Proctor v. Butler

• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BOIS; GRIMES
• Citation: Proctor v. Butler, 380 A.2d 673, 117 N.H. 927 (N.H. 1977)
• Decision Date: 16 November 1977
• Docket Number: 7738,Nos. 7737,s. 7737
• Parties: Randolph H. PROCTOR v. Edward Joshua BUTLER. Roland LORD v. Louis F. ZUCCARO.

Page 673

380 A.2d 673

117 N.H. 927

Randolph H. PROCTOR v. Edward Joshua BUTLER.

Roland LORD v. Louis F. ZUCCARO.

Nos. 7737, 7738.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Nov. 16, 1977.

[117 N.H. 928] New Hampshire Legal Assistance, Concord (David Wolowitz, Concord, by brief and orally), for defendant Louis F. Zuccaro.

New Hampshire Legal Assistance, Concord (Bjorn R. Lange, Concord, by brief and orally), for defendant Edward Joshua Butler.

David H. Souter, Atty. Gen., Wilbur A. Glahn III, Asst. Atty. Gen., and David W. Marshall, Concord, for the state.

BOIS, Justice.

In separate proceedings, the respondents herein, Edward Joshua Butler and Louis F. Zuccaro, were involuntarily committed to the New Hampshire Hospital pursuant to RSA ch. 135-B (Supp.1975). They were each found by the Probate Court (Cushing, J.) to be "in such mental condition as a result of mental illness as to create a potentially serious likelihood of danger to himself or others" and were committed for a period not to exceed ninety days and four months, respectively. The central issue in both cases is the standard of proof by which the commitment criterion must be proven.

The evidence as to both respondents was conflicting in part and subject to varying inferences and is only briefly outlined here. Mr. Butler had previously been admitted to the state hospital on three occasions and normally presented himself in a "dramatic, theatrical" way. The instant commitment was precipitated when Mr. Butler was informed that his brother had suffered complications from heart surgery and was in frail health. Upset by this news, respondent himself went to the hospital and asked to be admitted. While being escorted to a doctor he became disorderly and had to be restrained. Officers then drove him to the police station for the purpose of charging him with disorderly conduct. It is alleged that during this trip respondent "threatened to use a police officer's gun and shoot someone to get the death penalty reinstated." Upon his return from the station, an examining doctor found respondent's mental state to be so disturbed as to constitute a danger to himself and others. A petition for involuntary commitment was filed the following day.

Mr. Zuccaro also had previously been admitted to the state hospital. The petition seeking his involuntary commitment alleged certain instances of bizarre behavior stemming from a delusion that certain nocturnal creatures were out to get him. As a part of this delusion, respondent insisted that lights be turned off at night; also, respondent told his mother that he wished she would "have a heart attack" and thus be spared "what was going to happen." An examining psychiatrist testified that respondent might, if untreated, lapse into a delusion which could result in suicide. Respondent told this doctor that his behavior had been a "joke."

In both cases, respondents moved that the court rule, as a matter of law, that the burden was on the petitioner to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent was then in such a condition as a result of mental illness as to create a potentially serious likelihood of danger to himself or others. In addition thereto, respondent Butler moved that the court rule that the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt or in the alternative by clear and convincing evidence that there were no less restrictive alternatives to involuntary commitment. The motions were denied and respondents urge that this constitutes error.

At the outset, we confront the state's contention that these appeals must be dismissed on the ground of mootness since both respondents have completed their confinement and are now discharged from the hospital. Relying on Dolcino v. Thalasinos, 114 N.H. 353, 321 A.2d 107 (1974), which similarly involved release during the course of litigation, the state argues that neither respondent has any further interest in his appeal.

( T)he question of mootness is not subject to rigid rules but 'seems, rather, to be regarded as one of convenience and discretion.' " Hood & Sons v. Boucher, 98 N.H. 399, 401, 101 A.2d 466, 468 (1953). "A decision upon the merits may be thought justified where there is a pressing public interest involved . . . ." State v. Swift, 101 N.H. 340, 342, 143 A.2d 114, 116 (1958). For the reasons set out below, we hold that, even assuming arguendo that the controversy is moot as to these respondents, the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine justifies our proceeding to the merits of the instant appeals. See Littlefield v. N. H. Interscholastic Athletic Assoc., 117 N.H. ---, 370 A.2d 645 (February 28, 1977); Hinse v. Burns, 108 N.H. 58, 226 A.2d 865 (1967).

