Prock v. District Court of Pittsburg County

Decision Date07 April 1981
Docket NumberNo. 54385,54385
PartiesTimothy C. PROCK, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT COURT OF PITTSBURG COUNTY; Norman B. Hess, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, Respondents.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Appeal From the District Court, Pittsburg County; Robert Layden, judge.

Penitentiary inmate petitioned the district court for a writ (mandamus or habeas corpus) to review certain actions of prison authorities which were claimed to have denied him some federally-protected liberty interests. Relief is sought from district court's summary judgment against the prisoner. Proceeding is treated as a timely appeal from district court's denial of writ.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

Timothy C. Prock, pro se.

Jan Eric Cartwright, Atty. Gen., by Janet L. Cox, Oklahoma City, for respondents.

OPALA, Justice:

The issues to be answered in this proceeding are: (1) Did the trial curt err in declining to assume jurisdiction of a prisoner's petition alleging denial of certain federally-protected liberty interests by prison authorities acting in contravention of state-fashioned internal prison discipline rules? (2) Are the prisoner's allegations sufficient to raise constitutionally-cognizable claims to an administrative prison discipline hearing?

We hold that (a) access to district court must be accorded, of right, to a prisoner who asserts a federally-protected claim to a prison discipline hearing and (b) the facts alleged by the prisoner, both here and below, are sufficient to entitle him to a hearing on every claim which he anchored on the prison officials' alleged invasion of his state-recognized liberty interests.

THE ANATOMY OF PRIOR LITIGATION

The petitioner, Timothy Prock (Prock), an inmate at the state penitentiary, petitioned the District Court, Pittsburg County, for a writ directing the warden to release him from solitary confinement and to restore certain of his privileges created by prison rules but withheld by an allegedly arbitrary internal discipline action. The trial judge summarily denied his petition, believing, no doubt, that he was without legal authority to interfere with internal management of prison facilities. 1 Prock now seeks in this court a writ to review the trial court's adverse decision and to pronounce that the district court is by law invested with power necessary to afford him the relief he sought below.

PRISONER'S ALLEGATIONS

Prock's allegations are:

Until August 21, 1979, he was classified as a medium security prisoner and was housed with the general inmate population. On that date he came to be transferred, without notice, to administrative lockup. This move resulted in his loss of certain privileges which include a monthly "bonus" and earned good-time credits. This was contrary to prison rules. Antecedent to his solitary confinement transfer, he was not allowed to appear before the institutional classification committee. He was merely informed by a prison employee that the transfer was being effected because he was then under investigation for alleged involvement in a fellow prisoner's homicide. On August 27th Prock did complete a form for an inmate grievance report to the warden. That form was returned to him the next day. He was told that he had failed clearly to define the problem. From the rejection of his grievance he next lodged an appeal to the Deputy Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (Department). That official responded with a written statement that the grievance was being returned to the warden who would provide him with an explanation for the transfer. Prock remained in solitary confinement some 29 days before being brought before the institutional classification committee. At his appearance before that body he was told that no change was possible in his custodial condition so long as he remained in the lockup. The administrative actions taken against him while he was kept segregated from the general inmate population are said to have been contrary to prison rules in the following particulars: (a) his case was not reviewed weekly, (b) he did not receive a written investigative report of the reasons leading to his segregation, (c) he did not receive a psychological evaluation every thirty days and (d) he was not allowed to have daily physical exercise, to attend educational classes nor to participate in any of the available rehabilitative programs.

During his five-month lockup he was not questioned by anyone with respect to the suspected misconduct which brought about his isolation from the general prison population. Nor was there placed in his file a followup investigation report with respect to his alleged complicity in the prison homicide. While the cloud of a suspected serious misconduct remains in his prison file, he has been afforded no administrative forum to clear himself or to procure a removal of the

detrimental information from his prison record. Prison rules provide for the deletion from an inmate's record of all those references to a disciplinary breach of which he has been cleared. The cloud of homicide-complicity attribution remains in his file and adversely affects his eligibility for transfer to a trusty status or for parole.

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Prock is uncounseled in this court. His request for the appointment of an attorney has been denied by a predecisional order. The protection of the Federal Constitution's VIth Amendment extends only to "criminal prosecutions". The issues for resolution here all deal with administration of internal prison discipline. This case does not fall under the protected VIth Amendment rubric. The state's own counterpart of the VIth Amendment's assistance-of-counsel clause Art. 2 § 20, Okl.Con. is also co-extensive with criminal prosecutions. It hence does not confer on Prock the right to secure a free lawyer. Moreover, Prock has not shown here any of those "special circumstances" which may make assistance of counsel essential as a matter of federal or state due process. 2

THE PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK OF REVIEW

Prock's pro se paperwork for review of the district court's disposition is titled "Petition for Writ of Certiorari and/or Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction". Since the plea for corrective relief sought by him from this court was filed here within the 30-day statutory time limit for appeal, we treat Prock's complaint as a petition in error. 3 The question to be answered is whether the district court's denial of Prock's petition was anchored on a statutorily-imposed limitation of judicial authority or constituted mere self-abnegation of power whose exercise is constitutionally mandated.

