Progress Development Corporation v. Mitchell
Decision Date | 11 July 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 59 C 2050.,59 C 2050. |
Citation | 219 F. Supp. 156 |
Parties | PROGRESS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a corporation, and Modern Community Developers, Inc., a corporation, Plaintiffs, v. James C. MITCHELL et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
John W. Hunt, Richard G. Kahn and Howard Hoosin, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
Gerald C. Snyder and Lewis D. Clarke, Snyder, Clarke, Dalziel, Holmquist & Johnson, Waukegan, Ill., Allyn J. Franke, c/o Norman, Engelhardt & Zimmerman, Chicago, Ill., for defendants Deerfield Park District, James C. Mitchell, Dudley L. Dewey, Edward J. Walchli, Donald W. Keller and Aksel Petersen.
Thomas A. Matthews and Byron S. Matthews, John B. Moser, Moser & Compere, Chicago, Ill., for defendants Village of Deerfield, Winston Porter, Harold L. Peterson, John Aberson, Maurice Petesch, Arno Wehle and Joseph Koss.
Edward J. Kelly, Chicago, Ill., for defendant Joseph Powell.
George B. Christensen and Charles J. Calderini, Jr., Winston, Strawn, Smith & Patterson, Chicago, Ill., for defendants Harold C. Lewis, Herbert H. Garbrecht, Hal A. Petit, Robert D. Rierson, Robert G. Mullen, Leonard Bronstein, David J. Maundrell and Frank M. Blake.
On Counter-Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counter-Plaintiff's Counter-claim July 11, 1963.
The core of the controversy presented by the several motions of defendants to dismiss or for judgment upon the recently filed affirmative defenses is whether the finding by Judge Bernard M. Decker in his October 18, 1961 opinion in Cause No. 71780, Deerfield Park District, et al. v. Progress Development Corporation, in the Circuit Court of Lake County, Illinois, that "The evidence wholly fails to establish the charge of conspiracy against the members of the Park Board" obviates the need for this Court's "trial on the merits of Count III" as directed by the Court of Appeals' mandate of February 7, 1961. Judge Decker's opinion has been affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court, 26 Ill.2d 296, 186 N.E.2d 360, and certiorari denied by the United States Supreme Court, 372 U.S. 968, 83 S.Ct. 1093, 10 L.Ed.2d 131, and rehearing denied June 11, 1963, 374 U.S. 818, 83 S.Ct. 1692, 10 L.Ed.2d 1042. Count III is the conspiracy count of the complaint.
The four pending separate motions by defendants to dismiss the complaint or for judgment on the pleadings are filed by the Park District and its individual members, the resident defendants, the Village of Deerfield and the individuals constituting its board of trustees, and Joseph Powell, a member of the "citizens committee." These motions were filed in the month of May, 1963, and are predicated on the United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari from the Illinois Supreme Court holding which was adverse to Progress.
Supplemental answers have been filed by the resident defendants, the trustees of the Village of Deerfield, and Joseph Powell, setting forth "affirmative defenses" that the state court ruling constitutes a res judicata holding that there was no conspiracy as charged in the complaint.
There can be no question of the strict adherence required by a District Court of the mandate of a Court of Appeals. (Paull v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Company, 313 F.2d 612, 617 (C.A.8, 1963)). While requiring "strict compliance," the Court went on to say that "the trial court is free to pass upon any issue which was not expressly or impliedly disposed of on appeal." The United States Supreme Court has said that an inferior court "has no power or authority to deviate from a mandate issued by an appellate court." (Briggs v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 334 U.S. 304, 68 S. Ct. 1039, 92 L.Ed. 1403) Chief Judge John S. Hastings stated in Lee v. Terminal Transport Co., Inc., 7 Cir., 301 F.2d 234, that a district court is "without authority to modify the mandate" of the Court of Appeals. Judge Latham Castle stated similarly in Bankers Life and Casualty Company v. Bellanca Corporation, 7 Cir., 308 F.2d 757, at p. 759. Further holdings accord. Thus, where a cause has been remanded for procedure in compliance with a mandate, the District Court may not undertake to revise its original opinion in a material respect. (Stiller v. Squeez-A-Purse Corporation, 296 F.2d 504 (C.A.6, 1961)) Judge F. Ryan Duffy in Independent Nail & Packing Co., Inc. v. Perry, 7 Cir., 214 F.2d 670 (1954), stated that the District Judge had exceeded his powers in withholding from the petitioner the relief to which the Court of Appeals had decided it was entitled. To similar effect is Judge Walter C. Lindley's holding in Criscuolo v. United States, 7 Cir., 250 F.2d 388 (1957), where he held the District Court had deviated from the mandate. The limited and strict duty of the District Court is emphasized in the Sixth Circuit opinion in Scientific Anglers, Inc. v. B. F. Gladding & Co., Inc., 260 F.2d 662 (1958), and the Fourth Circuit opinion in Tribble v. Bruin, 279 F.2d 424 (1960).
That strict compliance with the dictates of a mandate may be relaxed to encompass intervening circumstances is indicated by Judge Elmer J. Schnackenberg's statement in A. C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corporation, 7 Cir., 314 F.2d 839 (1963), at p. 840:
(Emphasis supplied.)
In order to determine whether this Court's inescapable duty to comply with the Court of Appeals' mandate requires it to conduct anew a trial of the conspiracy issue raised by Count III despite the state court's intervening holding of the nonexistence of a conspiracy, this Court has studied carefully the very exhaustive opinion of Judge Decker, and the affirming opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court. This Court concludes there can be no question that Judge Decker granted the fullest opportunity to Progress to present all the evidence it could adduce against anyone charged with the alleged conspiracy. And upon that evidence there can be no question that Judge Decker found no conspiracy actually existed. Thus he states:
In its conclusion of law the Court stated:
"There is no evidence that any member of the Park Board formed or engaged in any conspiracy to deprive Progress of any of its legal rights."
The judgment by Judge Decker, after remand, also recites that the defendants were entitled to a full and complete hearing as to all matters alleged in said Motion to Dismiss. He found that:
* * *"
The judgment order of Judge Decker states that some of the bases for Progress' motion to dismiss in the Circuit Court suit were:
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