Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee

• Decision Date: 27 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-1846,93-1846
• Citation: 533 N.W.2d 780,194 Wis.2d 302
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Parties: , 64 USLW 2045 Judith M. PRITZLAFF, Plaintiff-Appellant, d v. ARCHDIOCESE OF MILWAUKEE, Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, Reverend John T. Donovan, Defendant-Respondent, Arizona Health Care Costs Containment System and Health Care Financing Administration, Defendants.

Page 780

533 N.W.2d 780

194 Wis.2d 302, 64 USLW 2045

Judith M. PRITZLAFF, Plaintiff-Appellant, ^d v. ARCHDIOCESE OF MILWAUKEE, Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, Reverend John T. Donovan, Defendant-Respondent,

Arizona Health Care Costs Containment System and Health Care

Financing Administration, Defendants.

No. 93-1846.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued April 26, 1995.

Decided June 27, 1995.

For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs by Matthew J. Flynn, Kevin P. Crooks, Katherine H. Grebe and Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee and oral argument by Matthew J. Flynn.

For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief and oral argument by Robert S. Sosnay, Milwaukee.

Amicus curiae brief was filed by M. Christine Cowles, Mary Beth Castino and Mohr & Anderson, S.C., Hartford, for Wis. Ins. Alliance.

DAY, Justice.

This is a review of a decision of the court of appeals reversing an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Honorable John G. Bartholomew, presiding, that dismissed all claims against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee (Archdiocese) and the Reverend Father John Donovan (Fr. Donovan) arising out of a relationship that was alleged to have occurred between Fr. Donovan and Ms. Judith M. Pritzlaff from 1959 to 1965 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and because the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Section 802.06, Stats. (1993-94). We conclude that to allow the claim to proceed against the Archdiocese based on Ms. Pritzlaff's allegation concerning Fr. Donovan despite the passage of twenty-seven years since the end of the alleged relationship would be contrary to the public policy of the State. We also conclude that the claims of negligent hiring, retaining, training and supervision are barred by the First Amendment in this case. We therefore reverse that portion of the decision of the court of appeals which remanded the case for a trial of the negligent hiring, training and supervision claim against the Archdiocese.

Ms. Pritzlaff first filed a complaint against Fr. Donovan and the Archdiocese on November 12, 1992. The relevant allegations from her complaint are as follows:

4. That at all times material, defendant Donovan was a Roman Catholic priest and an agent/representative of the defendant Archdiocese.

5. That defendant Donovan first met the plaintiff while she was a high school student in the late 1950's.

6. That thereafter, while acting in his capacity as a priest, defendant Donovan used said position to develop a friend like relationship with the plaintiff.

7. That defendant Donovan continued said relationship with the plaintiff.

8. That defendant Donovan did in fact use said relationship and his position as a priest to coerce the plaintiff to have a sexual relationship with him.

9. That as a result of the actions of defendant Donovan, the plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer from severe emotional distress, causing and contributing to the break-up of her marriage, separation from her children, loss of jobs and other difficulties.

. . . . .

11. That at all times the defendant Archdiocese knew or should have known the type of conduct being pursued by Donovan and should have taken steps to stop same.

Five days later, on November 17, 1992, Fr. Donovan filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, asserting among other things that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. On December 28, 1992, the Archdiocese also filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim which asserted that the alleged conduct of Fr. Donovan was not tortious, that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, and that the Archdiocese was not responsible as a matter of law for the alleged conduct of Fr. Donovan.

In apparent response to the defendants' motions, on January 20, 1993, Ms. Pritzlaff filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint was divided into two causes of action. The first cause of action was against Fr. Donovan for his alleged actions. The second cause of action was against the Archdiocese and incorporated by reference all of the allegations against Fr. Donovan. The amended complaint reasserted most of the allegations made above and added the following relevant allegations:

9. That defendant DONOVAN did in fact use said relationship and his position as a priest to force and coerce the plaintiff to have a sexual relationship with him without her consent.