The respondents assert that various probate judges hearing commitment petitions do not apply a uniform standard of proof to the "likelihood of danger" criterion for involuntary commitment. RSA 135-B:26 (Supp.1975). The state has not denied that such a lack of uniformity exists. The courts are thus apparently applying differing standards of proof to similarly situated petitionees, although the same "massive curtailment of liberty," Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972), is at stake in all cases. There can be no justification for varying standards of proof in such proceedings since they may culminate in a deprivation of an individual's most precious freedom his personal liberty. We agree that lack of uniformity in the standard of proof "contravenes the principle that all citizens are entitled to equal protection of the law." There is thus a pressing public interest calling for our resolution of this issue.

Another issue raised in these appeals, that of whether the state must prove the absence of less restrictive alternatives to involuntary commitment, demonstrates additional confusion in the proper application of RSA ch. 135-B (Supp.1975). The "substantial social costs stemming from continued uncertainty in the law," Kates and Booker, Mootness in Judicial Proceedings: Toward a Coherent Theory, 62 Cal.L.Rev. 1385, 1413 (1974), further establish the pressing public interest in a decision on the merits.

The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine should be invoked cautiously, for "a case should not be heard when the parties' interests are not sufficiently adverse to ensure proper and effective presentation of the arguments for each side." Kates and Booker, supra at 1387. However, we are satisfied that these appeals are not essentially "abstract, feigned, or hypothetical." Sibron v. N. Y., 392 U.S. 40, 57, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). The state has an interest in preserving the contested commitment orders of the court. The respondents' genuine interest in reversing those orders offers compelling evidence of the adversity of the parties. Although discharge remedies the immediate deprivation of liberty, it cannot free one from the less direct consequences of an adjudication that he is "in such mental condition . . . as to create a . . . likelihood of danger to himself or to others." RSA 135-B:26 (Supp.1975). Respondents' interest in securing their freedom from the "continuing disability imposed by the stigma of commitment," Note, Developments in the Law Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 1190, 1201 (1974), expresses sufficient adversity to "ensure adequate presentation of all arguments bearing on the issues presented." Kates and Booker, supra at 1402. (Footnote omitted). Finally, we note that our functional competence to proceed to the merits of these appeals is ensured by the parties' thorough briefing and arguing of the issues.

Despite the state's contention to the contrary, Dolcino v. Thalasinos, 114 N.H. 353, 321 A.2d 107 (1974), does not control our disposition of the instant appeals. Dolcino involved an analogous fact situation and presented similar issues but less than one year after the statute took effect. Now, more than four years after its enactment, problems in its application require our finding the public interest which was not present at that time.

For these reasons, we proceed to the merits of the instant appeals.

RSA 135-B:26 (Supp.1975) provides the criterion for involuntary commitment but does not define the standard of proof by which mental illness and potential dangerousness must be determined. The state agrees that constitutional due process standards apply to these commitments but argues that the constitution does not mandate the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof requested by the respondents herein.

The function of the standard of proof is "to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1076, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring). Of course, it is inevitable, where facts are in dispute, that the trier of fact will sometimes be wrong in his findings. Id. The choice of standard of proof influences which party will bear the risk of such erroneous findings: "As the required degree of certainty increases, the risk of error will shift; any error in the decisionmaking process will be increasingly likely to disadvantage the party who has the burden of proof." Note, Development in the Law Civil Commitment, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 1190, 1297 (1974).

The standard chosen may be said to reflect "the comparative social costs of erroneous factual determinations" In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 370, 90 S.Ct. (1068) at 1075 (Harlan, J. concurring). In a criminal prosecution, the reasonable doubt standard is required as a matter of due process, since the criminal defendant's "transcending" interest in liberty requires that the risk of error as to the defendant be reduced by " 'impress(ing) on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue.' " Id. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at...