Proctor v. Castelletti
| Decision Date | 29 February 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 25366,25366 |
| Citation | 112 Nev. 88,911 P.2d 853 |
| Parties | Penny PROCTOR, Appellant, v. Attilio CASTELLETTI, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
As a result of an automobile accident in which respondent Attilio Castelletti rear-ended appellant Penny Proctor, Proctor allegedly suffered extensive personal injuries. Proctor sued Castelletti. At trial, Castelletti sought to introduce evidence concerning payments Proctor received from a collateral source: disability insurance. Proctor objected to the introduction of this evidence on the ground that it would prejudice the jury's calculation of damages. However, the trial court allowed Castelletti to present the collateral source evidence on the ground that it was probative of Proctor's malingering. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Proctor for $7,000. This amount was less than the $150,000 Offer of Judgment that Castelletti presented to Proctor prior to trial. As a result, the district court awarded Castelletti attorney fees and costs because she failed to recover more than the Offer of Judgment. NRS 17.115; NRCP 68; Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 668 P.2d 268 (1983). Proctor appeals, contending that the district court erred in admitting evidence of the collateral source payments and awarding Castelletti attorney fees.
Whether collateral source evidence is relevant to an issue at trial other than damages is one of first impression in Nevada. 1 We now adopt a per se rule barring the admission of a collateral source of payment for an injury into evidence for any purpose. Collateral source evidence inevitably prejudices the jury because it greatly increases the likelihood that a jury will reduce a plaintiff's award of damages because it knows the plaintiff is already receiving compensation.
We note that the United States Supreme Court adopted a per se rule against the introduction of collateral source evidence because it believed that the prejudicial impact of collateral source evidence inevitably outweighs the probative value of such evidence on the issue of a plaintiff's credibility and motives. Eichel v. New York Central Railroad Co., 375 U.S. 253, 84 S.Ct. 316, 11 L.Ed.2d 307 (1963). We believe the Supreme Court's reasoning in that case to be persuasive here. In Eichel, the Supreme Court was faced with a suit brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) wherein the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the plaintiff had been receiving payments under the Railroad Retirement Act since his injury. Id. The Supreme Court held:
[T]he likelihood of misuse by the jury clearly outweighs the value of this evidence. Insofar as the evidence bears on the issue of malingering, there will generally be other evidence having more probative value and involving less likelihood of prejudice than the receipt of a disability pension.
Id., 375 U.S. at 317, 84 S.Ct. at 414 (footnote omitted). Other jurisdictions have applied the same rationale in barring the admission of evidence of collateral source benefits for the purpose of showing that a plaintiff was malingering. See, e.g., Reinan v. Pacific Motor Trucking Company, 270 Or. 208, 527 P.2d 256 (1974).
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