Probst v. Adams Cnty. Sheriff Dep't
| Decision Date | 03 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:20-cv-00032-DCN |
| Parties | JULIA VANCE PROBST, Plaintiff, v. ADAMS COUNTY SHERIFF DEPT.; VALLEY COUNTY SHERIFF DEPT.; UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE; and ST. LUKES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Julia Probst's Complaint (Dkt. 2); Amended Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Dkt. 4); Draft Amended Complaint (Dkt. 13); Motion to Seal (Dkt. 14); Amended Complaint (Dkt. 20); and Brief (Dkt 23).1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court must review Probst's request to determine whether she is entitled to proceed in forma pauperis—which permits civil litigants to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee or to pay the filing fee over time. Rice v. City of BoiseCity, No. 1:13-CV-00441-CWD, 2013 WL 6385657, at *1 (D. Idaho Dec. 6, 2013). Because she is filing to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must also undertake an initial review of Probst's Complaint to ensure it meets the minimum required standards.
For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Probst's application to proceed in forma pauperis and will allow her to pay the filing fee over time. However, in light of the Court's review of Probst's Complaint, it DISMISSES Probst's Complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and GRANTS Probst leave to file an amended complaint. If Probst chooses to amend her Complaint, she will then be required to pay the filing fee—albeit over time.
"[A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, . . . without prepayment of fees or security therefor." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In order to qualify for in forma pauperis status, a plaintiff must submit an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets she possesses and indicates that he is unable to pay the fee required. The affidavit is sufficient if it states that the plaintiff, because of her poverty, cannot "pay or give security for the costs" and still be able to provide for herself and dependents "with necessities of life." Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Numours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). The affidavit must "state the facts as to affiant's poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty." United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court has examined Probst's application to proceed in forma pauperis and finds it does not conclusively establish her indigence. Probst lists her monthly income as $948.00 and her monthly expenses as $870.00. Dkt. 4, at 2, 5. In short, Probst has approximately $78.00 in discretionary income each month. Probst did not provide the Court with any receipts or documents corroborating her various disability disbursements or how they are applied to her expenses such as rent or groceries.
For these reasons, the Court finds Probst has not sufficiently proved her indigence under 28 U.S.C. §1915 and the Court will not waive the fee entirely. Nonetheless, the Court will lessen the financial burden by allowing Probst to pay the fee over time. Probst must pay the fee in $50 monthly installments.
The Court is required to screen complaints that are brought by litigants who seek in forma pauperis status. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must dismiss a plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). Pleadings prepared by pro se litigants are held to a less stringent standard and are liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986).
An in forma pauperis complaint is frivolous if it has "no arguable basis in fact or law." O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court has statedthat a complaint filed in forma pauperis may be dismissed as frivolous if it is premised upon "fantastic or delusional scenarios," outlandish legal theories, or the infringement of a legal interest that does not exist. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989) (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000)). Moreover, "[a] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts as alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Additionally, a complaint should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 if the factual allegations are not "plausible," but merely "conceivable." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009). A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. "Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Although the Court generally construes pro se pleadings liberally when conducting an initial review, "pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants." Id. (quoting King, 814 F.2d at 567). However, if amending the complaint would remedy the deficiencies, plaintiffs should be notified and provided an opportunity to amend. See Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 2003).
Here, Probst has essentially filed four complaints.2 She filed her original complaint on January 21, 2020. Dkt. 2. She filed what she titled her "Draft Amended Complaint" on May 1, 2020. Dkt. 13. She then filed her "Amended Complaint" on June 17, 2020. Dkt. 20. Finally, she filed her "Brief" on July 9, 2020, which is essentially a copy of her June 17, 2020 amended complaint. Dkt 23. The Court is unsure what complaint it needs to review; it is unclear if all of the complaints are moot except for the most recently filed July 9, 2020 version. However, as each complaint is insufficient, the Court will briefly review why.
In Probst's original complaint, she accuses five entities of violating her civil rights, creating false records, and distributing false records. Dkt. 2, at 6-13. Her complaint against each entity is insufficient. She has failed to allege either a plausible 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim or a Bivens claim against the various state, federal, or private entities.
First, Probst alleges she is bringing a § 1983 claim against the Valley County Sheriff Department ("VCSD"). In general, "[t]o establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both: (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011) ).
Bringing a § 1983 claim against a municipal police department is essentially bringing the claim against the municipality. See Annan-Yartey v. Honolulu Police Dep't, 351 F. App'x 243, 246 (9th Cir. 2009). Such a claim is considered a Monell claim. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
In a Monell claim, a municipality or police department performing a state function "may be held liable under § 1983 when the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority or such an official ratified a subordinate's unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it." Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled in part on other grounds by Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). A police department may not, however, be sued under a respondeat superior theory. A plaintiff must therefore show "deliberate action attributable to the municipality [that] directly caused a deprivation of federal rights." Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). "Where a court fails to adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and causation, municipal liability collapses into respondeat superior liability." Id.
In addition, a policy of inaction may be a municipal policy within the meaning of Monell. Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (). However, liability of an allegedly improper custom or policy may not be predicated upon isolated or sporadic events; rather, "it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct hasbecome a traditional method of carrying out policy." Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
In sum, to bring a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality or entity had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001). Since Iqbal, courts have repeatedly rejected conclusory Monell...
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