I.

JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT TO REVIEW A

FEDERALLY-PROTECTED INMATE CLAIM TO A HEARING ON

AN ALLEGED

BREACH-OF-INTERNAL-PRISON-DISCIPLINE COMPLAINT

Our statutes provide no explicit access to the district court to a prisoner who seeks review of a warden's administrative action taken in the course of maintaining internal prison discipline. Prock stands before us without the benefit of a state-created claim to question, in a judicial forum, any constitutionally impermissible agency behavior of prison authorities acting in the administration of correctional discipline.

This lacuna in our state law is itself offensive to constitutional notions of legality. A prisoner's access to the courts to litigate constitutionally-cognizable claims to a denied liberty interest is clearly mandated by federal case law. 4 If the parties to the proceedings are subject to state-court jurisdiction, a state court is authorized nay required to review violations of federal constitutional rights which occur within its borders. In short, prisoners must be provided with "some clearly defined method While statutory state law does not authorize review of actions by prison officials in dealing with internal breach of discipline, claims for vindication of constitutionally-protected interests, which may arise from prisoner misconduct disputes, must receive judicial scrutiny by the command of the Federal Government's fundamental law.

by which they may raise claims of denial of federal rights". 5

II. THE NATURE OF THE INMATE'S CLAIMS

Prock argues that certain arbitrary and summary action of the prison officials, acting in contravention of existing regulations, violated the minimum standards of due process. These actions are said to have consisted of (a) his transfer to solitary confinement and (b) improper treatment while he remained in that custodial surrounding.

The test for gauging a prisoner's claim to a due-process-mandated administrative hearing that precedes imposition of disciplinary sanctions is whether his liberty or property interest was in fact threatened with invasion. Both the United States Constitution and Oklahoma's own fundamental law require that governmental action affecting life, liberty or property conform to that measure of fairness which accords with the minimum standards of due process. 6

The basis for Prock's complaint is that he was deprived of liberty interest by a modification in his custodial surrounding which was so significant as to trigger a due process demand for a hearing. 7 We are not quite in accord with Prock's view. The notion that every state action with adverse consequences for a prison inmate is per se capable of raising a due process shield stands rejected by the United States Supreme Court. 8 A change in the conditions of one's confinement, although it may have a substantial adverse impact on a prisoner no matter how drastic will not alone suffice to raise due process implications. 9

While neither our state nor the federal constitution does guarantee any particular custodial condition to an incarcerated prisoner, the state may by statutory law or regulations limit its official latitude to change the conditions of confinement and limit the circumstances under which breach-of-discipline sanctions may be...

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25 cases
  • Payne v. Kerns
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • May 12, 2020
    ...claims to interests of expectations of a constitutionally -protected nature be afforded access to the courts. See, Prock v. District Court of Pittsburg County, 1981 OK 41, ¶22, 630 P.2d 772. By punishing inmates with something less than revocation of earned credits, the DOC escapes the stat......
  • Forbes v. Trigg
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • October 21, 1992
    ...it, see, e.g., Richardson v. Miller, 716 F.Supp. 1246, 1257-60 (W.D.Mo.1989) (thoroughly reviewing issue); Prock v. District Court of Pittsburg County, 630 P.2d 772 (Okla.1981), we do not believe we should decide this issue in a case where a prisoner has been accorded a judicial forum, albe......
  • Ping v. McBride
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • July 19, 1993
    ...it, see, e.g., Richardson v. Miller, 716 F.Supp. 1246, 1257-60 (W.D.Mo.1989) (thoroughly reviewing issue); Prock v. District Court of Pittsburg County, 630 P.2d 772 (Okla.1981), we do not believe we should decide this issue in a case where a prisoner has been accorded a judicial forum, albe......
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    • October 31, 1995
    ...Amarex, Inc. v. Baker, Okl., 655 P.2d 1040, 1043 (1983); Knell v. Burnes, Okl., 645 P.2d 471, 473 (1982); Prock v. District Court of Pittsburg County, Okl., 630 P.2d 772, 775 (1981); Harry v. Hertzler, 185 Okl. 151, 90 P.2d 656, 659 (1939); Ginn v. Knight, 106 Okl. 4, 232 P. 936, 937 (1925)......
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