Proft v. Madigan
| Citation | 340 F.Supp.3d 683 |
| Decision Date | 24 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 18 C 4947 |
| Parties | Dan PROFT and Liberty Principles PAC, Plaintiffs, v. Lisa MADIGAN, Attorney General of Illinois, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Patrick Joseph Hughes, Jeffrey M. Schwab, James Joseph McQuaid, Liberty Justice Center, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Thomas A. Ioppolo, Sarah Hughes Newman, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Dan Proft and the independent expenditure committee he chairs, Liberty Principles PAC, sued Lisa Madigan, the Attorney General of Illinois, and the members of the Illinois State Board of Elections in their official capacities, alleging that a provision of the Illinois Election Code violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. (Dkt. 1.)
The Code generally limits contributions that individuals and organizations may make to candidates for office and their campaigns, but it removes those limits in races where a candidate's self-funding, or independent expenditures supporting or opposing a candidate, exceed a threshold amount. That rule, however, has one important exception that is the subject of this litigation: independent expenditure committees can never contribute to candidates even in races where the Code lifts the limits for everyone else. Attorney General Madigan justifies this exception by invoking the prevention-of-corruption rationale that the Supreme Court recognizes. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 359, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). Proft claims that these groups do not pose a unique threat of corruption and it is not fair to ban them from contributing when all others can do so. To do that, in his view, unreasonably restricts the free-speech and free-association rights of the organizations and the individuals who comprise them.
Proft accordingly moved this Court to preliminarily enjoin Attorney General Madigan from enforcing the Code in the 2018 Election so that he and his committee can participate in races where the Code eliminates contribution limits to the same extent as individuals and other groups. (Dkt. 12.) Attorney General Madigan opposed this motion and moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that independent expenditure committees must remain independent. (Dkt. 19.) Because accepting Proft's argument would erase the Supreme Court's 40-year-old distinction between contributions and independent expenditures, the Court denies his motion for a preliminary injunction and grants Attorney General Madigan's motion to dismiss.
Dan Proft is a political activist. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 8–9.) He founded a political committee named Liberty Principles PAC. Id. More specifically, Liberty Principles is an independent expenditure committee which the Illinois Election Code defines as an organization, corporation, association, or committee "formed for the exclusive purpose of making independent expenditures during any 12-month period in an aggregate amount exceeding $5,000 in support of or in opposition to ... [the] election ... of any public official or candidate." 10 ILCS 5/9-1.8(f). An independent expenditure is "any payment, gift, donation or other expenditure of funds" for "electioneering communications," or other express advocacy urging the election or defeat of a candidate. 10 ILCS 5/9-1.15.
Basically, these committees are independent because they lack the connection to and coordination with a candidate or campaign that their counterparts, political action committees, have. Indeed, an independent expenditure committee's funding of electioneering communications or express advocacy must "not [be] made in connection, consultation, or concert with or at the request or suggestion of the candidate's political committee or campaign." Id. Conversely, a coordinated expenditure is just a contribution of the sort that a political action committee ("PAC") would make. Some observers, in fact, refer to independent expenditure committees as "super PACs" because they can raise and spend unlimited money, provided they do not cooperate or consult with a candidate, her committee, or the committee of a political party.
This distinction is consequential. On the one hand, the Code limits the contribution amounts that PACs can receive and make themselves. See 10 ILCS 5/9-8.5(d) ; see also Dkt. 1 ¶ 21. On the other hand, independent expenditure committees may raise and spend money in any amount from any source. See 10 ILCS 5/9-8.5(e-5) ; see also Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 36–37. There is, however, one significant exception to these contribution caps: if a candidate's self-funding individually exceeds, or independent expenditures supporting or opposing a candidate collectively exceed $250,000 for statewide office, or $100,000 for all other offices, then all candidates in that race may accept contributions more than the otherwise governing limits. See 10 ILCS 5/9-8.5(h) ; id. at (h-5); see also Dkt. 1 ¶ 39. The Legislature decided "that it was better to level the playing field and lift the caps than keep the usual contribution limits in place." (Dkt. 19 at 4.) The Legislature also chose to keep the contribution caps for independent expenditure committees in place because the fact that "they cannot spend in coordination with candidates and cannot contribute directly to them" effectively defines their status. Id. Independent expenditure committees remain free to raise and spend funds in any amount. Id.
Dan Proft, Chairman of Liberty Principles PAC, alleges that there are multiple races in the 2018 Election where the Code will lift the $100,000 cap. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 53–54.) Essentially, Proft wants to directly coordinate with the candidates that he supports in those races. Id. at ¶¶ 55–56. Because all others can coordinate and contribute when the caps are off, Proft argues independent expenditure committees should be able to do the same; otherwise, this provision violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at ¶¶ 65, 69. Proft therefore moved for a preliminary injunction to bar Attorney General Madigan from enforcing the Code's prohibition of coordinated expenditures by independent expenditure committees in races where the Code eliminates the contribution limits. (Dkt. 12 at 1.)
"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy." Whitaker By Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ. , 858 F.3d 1034, 1044 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. dismissed sub nom. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ. v. Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 1260, 200 L.Ed.2d 415 (2018) (citation omitted). To determine whether a situation warrants such a remedy, district courts analyze the motion in "two distinct phases: a threshold phase and a balancing phase." Valencia v. City of Springfield, Illinois , 883 F.3d 959, 965–66 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). In the threshold phase, the moving party bears the burden of showing that: "(1) without preliminary relief, it will suffer irreparable harm before final resolution of its claims; (2) legal remedies are inadequate; and (3) its claim has some likelihood of success on the merits." Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc. , 893 F.3d 375, 381 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Only if the moving party satisfies each of these requirements does the court move to the balancing phase, where it must "weigh the harm the plaintiff [or the public] will suffer without an injunction against the harm the defendant [or the public] will suffer with one." Harlan v. Scholz , 866 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong , 520 U.S. 968, 972, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997) ).
Relevant here, "the likelihood of success on the merits is usually the determinative factor when a preliminary injunction is sought on First Amendment grounds." Higher Soc'y of Indiana v. Tippecanoe Cty., Indiana , 858 F.3d 1113, 1118 (7th Cir. 2017) ; see ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez , 679 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2012) ; Joelner v. Village of Washington Park, Ill. , 378 F.3d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 2004). Indeed, the analysis can leaving no need for "district courts to weigh the injunction equities." Korte v. Sebelius , 735 F.3d 654, 666 (7th Cir. 2013).
Proft argues that the ban on independent expenditure committees' contributions in circumstances where all others may contribute without limit is not a narrowly tailored or closely drawn means of preventing corruption. Attorney General Madigan responds that to adopt this rationale would eliminate the distinction between independent expenditure committees and PACs (), permitting Proft to circumvent the contribution ban and corrupt the election system.
As a threshold matter, Proft asks this Court to subject the ban on contributions by independent expenditure committees to strict scrutiny, wherein the government must show that the legislature narrowly tailored the law to serve a compelling interest. (Dkt. 13 at 9–10.) In the alternative, Proft requests rigorous First Amendment scrutiny, obligating the government to demonstrate that the legislature closely drew the statute to serve a sufficiently important interest. (Dkt. 13 at 10–11.)
True enough, Illinois Liberty PAC v. Madigan , 904 F.3d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 2018). The only "sufficiently important interest" recognized by the Supreme Court is...
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Tranchita v. Callahan
...from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury." Proft v. Madigan , 340 F. Supp. 3d 683, 695 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (citation omitted). In the same vein, it is in the public interest for Defendants to be allowed to enforce Section 3.25......