Proctor v. WMATA

• Decision Date: 12 March 2010
• Citation: 412 Md. 691,990 A.2d 1048
• Parties: Sylvester L. PROCTOR, et ux. v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

990 A.2d 1048

412 Md. 691

Sylvester L. PROCTOR, et ux. v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY.

Misc. No. 1 September Term, 2009.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 12, 2010.

Andrew H. Baida (Caroline L. Hecker of Rosenberg, Martin, Greenberg, LLP, Baltimore, MD; John B. Low of Law Offices of John B. Low, P.A., Temple Hills, MD), on brief, for Appellants.

Gerard J. Stief, Senior Associate Gen. Counsel (Carol B. O'Keeffe, Gen. Counsel, Mark F. Sullivan, Deputy Gen. Counsel, and Nicholas S. Nunzio, Jr., Asst. Gen. Counsel, Washington, DC), on brief, for Appellee.

Brief of the state of Maryland as Amicus Curiae: Douglas F. Gansler, Esquire Atty. Gen. of Maryland, William F. Brockman, Esquire, Deputy Sol. Gen., Baltimore, MD

ARGUED BEFORE BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.

GREENE, Judge.

We have before us questions of law certified by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Md.Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § § 12-601 to 12-613 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and Maryland Rule 8-305. The District Court has asked us to determine whether the waiver of sovereign immunity provision contained in Md.Code (1984, 2009 Repl.Vol.), § 12-104(a)(1) of the State Government Article applies to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA"), notwithstanding the broad waiver of sovereign immunity provision contained in § 80 of the WMATA Compact. We shall hold that § 12-104 of the State Government Article does not apply to actions filed against WMATA. The District Court also has asked us to determine whether the cap on noneconomic damages contained in Md.Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 11-108(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article or our decision in Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 660 A.2d 423 (1995), applies to civil actions filed against WMATA in light of the broad waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 80 of the WMATA Compact. We shall hold that both § 11-108(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and our holding in Oaks apply to actions against WMATA.

We adopt the facts of the case as set forth by the District Court in its Memorandum Opinion dated April 6, 2009:

On April 9, 2008, Sylvester Proctor was seriously injured when his motorcycle and a Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA") Metrobus collided at the intersection of Martin Luther King Highway and Parliament Place in Lanham, Maryland. Mr. Proctor and his wife Gloria ("Plaintiffs") filed their complaint for negligence and loss of consortium in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland, on July 30, 2008. The complaint seeks $7 million in damages, in addition to costs. Defendant WMATA removed the complaint to the District Court for the District of Maryland on September 4, 2008.

On February 19, 2009, WMATA made an offer of judgment of $400,000 to Plaintiffs, which they rejected. Based upon the decision of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Deschamps, 183 Md.App. 279, 297, 961 A.2d 591, 601 (2008), which applied a cap on damages in actions involving the State (of which WMATA was held to be a unit), WMATA moved for summary judgment on March 18, 2009. WMATA contended that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, it had made an offer of the maximum amount of recovery allowable under the damages cap, Md.Code Ann., State Gov't § 12-104 (West 2009), which Plaintiffs rejected, thereby divesting the District Court of jurisdiction over the case....

The outcome of WMATA's motion for summary judgment turns on (1) whether it is a "unit" of the state when suit is brought against it in, or removed to, federal court such that the $200,000 cap on liability contained in the Maryland Tort Claims Act should apply; and (2) whether the Maryland cap on non-economic damages applies.

As to the first issue, state and federal courts in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia have rendered inconsistent interpretations of this provision of Maryland's waiver of sovereign immunity. As it is axiomatic that the sovereign state may not be sued absent its express consent, this Court will accordingly defer to the Court of Appeals of Maryland for resolution of these important questions.

In light of the inconsistency in the interpretations of state and federal courts on this issue, the District Court certified the following questions of law to this Court:

1. Does the phrase "in a court of the State" contained in § 12-104(a)(1) of the State Government Article of the Maryland Code apply to civil actions originally filed in or removed to a United States District Court?

2. Do the terms "its units" contained in § 12-104(a)(1) of the State Government Article of the Maryland Code apply to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA") in light of the broad waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 80 of the WMATA Compact, such that civil actions filed against WMATA are not subject to the $200,000 cap for an incident or occurrence?

3. Does the Maryland statutory cap on noneconomic damages contained in § 11-108(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code apply to civil actions filed against WMATA in light of the broad waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 80 of the WMATA Compact?

4. Does Maryland decisional law, specifically Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423 (1995), apply to preclude a recovery by both spouses for a loss of consortium claim brought against WMATA in light of the broad waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 80 of the WMATA Compact?

Md.Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 12-604 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states that "the Court of Appeals... may reformulate a question of law certified to it." Accordingly, we shall combine Questions One and Two into a single question: Does the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in Md.Code (1984, 2009 Repl.Vol.), § 12-104(a)(1) of the State Government Article, apply to WMATA, in light of the broad waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 80 of the WMATA Compact?

Power to Answer

Before we may answer the questions certified by the District Court, we must address the issue of this Court's power to answer the certified questions pursuant to Md.Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 12-603 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Section 12-603 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states:

Power to answer. The Court of Appeals of this State may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States ... if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this State.

(Emphasis added.) WMATA challenged this Court's jurisdiction to respond to the certified questions in this case, arguing that the Court of Special Appeals' decision in WMATA v. Deschamps, 183 Md.App. 279, 961 A.2d 591 (2008), discussed in detail infra, is a "controlling appellate decision" as contemplated by § 12-603 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

WMATA contends in this Court that our opinions and opinions of the Court of Special Appeals are "controlling appellate decisions." WMATA points out that, when the Legislature amended the existing certification statute and adopted the revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Chapter 344 of the Acts of 1996, the wording of the statute changed from "controlling precedent in the Court of Appeals of this State" to "controlling appellate decision." This change, in WMATA's view, demonstrates the Legislature's intent to prevent this Court from accepting certified questions when the Court of Special Appeals has spoken on the issue. WMATA acknowledged at oral argument that, although this Court is the final arbiter of Maryland law, controversies must come before the Court of Appeals in a manner in which this Court has proper jurisdiction, which is lacking in this case. According to WMATA, the District Court's reticence about the approach taken by the Court of Special Appeals in Deschamps, 183 Md. App. 279, 961 A.2d 591, is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court. WMATA also asserted at oral argument that should this Court answer the certified questions, it will somehow undermine the precedential value of decisions of the Court of Special Appeals in the state's trial courts.

Proctor argues that, because there is no decision from this Court as the final arbiter on Maryland law, there is no controlling appellate decision on the issue presented with regard to the certified questions. According to Proctor, the Legislature's amendment to Maryland's Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Chapter 344 of the Acts of 1996, was undertaken in an effort to bring the statute in line with the national model statute, which sought to bring uniformity to procedures governing certified questions. Proctor cites the Floor Report and the Bill Analysis of House Bill 1450, which point to the revisions in question, as examples of non-substantive changes made to clarify the statutory language. Proctor further maintains that the proper consideration of what is a "controlling appellate decision" is a determination of whether the decision is controlling with regard to the federal courts, not Maryland state trial courts.

The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation "is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature." UMMSC v. Waldt, 411 Md. 207, 223, 983 A.2d 112, 122 (2009) (quoting Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443, 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006)). The plain language of the statute provides the best insight into the Legislature's intent. See id. In this case, the question turns on the proper interpretation of the phrase "controlling appellate decision." This Court previously analyzed the language of § 12-603 of the Courts and...