Proctor v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.

Decision Date19 November 2020
Docket NumberNo. CV-19-05503-PHX-MTL,CV-19-05503-PHX-MTL
PartiesMarissa Janelle Proctor, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Arizona
ORDER

At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Marissa Proctor's Application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income Benefits by the Social Security Administration. Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review of that denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff's Opening Brief (Doc. 19, Pl. Br.), Defendant Social Security Administration Commissioner's Answering Brief (Doc. 22, Def. Br.), and Plaintiff's Reply Brief (Doc. 23, Reply). The Court has reviewed the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc. 17, R.) and now reverses the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") decision. (R. at 12-36.)

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income benefits in January 2013. (R. at 172, 338, 345.) The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's application initially and on reconsideration. (R. at 101-68, 197-211.) Plaintiff and a vocational expert then testified at an administrative hearing before an ALJ. (R. at 37-69.) In June 2015, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 169-88.) The Appeals Council subsequently granted Plaintiff's request for review and remanded the case to the ALJ for reassessment of Plaintiff's mental and physical impairments. (R. at 189-94.) The ALJ then held another administrative hearing. (R. at 70-100.) The ALJ again found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 12-36.) In August 2019, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. at 1-6.) Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

The pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in addressing the issues raised by Plaintiff. Upon considering the medical records and opinions, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's disability based on the severe impairment of chronic pain syndrome. (R. at 18.) The ALJ reviewed the entire record, including medical records and statements from Plaintiff, a vocational expert, a State agency medical consultant, Plaintiff's treating physicians, and Plaintiff's counselor. (R. at 18-25.)

The ALJ considered back pain, rheumatoid arthritis, a history of opioid dependence, a fifth hammertoe, migraine headaches, and prediabetes, but did not find these impairments, separately or combined, to be severe. (R. at 19.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the residual function capacity ("RFC") to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels "that does not involve climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds or exposure to unprotected heights." (R. at 25.)

In making these findings, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff's complaints about "back pain that radiates to the legs," "rheumatoid arthritis that affects her hands, feet, arms, wrists, back and hips," and "[o]ngoing symptoms include chronic pain, diffuse joint aches, muscle tension, fatigue and intermittent headaches." (R. at 22.) The ALJ also analyzed conflicting medical and opinion evidence. (R. at 22-25.) The ALJ nevertheless found that the medical record demonstrates functional abilities and behaviors inconsistent with the duration, frequency, and severity of the alleged limitations. (R. at 23.) Based on Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform past relevant work as an office coordinator. (R. at 25.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabledduring the relevant period. (R. at 26.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner's disability determination only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the Court must consider the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a "specific quantum of supporting evidence." Id. Generally, "[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). "[The Court] review[s] only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he [or she] did not rely." Id. "Even when the ALJ commits legal error, [the Court] uphold[s] the decision where that error is harmless." Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). "An error is harmless if it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination, or if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned, even if the agency explains its decision with less than ideal clarity." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determineswhether the claimant has a "severe" medically determinable physical or mental impairment. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to be disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC and determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where the ALJ determines whether the claimant can perform any other work in the national economy based on the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff raises three arguments. First, she argues that the ALJ erred by assigning "little weight" to the two treating physicians' assessments and according "great weight" to the State agency's medical consultant. (Pl. Br. at 11.) Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed legal error by rejecting her symptom testimony. (Id. at 19.) Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly concluded that several impairments were not severe. (Id. at 23.) As addressed in turn below, the Court agrees with Plaintiff's first argument but disagrees with the other two.

A. Medical Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff's first assignment of error is that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of her treating physicians, Tiffany Nunnelley, D.O., and Joel Edelstein, D.O., and afforded too much weight to the State agency's medical consultant. (Pl. Br. at 11.) Defendant responds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision and that the ALJ set forth specific reasons for doing so. (Def. Br. at 9-10.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff.

An ALJ must consider all medical opinions when assessing a claimant's RFC. The regulations instruct that the weight assigned to medical opinions is determined based on factors including the examining relationship, treatment relationship, the length and nature of treatment, supportability, consistency, and specialization, among other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). That said, as Plaintiff notes, "special weight" is generally accorded to opinions of the claimant's treating physician. Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 825 (2003); see also Orn, 495 F.3d at 631 ("By rule, the Social Security Administration favors the opinion of a treating physician over non-treating physicians.").

Despite the deference generally afforded to treating physicians, the ALJ is not required to rely on them. If a treating physician's opinion is not "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques" or is "inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record," the ALJ need not give it controlling weight. Id. § 404.1527(c)(2); see also Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (an ALJ may discredit treating physicians' opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole or by objective medical findings). If a treating physician's opinion is not given controlling weight, the ALJ must consider the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) in assigning its relative weight. When rejecting a treating physician's testimony, "the ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors', are correct." Orn, 495 F.3d at 631 (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988)).

a. Treating Physicians' Opinions

The ALJ considered medical assessments from Drs. Nunnelley and Edelstein, Plaintiff's treating physicians. (R. at 24.) The ALJ gave "little weight" to both physicians. (R. at 24.) Dr. Nunnelley indicated that she "[did] not think [Plainti...

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