to the payment of the debts of her husband as if it had been sold on the execution against him.

The claim of the plaintiff is barred, because she waived her right of dower, and she is equitably estopped. She assented to the assignment by him of the articles at the time, and after his death declared she had no interest in or claim to the land. It is strong evidence of her assent. And if it amounted to an expression of intention to waive her right of dower, her claim will be barred: Deshler v. Beery, 4 Dall. 281. A formal written release was not necessary.

But should the court be of opinion that the demandant is entitled to recover, of what is she dowable? She claims one-third of the land according to its valuation at the date of the alienation by her husband. Is she entitled? We think not. A man by articles purchases land worth $60,000, pays $100, assigns the articles and dies, and his widow claims land set apart to her of the value of $20,000. The proposition is too monstrous to obtain consideration. There is no reported case in this state like this; but there are certain analogies in the law from which we may derive light in the investigation. A judgment against a vendor after articles binds not only the legal title, but the interest which he has in the land. So of a vendee: Cahoon v. Hollenbach, 16 S. & R. 431 Russell's Appeal, 3 Harris 319. If then the liens of creditors are restrained to the amount of the purchase-money paid by their debtors, why not widows in their claim for dower? We allege then that if she can recover at all, it is only the interest of one-third of the purchase-money paid by her husband. She is entitled to no benefit from the appreciation in value of the land: Benner v. Evans, 3 Pa. Rep. 456; Thompson v. Morrow, 5 S. & R. 293; Sharp v. Pettit, 3 Yeates 38; Barnett v. Barnett, 15 S. & R. 72; Lineweaver v. Stover, 17 S. & R. 297.

The plaintiff cannot recover in this action, unless entitled to recover one-third of the land by metes and bounds. Her husband did not die seised. And it is only in such case that a judgment for money can be given, in writ of dower unde nihil habet. Where he does not die seised, she can only recover one-third the land to be laid off to her in severalty according to the value at the time her husband aliened, which is fully sustained by the cases just cited, and by 2 Saund. 44. If the court hold that she is not entitled to recover according to the purchase-money paid, then she cannot recover in this action, because it could not be set off to her in severalty. The execution of the judgment would be impracticable.

The opinion of the court was delivered by LOWRIE, J.

When we notice that this claimant's husband was insolvent when he transferred his inchoate title to this land to Ritchey, and that, by that...