Procknow v. Curry
| Decision Date | 20 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-2046,15-2046 |
| Citation | 826 F.3d 1009 |
| Parties | Jason Procknow, Plaintiff–Appellant v. Hugh Curry; Brian Rundquist; Matt Ondrey; Brian Renzy; Rich Evans ; John Collins, City of Eagan Police Officers in their individual and official capacities; City of Eagan; City of Eagan Police Department, Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Amanda R. Cefalu, Anderson & Helgen, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Jason Procknow, Terre Haute, IN, Pro Se.
Daniel Patrick Kurtz, Ryan Michael Zipf, League of Minnesota Cities Insurance Trust, Saint Paul, MN, for Defendants–Appellees.
Before SHEPHERD, BEAM, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
KELLY
, Circuit Judge.
Jason Procknow sued officers Hugh Curry, Matt Ondrey, and Brian Rundquist of the City of Eagan Police Department, alleging that they used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. After litigation of Procknow's motion in limine, which was granted in part and denied in part, the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of the defendants and the district court1 entered judgment accordingly. Procknow filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, which the district court denied. Procknow now appeals the partial denial of his motion in limine, and the denial of his motion for judgment as a matter of law. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
, and finding no reversible error, we affirm the district court on both issues.
This case arose out of Procknow's arrest for an alleged parole violation on August 29, 2011. Procknow was staying at the Extended Stay America hotel in Eagan, Minnesota, on that date. At the request of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, several officers from the City of Eagan Police Department—including Curry, Ondrey, and Rundquist—went to the hotel to arrest Procknow. It was undisputed that during the course of the arrest, Ondrey tased Procknow three times within approximately 20 seconds, and that Procknow suffered lacerations to his lips
, nose, and forehead as well as several chipped teeth. The other facts of the arrest, however, were disputed: Procknow claimed that he ran from the officers very briefly out of fear, but made no attempt to resist arrest, and that his injuries were the result of the officers kicking him, punching him, and stomping his head into the floor. The officers claimed that Procknow attempted to flee and refused to obey their commands, and that his injuries occurred when he fell into a door and then onto the floor when he was tased.
Before trial, the parties filed a stipulation to Procknow's criminal history, and both filed motions in limine. Procknow sought to exclude evidence of several of his prior convictions. The district court granted Procknow's motion in part, barring the introduction of his misdemeanor convictions for possession of a switchblade, carrying a concealed weapon, and fleeing or eluding an officer; and denied it in part, permitting the introduction of his convictions for theft of government funds, aggravated identity theft, forgery (three separate convictions), impersonating a peace officer, and attempted first degree murder.
The case proceeded to trial on March 2, 2015. On March 3, after the jury returned a verdict for the defendants, Procknow moved for judgment as a matter of law. In support of his motion, he argued that regardless of the jury's factual findings, Ondrey's third use of the taser2 constituted excessive force as a matter of law. Procknow also moved for a new trial, based on the district court's partial denial of his motion in limine. The district court denied both motions. Procknow timely appealed.
Procknow asserts first that the district court erred in admitting evidence of his convictions for impersonating a peace officer and attempted first degree murder. We review the district court's evidentiary determinations for abuse of discretion. Harris v. Chand , 506 F.3d 1135, 1139 (8th Cir. 2007)
. To reverse the district court on this issue, we must conclude both that the convictions were not properly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 609, and that their admission prejudiced the outcome of the case. See id. Because the convictions at issue were more than ten years old, they were properly admitted only if their probative value substantially outweighed their prejudicial effect. Fed. R. Evid. 609(b).
With regard to the conviction for impersonating a peace officer, the district court found that the crime “involved deception,” and therefore had “important probative value which, in the Court's view, substantially outweigh [ed] any prejudice, particularly because [Procknow] was impersonating a law enforcement officer.” Though it is true that Procknow's credibility was a significant issue in this case, we have some doubts as to whether a more than 20-year-old conviction for impersonating a peace officer is substantially more probative of Procknow's credibility than prejudicial. Cf. United States v. Brown , 956 F.2d 782, 787 (8th Cir. 1992)
(). Nevertheless, under the circumstances of this case, any error associated with the introduction of the conviction was harmless. Cross-examination on this conviction was limited to a single question, and occurred just before cross-examination on Procknow's convictions for forgery, aggravated identity theft, and theft of government funds. Procknow does not dispute that these latter convictions, all probative of his credibility, were properly admitted. In this context, we cannot conclude that the conviction for impersonating a peace officer had a “substantial influence on the jury's verdict.” Harris , 506 F.3d at 1139.
More concerning, given the greater severity of the offense, is the admission of Procknow's conviction for attempted first degree murder. Procknow argues that the conviction was highly prejudicial and that its probative value was minimal, particularly as to the third application of the taser (at the time of which, he argues, he had been both incapacitated and injured and no longer could have posed any sort of threat). This argument is persuasive insofar as the conviction was introduced as impeachment evidence under Rule 609—an attempted murder conviction is likely to be highly prejudicial, and its added probative value in a case with several other convictions bearing on the witness's credibility is likely to be quite limited. Fed. R. Evid. 609
; cf. United States v. Keene , 915 F.2d 1164, 1169 (8th Cir. 1990). But here, the conviction was not admitted solely pursuant to Rule 609. The district court also determined that the attempted murder conviction was admissible as substantive...
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