Proescher v. Bell

• Decision Date: 21 August 2013
• Docket Number: No. 1:12–cv–1459–WSD.,1:12–cv–1459–WSD.
• Parties: Christopher PROESCHER, Plaintiff, v. Adam BELL, and Rodney Dantzler, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

966 F.Supp.2d 1350

Christopher PROESCHER, Plaintiff,

v.Adam BELL, and Rodney Dantzler, Defendants.

No. 1:12–cv–1459–WSD.

United States District Court,

N.D. Georgia,

Atlanta Division.

Aug. 21, 2013.

John R. Monroe, Roswell, GA, for Plaintiff.

Tuwanda Rush Williams, Gwinnett County Department of Law, Lawrenceville, GA, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR., District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Adam Bell and Rodney Dantzler's Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion for Summary Judgment”) [40].

I. BACKGROUND

On April 27, 2012, Plaintiff initiated this action against the Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking “damages for the illegal detention, search, and arrest of Plaintiff, as well as the seizure of Plaintiff's personal property” during an April 20, 2012, encounter at Gary Pirkle Park in Gwinnett County, Georgia.¹ [26, ¶¶ 1, 76]. Plaintiff also seeks a declaratory judgment that he “may not be ejected from Gary Pirkle Park while using such park for the purposes for which it is dedicated” and that he “may not be lawfully detained for carrying a firearm in a place where the carriage of firearms is not prohibited.” [ Id. ¶¶ 1, 77]. On July 10, 2012, Plaintiff amended his complaint to add a malicious-prosecution claim under Georgia state law (the “Amended Complaint”) [26].

A. Factual Background

Paul Reid Hanna (“Hanna”) was employed as a private security officer by Plaza Security, LLC. In this capacity, Hanna performs security-related functions for the City of Sugar Hill, including the patrol of Gary Pirkle Park (the “Park”). Hanna is required to investigate suspicious persons and activities. [42, ¶¶ 5–6; 47–1, ¶¶ 5–6]. The Gwinnett Police Department is the law-enforcement agency that Hanna called for help in unusual situations. Hanna called the police department once a week. [52, 17:10–12, 26:13–27:1].

On April 20, 2012, Hanna was patrolling the parking lot of the Park when he saw Plaintiff Christopher Proescher (“Plaintiff” or “Proescher”) walking on a walking path that circles the main parking area of the Park. Hanna saw a gun holster on Plaintiff's hip and assumed that there was a firearm in it. [42, ¶¶ 8–9; 47–1, ¶¶ 8–9]. Nearby was a children's playground. [52, 92:22–93:8].

Hanna observed Plaintiff's dress. Instead of clothing normally worn by walkers who exercise in the park, Plaintiff wore black boots, black socks and what looked to Hanna like a camouflage uniform. [52, 35:3–39:14]. Plaintiff was walking at a fast, determined, agitated pace. [52, 68:8–68:16].

Hanna called the Gwinnett County police dispatcher and reported that there was in the Park a person wearing military boots and black socks. Hanna further described the top and bottom of Plaintiff's clothing, and reported that the person was carrying a gun. Hanna asked whether any county ordinance or Georgia law prohibited the carrying of a firearm in the Park. [52, 37:19–40:3]. The dispatcher responded by asking whether Hanna needed a Gwinnett County police officer at the scene. Hanna responded that he did. [52, 40:9–40:18].

Defendant Bell (“Bell”) is a Gwinnett County police officer. [50, 4:13:4:16]. On April 27, 2012, he received a dispatcher's radio call stating that a suspicious person was at Gary Pirkle Park, near a playground, carrying a gun out in the open. Bell was told that a security officer had called in to report the suspicious person. [50, 12:2–13:23].

When Bell arrived at the Park, he saw Plaintiff standing next to a security guard inside the Park. Plaintiff was talking on a cell phone. [50, 15:4–15:9]. Bell identified himself to Plaintiff and asked for Plaintiff's identification. Plaintiff interrupted his phone conversation and asked if he was under detention. Bell responded that he was. Bell then requested that Plaintiff hang up the phone, and Plaintiff complied. [50, 15:19–16:12].

Bell detained Plaintiff because he had observed that Plaintiff was carrying a sidearm or firearm on his “left hip,” ² and was concerned for the safety of the people in the Park and for his own safety. Bell needed to identify Plaintiff to see whether Plaintiff was authorized to carry a firearm. Bell also wanted to find out why Plaintiff was at the Park. [50, 16:11–16:21].

