Procunier v. Atchley
Decision Date | 19 January 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 44,44 |
Citation | 91 S.Ct. 485,27 L.Ed.2d 524,400 U.S. 446 |
Parties | R.K. PROCUNIER, Director, California Department of Corrections v. Veron ATCHLEY |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
See 401 U.S. 966, 91 S.Ct. 966.
Respondent was convicted in 1959 of murdering his wife. A recorded statement, made in jail to an insurance agent in connection with discussion of a policy on the life of respondent's wife, was admitted into evidence at the trial. The California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction finding the statement voluntary. Respondent later sought federel habeas corpus relief, contending that the statement was involuntary. The District Court granted relief on the ground that the trial court had excluded relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and thus 'did not reliably determine whether (the) confession was voluntary or involuntary.' The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: An applicant for federal habeas corpus relief is not entitled to a new hearing on the voluntariness of a statement introduced at his trial merely because he can point to shortcomings in the state court procedure used to decide the voluntariness issue, as he must also show (which respondent did not do in this case) that his version of the events, if true, would require the conclusion that the statement was involuntary. Pp. 451—454, 412 F.2d 230, reversed.
Robert R. Granucci, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner.
Charles A. Legge, San Francisco, Cal., for respondent.
In 1959 a jury in a California trial court found the respondent guilty of murdering his wife by firing six bullets into her body at close range. A key prosecution witness at the trial was Ray Travers, an insurance agent. Two days after the respondent's wife was killed, Travers visited the respondent in jail at the latter's request, and the two conversed regarding an insurance policy on the life of the decedent. During the course of this conversation the respondent told Travers his version of how his wife had been killed, admitting that he had lain in wait for her with a gun, but insisting that her shooting had been accidental. As he was leaving the jail, Travers told the sheriff's officers about the respondent's statement. They asked him if he would be willing to have his next conversation with the respondent electronically recorded, and, since he planned to return to get additional information for the insurance company, he agreed. Later the same day Travers returned to the jail and had another conversation with the respondent, in the course of which the respondent again gave Travers substantially the same account of the circumstances of his wife's death. This conversation was recorded.1 Over the objection of defense counsel, the recording of the second conversation was admitted in evidence at the trial. Travers in detailed testimony verified the authenticity of the recording, and orally recounted the two conversations he had had with the respondent. The accuracy of the recording and of Travers' testimony was not questioned; indeed, when the respondent took the stand he gave substantially the same account of how his wife had been killed that he had given to Travers.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, the respondent contended that the second conversation with Travers was an involuntary confession, and that the record of the conversation and Travers' supporting testimony had, therefore, been wrongly admitted in evidence at the trial. The state appellate court unanimously rejected this contention and affirmed the conviction. People v. Atchley, 53 Cal.2d 160, 346 P.2d 764. Proceeding upon the proposition that 'any statement by an accused relative to the offense charged is inadmissible against him if made involuntarily,' Justice Traynor's opinion for the Supreme Court of California reasoned as follows:
* * *
53 Cal.2d, at 170—171, 346 P.2d, at 769—770.
This Court granted certiorari.2 After hearing argument, we disposed of the case as follows:
3
In 1967 the respondent initiated the present habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. He contended that decisions of this Court rendered subsequent to his direct appeal had established that the recording of his conversation with Travers had been unconstitutionally introduced into evidence, and that he was accordingly entitled to a new trial. It was asserted that his statements were involuntary under the criteria stated in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882, because he had been denied access to a lawyer and because he had not been advised of his right to remain silent; and that in any event the procedures used to determine the voluntariness of these statements were constitutionally inadequate under the criteria stated in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908.
The District Court, although making clear that it was not 'presently able to say that the confession was involuntary,' nonetheless concluded that the respondent was entitled to relief because the state trial court had 'excluded relevant and perhaps crucial evidence on the issue of whether the confession was voluntary' and thus 'did not reliably determine whether Atchley's confession was voluntary or involuntary.' 300 F.Supp. 68, 71, 72. The excluded evidence that the District Court thought 'relevant and perhaps crucial' had to do with what the police had said to Travers before the recorded interview, whether the respondent had been trying to obtain a lawyer, whether Travers had deceived the respondent about his motives and feigned sympathy, whether the respondent knew that the conversation was being recorded, and, finally, with the respondent's intellectual and educational qualifications. Because inquiry into these matters had been restricted, the federal court held that the wrong standard of voluntariness had been applied in the state trial proceeding. Accordingly, the District Court ruled that the respondent was entitled to a new hearing in the state courts on the issue of voluntariness and, in the event that the statements should be found involuntary, to a new trial. The Court of Appeals4 affirmed on the opinion of the District Court, Judge Barnes dissenting, and we granted certiorari.5
In Jackson, the Court held that to commit the determination of the voluntariness of a confession solely to the same jury that decided guilt was inconsistent with the constitutional requirement that the procedures used to determine voluntariness be reliable. Concern for the reliability of the procedures utilized to decide the voluntariness issue was also reflected in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770, where it was held that a state trial court's resolution of a disputed issue of historical fact could not be dispositive in a later federal habeas corpus proceeding unless the petitioner had had a 'full and...
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