Proft v. Raoul

• Decision Date: 16 December 2019
• Docket Number: No. 18-3475,18-3475
• Citation: 944 F.3d 686
• Parties: Dan PROFT and Liberty Principles PAC, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Kwame RAOUL, Attorney General of Illinois, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

944 F.3d 686

Dan PROFT and Liberty Principles PAC, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.Kwame RAOUL, Attorney General of Illinois, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-3475

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 6, 2019

Decided December 16, 2019

Jeffrey M. Schwab, Attorney, LIBERTY JUSTICE CENTER, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants DAN PROFT, LIBERTY PRINCIPLES PAC.

Frank Henry Bieszczat, Attorney, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees KWAME RAOUL, Attorney General of Illinois, WILLIAM J. CADIGAN, Chairman, Illinois State Board of Elections, JOHN R. KEITH, Vice Chairman, Illinois State Board of Elections, ANDREW K. CARRUTHERS, Member, Illinois State Board of Elections, IAN LINNABARY, Member, Illinois State Board of Elections.

Before Easterbrook, Kanne, and Brennan, Circuit Judges.

Brennan, Circuit Judge.

A provision of the Illinois Election Code limits how much money entities can contribute to political campaigns. But in some races, Illinois lifts these limits, allowing certain entities to make unlimited campaign contributions and coordinate unlimited spending with candidates. Illinois Liberty PAC, an independent expenditure committee, is not one of these entities; indeed, Illinois bans all independent expenditure committees from making campaign contributions and from coordinating spending with candidates.

Plaintiffs Dan Proft and the Illinois Liberty PAC do not attack the entire contribution and coordination ban enforced against independent expenditure committees. Rather, they seek to overturn the ban only when unlimited contributions and unlimited coordinated expenditures are allowed for others. Otherwise, plaintiffs claim, Illinois’s ban violates the First Amendment rights of free speech and free association and the Fourteenth Amendment right of equal protection.

Whether a constitutional violation exists here depends on if the contribution and coordination ban is closely drawn to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption. Because striking down the ban would increase the risk of corruption and circumvent other election code sections that work to prevent political corruption, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this suit and denial of plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.

I.

A. The Illinois Election Code

Like many states, Illinois permits political contributions by individuals, corporations, unions, associations, political action committees ("PACs"), and political parties. Illinois limits how much money these groups may contribute to a political campaign. See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-8.5(b). Individuals may contribute up to $5,000; corporations, unions, and associations may donate up to $10,000; and PACs may provide up to $50,000. Id . The Illinois Election Code does not limit contributions by a political party in a general election, but it does limit a political party’s contributions in a primary election. Id.

Unlike many other states, Illinois lifts these contribution limits in some races. If a candidate’s self-funding exceeds $250,000 in a race for statewide office, or $100,000 in any other race, or if spending by an independent expenditure committee or individual exceeds either of these limits, the Illinois Election Code waives contribution limits for all candidates in that race. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-8.5(h), (h-5). In short, the code allows individuals and certain entities to contribute to and coordinate with candidates without limits when self-funding or independent expenditures exceed a threshold amount.

In addition to regulating contributions to candidates, the Illinois Election Code regulates independent expenditures. Those expenditures are (1) "any payment, gift, donation, or expenditure of funds," (2) used "for the purpose of making electioneering communications" or for advocating in support of a candidate or against a candidate, and (3) not made in coordination with a campaign. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.15. Before making political expenditures exceeding $3,000 in a 12-month period, the Illinois Election Code requires any entity (other than an individual) to first register as a political committee. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-8.6(b).

An independent expenditure committee is a type of political committee that may "accept unlimited contributions from any source, provided [ ] the independent expenditure committee does not make contributions to any candidate ..., political party committee, or [PAC]." 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3(d-5). The Illinois Election Code never permits independent expenditure committees to contribute to candidates, even when contribution limits are lifted for individuals and other entities.¹ If an independent expenditure committee violates the code by contributing to a candidate, party, or PAC, the Illinois State Board of Elections assesses a fine on the independent expenditure committee "equal to the amount of any contribution received in the preceding 2 years by the independent expenditure committee that exceeded the limits [ ] a [PAC]" may accept in an election cycle. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-8.6(d). In effect, the Illinois Election Code grants independent expenditure committees a trade-off—they can raise unlimited funds for independent expenditures, but they risk heavy fines if those funds are contributed to candidates, parties, or PACs.

B. Claims by Proft and Illinois Liberty PAC

Illinois Liberty PAC is an Illinois-based independent expenditure committee that supports Illinois political candidates committed to economic liberty. Proft founded Illinois Liberty PAC and currently serves as its chairman and treasurer. Although the Illinois Election Code bars independent expenditure committees from contributing to or coordinating with candidates, Proft, through Illinois Liberty PAC, wants to make unlimited contributions directly to political candidates and coordinate with those candidates in races where the code lifts contribution caps for other entities and individuals. To do so, plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Illinois Attorney General and the members of the Illinois State Board of Elections to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief permitting such contributions and coordinated spending. Plaintiffs argue that by excluding independent expenditure committees from making these contributions and coordinated expenditures, Illinois has violated their First Amendment rights to free speech and free association and their Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Equal Protection Clause.

Plaintiffs raised these arguments in a motion to enjoin the Illinois Attorney General from enforcing the Illinois Election Code in the 2018 election. The Illinois defendants opposed plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction request and moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint. The district court looked to whether the code’s ban on contributions and coordination by independent expenditure committees satisfied the Supreme Court’s requirement that contribution limits serve "a sufficiently important interest and employ means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms." Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1, 25, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (citations omitted). The court found that the Illinois Election Code’s "suppression of independent expenditure committee[ ] contributions to candidates" satisfied the standard for constitutionality set by the Supreme Court because the ban "prevent[ed] corruption or its appearance" through "closely drawn means." After finding the contribution and coordination ban constitutional, the district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs appeal those decisions.

II.

A. Standards of Review

We review a dismissal order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. Tagami v. City of Chicago , 875 F.3d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a claim for relief must be "plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). When reviewing the district court’s grant of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "[w]e construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged, and drawing all possible inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor." Tamayo v. Blagojevich , 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs urge this court to apply a strict scrutiny standard when reviewing the contribution and coordination ban under the First Amendment because "the ban discriminates against certain political speakers ... and in favor of others." Although "[m]ost laws that burden political speech are subject to strict scrutiny[,] ... the Supreme Court has adopted a form of intermediate scrutiny" when contribution limits are at issue. Ill. Liberty PAC v. Madigan , 904 F.3d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Under this intermediate scrutiny standard of review, "[c]ampaign contribution limits are generally permissible if the government can establish that they are ‘closely drawn’ to serve a ‘sufficiently important interest.’ " Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland , 664 F.3d 139, 152 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Buckley , 424 U.S. at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612 ). And because coordinated expenditures "are as useful to [ ] candidate[s] as cash," coordinated expenditures are subject to the same closely drawn standard as contribution limits. See FEC v. Colo. Republican Federal Campaign Committee , 533 U.S. 431, 446, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461 (2001) (citing Buckley , 424 U.S. at 47, 96 S.Ct. 612 ). Because the Illinois Election Code bans contributions and coordinated expenditures by independent expenditure committees but not independent expenditures, we apply the "closely drawn" standard to plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim. See McCutcheon , 572 U.S. at 197, 134 S.Ct. 1434 (citing Buckley , 424 U.S. at 21, 25, 96 S.Ct. 612 ).

Plaintiffs also contend the contribution and...