Bell and Plaintiff walked to Bell's patrol truck, which was about 15 yards from where they were standing. [50, 18:1–18:9]. Bell asked if Plaintiff had other weapons. Plaintiff responded that he did not. Bell had Plaintiff place his hands on the bed cover of the truck and then asked Plaintiff for permission to pat him down. Plaintiff did not object. Bell removed the firearm on Plaintiff's hip and unloaded a round that was inside the chamber. Bell laid the firearm on the back of his truck. He patted Plaintiff down and felt a fully-loaded ammunition magazine in Plaintiff's left pants pocket. Bell removed the magazine and also placed it on the back of the truck. [50, 18:1–19:5].

Bell asked if Plaintiff had any identification, specifically asking to see Plaintiff's driver's license. Plaintiff responded by presenting a Georgia weapons permit that contained a name, date of birth and fingerprint, but which did not have a photograph. As a result, Bell could not confirm Plaintiff's identity. [50, 19:15–20:24, 36:16–36:25]. Bell asked Plaintiff why he was at the Park. Plaintiff responded that he was exercising. [50, 20:25–21:2]. ³

Defendant Dantzler (“Dantzler”), another Gwinnett County police officer then arrived at the Park as a backup. [50, 23:19–23:21]. Bell gave Dantzler a quick briefing on what had occurred, and Dantzler ran the serial number on Plaintiff's firearm through a database to determine if it was stolen. [51, 11:2–12:9, 17:24–22:25]. Plaintiff stated that he did not consent to a “search” of his weapon. Bell told Plaintiff that Dantzler was running the serial number to determine if it had been reported stolen. [50, 23:22–24:5]. The database search indicated that the gun was not stolen. [51, 17:24–22:25].

Bell continued to ask Plaintiff for a form of identification that contained Plaintiff's photo. [50, 36:16–36:25]. In response, Plaintiff gave confusing information about his birthday and evaded requests for his driver's license, including by chatting about dogwood leaves and Bell's legs and eyes. [50, 32:11–32:18, 38:24–38:25]. When specifically asked to provide his license, Plaintiff stated that he had “a license for whatever he [needed] a license for.” [50, 37:11–37:21]

Corporal Kimsey (“Kimsey”), Bell's immediate supervisor, next arrived on the scene and spoke to Hanna. [50, 40:15–41:6]. After learning that Hanna had asked Plaintiff to leave the Park and that Plaintiff had refused, Kimsey called the magistrate judge to determine whether an arrest of Plaintiff could be made. The magistrate judge replied that there was enough probable cause to arrest. [50, 41:19–43:3]. Kimsey then walked to Bell and told him that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for criminal trespass. Kimsey explained that Hanna had asked Plaintiff to leave the Park, but Plaintiff had declined. Kimsey also told Bell that a magistrate judge had confirmed over the phone that there was enough probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for criminal trespass. [ Id.].

Bell ultimately filled out an affidavit of criminal trespass and arrested Plaintiff. Bell handcuffed and searched Plaintiff. During the search, Bell discovered that Plaintiff had possession of a tape-recorder and determined that it had been recording Plaintiff's encounter with Hanna, Bell, Dantzler and Kimsey. [50, 45:20–46:16].^4,5,6

B. Procedural History

Bell and Dantzler move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim on the ground that Plaintiff has not asserted cognizable claims that his constitutional rights were violated. Even if Plaintiff did, Defendants argue that (i) Plaintiff has not asserted a cognizable claim against Gwinnett County based on any policy or conscious disregard by the county, and (ii) Bell and Dantzler are entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, Defendants claim that summary judgment is required to be granted on Plaintiff's malicious-prosecution claim because they did not act maliciously or without authority of law. The Court begins by analyzing Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, the capacity in which Defendants are alleged to have acted, and whether they are entitled to qualified immunity.

II. DISCUSSIONA. Legal Standard

A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Parties “asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support that assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir.1999). Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-movant must demonstrate that summary judgment is inappropriate by designating specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir.1999). Non-moving parties “need not present evidence in a form necessary for admission at trial; however, [they] may not merely rest on [their] pleadings.” Id.

The Court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and must draw all inferences in favor of the non-movant, but only “to the extent supportable by the record.” Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1165 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007)). “[C]redibility determinations,...