10. That Defendant DONOVAN caused Plaintiff JUDITH M. PRITZLAFF, to suffer and continues to suffer from severe emotional distress, causing and contributing to the break-up of her marriage, separation from her children and serious personal injuries, including but not limited to severe and painful psychological injuries, which injuries are permanent in nature and have caused her to incur pain, suffering, humiliation, disability, loss of earning capacity and a loss of an ability to enjoy life and expenses for medical and psychological treatment.

11. As a result of the psychological distress caused by the sexual advances and the coping mechanisms which were subsequently developed by JUDITH M. PRITZLAFF, she has suppressed and been unable to perceive the existence, nature or cause of her psychological and emotional injuries until approximately April, 1992.

. . . . .

15. That upon information and belief, and at all times material hereto, the ARCHDIOCESE was responsible for the training and placement and supervision of archdiocesan priests and the assignment of those priests into archdiocesan's schools and church parishes within the Milwaukee Archdiocese.

16. The ARCHDIOCESE had a duty to admit only qualified candidates into the priesthood, properly test and screen candidates for the priesthood and priests to ascertain if such persons had an illness or sexual inclination which caused a priest to be sexually attracted to teenage girls/young women, ... prior to placing a priest in to the community, to make appropriate placements of priest considering all relevant factors, supervise the priests which the archdiocese placed into the community, to counsel and guide priests in dealing with issues of celibacy and human sexuality and to supervise the operation of the various parishes located within the Archdiocese, including but not limited to all parishes at which DONOVAN served.

. . . . .

20. The ARCHDIOCESE knew or should have known that DONOVAN had a sexual problem prior to 1959 and acted willfully, intentionally and in wanton and reckless disregard of the rights and safety of plaintiff by failing to remove DONOVAN from serving as a priest....

On February 8, 1993 and February 26, 1993, Fr. Donovan and the Archdiocese again filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In addition to the reasons stated in their first motions to dismiss, the Archdiocese asserted that the negligent supervision claim was inadequately pleaded and that First Amendment precluded a court from finding any liability on the part of the Archdiocese for negligent supervision. Ms. Pritzlaff did not respond to the defendants' motion to dismiss until March 31, 1993. The Archdiocese asserted that this failure to file a timely brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss was also a ground for dismissing the complaint.

On April 26, 1993, the circuit court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss. The court held that the Archdiocese was not responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior since the alleged actions of Fr. Donovan could not have been in the scope of his employment, that there is no basis to hold the Archdiocese liable on a theory of negligence, and that the statute of limitations bars the claims both because the plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence in discovering her claim and because "to allow this action to proceed after a passage of 27 years would be fundamentally wrong and in clear violation of sound public policy." Ms. Pritzlaff appealed the circuit court order.

On August 23, 1994, the court of appeals held that the claims were not barred by the statute of limitations. It also held that the circuit court erred when it declined to recognize the claim of negligent supervision. However, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's conclusion that the Archdiocese was not liable on a theory of respondeat superior. The Archdiocese, but not Fr. Donovan, petitioned this court for review of the court of appeals' decision. We granted that petition for review. ¹ Ms. Pritzlaff did not file a cross-petition seeking review of the court of appeals decision that the Archdiocese could not be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior. That issue is therefore not before this court.

This case requires this court to review the pleadings to determine if they state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When undertaking such a review, this court liberally construes the pleadings, and accepts the allegations in the pleadings as true. Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis.2d 627, 635-36, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994). Further, this court will dismiss claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted only if "it is quite clear that under no conditions can the plaintiff recover." Id. at 636, 517 N.W.2d 432.

A threshold question when reviewing a complaint is whether the complaint has been timely filed, because an otherwise sufficient claim will be dismissed if that claim is time barred. Section 802.06, Stats. (1993-94). Since we conclude that Ms. Pritzlaff's twenty-seven year old claim is time barred, we reverse that portion of the decision of the court of appeals which remanded the claim against the Archdiocese for negligent supervision.

The relevant statute of limitations for actions against the Archdiocese is three years. See sec. 330.205, Stats. (1963), and its successor, sec. 893.54, Stats. (1993-94). The three year period begins on the same date that the cause of action accrued against Fr. Donovan. Thus, unless the statute of limitations was...