Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Groves

• Decision Date: 21 September 2022
• Docket Number: 28115,Appellate Case 2020-001337
• Parties: Progressive Direct Insurance Co., and USAA General Indemnity Company, Petitioners, v. Shanna Groves as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Lynn Harrison, Respondent.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Progressive Direct Insurance Co., and USAA General Indemnity Company, Petitioners, v. Shanna Groves as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Lynn Harrison, Respondent.

No. 28115

Appellate Case No. 2020-001337

Supreme Court of South Carolina

September 21, 2022

Heard November 10, 2021

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from Dorchester County Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge

John Robert Murphy and Wesley Brian Sawyer, both of Murphy &amp Grantland, PA, of Columbia, for Petitioners Progressive Direct Insurance Co. and USAA General Indemnity Company.

John Phillips Linton, Jr., of Walker Gressette Freeman &amp Linton, of Charleston, and Ryan Harris Sigal, of Miller Dawson, Sigal & Ward, LLC, of North Charleston, both for Respondent Shanna Groves.

HEARN JUSTICE

In this case we determine whether uninsured or underinsured benefits may be recovered when an individual is shot and killed by another motorist as both cars are stopped at a traffic light. In deciding this question, we revisit and attempt to clarify our somewhat conflicting jurisprudence as to whether such injuries arise out of the "ownership, maintenance, or use" of an automobile. We hold that gunshot injuries do not arise out of the use of an automobile. Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jimi Redman shot and killed Lynn Harrison with a rifle while both were in their vehicles at a stoplight. Immediately before the shooting, Redman, who was driving a Ford Escape, approached Harrison's GMC in the lane to her right. A witness, who was directly behind Harrison in the left lane, saw Redman make hand gestures and blow kisses toward Harrison. There is no evidence that Harrison attempted to evade Redman or that she even saw his gestures. Instead, as the two vehicles stopped at the red light, Redman pulled out a rifle and fired one shot which traveled through Harrison's passenger side window, killing her. Redman subsequently sped away, while Harrison's vehicle, which was still in drive, crept forward until coming to rest in the median. Redman was arrested a few blocks away.

Harrison was insured through her husband's^[1] motorcycle policy issued by Progressive and an automobile insurance policy provided by USAA. The Progressive policy provided,

If you pay the premium for this coverage, we will pay for damages that an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of:

1) an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury:

a) sustained by an insured person;

b) caused by an accident; and

c) arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle[.]

The USAA policy stated,

We will pay for the following damages which a covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of an auto accident:

1) [bodily injury] sustained by a covered person; and

2) injury to or destruction of the property of a covered person.

The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle.

Progressive filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that there was no coverage because Harrison's injuries did not arise out of the use of Redman's motor vehicle. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and the circuit court held a hearing. Progressive contended that Harrison's injuries were not causally connected to the use of Redman's vehicle under our causation analysis set forth in State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Aytes 332 S.C. 30, 33, 503 S.E.2d 744, 745 (1998). Further, it contended gunshot injuries are not foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of a vehicle. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bookert, 337 S.C. 291, 293, 523 S.E.2d 181, 182 (1999) (determining injuries suffered from a gunshot involving a vehicle were not foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of a vehicle thereby precluding coverage). Conversely, Groves argued Aytes and Bookert did not overrule prior case law which is more analogous to the present facts. Accordingly, Groves contended that Redman pursued Harrison before shooting her, thus establishing a causal connection. The circuit court disagreed, concluding Groves failed to demonstrate that Harrison's injuries were causally connected to the use of Redman's vehicle. Additionally, the court determined her injuries were not "foreseeably identifiable with the use of an automobile" and even if they were, firing the rifle constituted an act of independent significance that otherwise broke the causal chain.

Groves appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Groves, 431 S.C. 203, 206, 847 S.E.2d 114, 116 (Ct. App. 2020). The court concluded Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company v. Howser, 309 S.C. 269, 422 S.E.2d 106 (1992) and Home Insurance Company v. Towe, 314 S.C. 105, 441 S.E.2d 825 (1994) remained good law, and that both cases were more similar to the instant facts than Aytes, Bookert, or the federal decisions relied on by Progressive. Thereafter, Progressive filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted.

ISSUES

Whether injuries arising from the intentional firing of a gun are foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of an automobile and whether the act of firing a gun constitutes an act of independent significance breaking the causal chain?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An appellate court reviews a motion for summary judgment using the same standard employed by the circuit court. Traynum v. Scavens, 416 S.C. 197, 201, 786 S.E.2d 115, 117 (2016). Whether coverage exists under an insurance contract is a question of law for the Court. Williams v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. (GEICO), 409 S.C. 586, 593, 762 S.E.2d 705, 709 (2014). Further, cross-motions for summary judgment are treated as questions of law. Wiegand v. U.S. Auto. Ass'n, 391 S.C. 159, 163, 705 S.E.2d 432, 434 (2011).

DISCUSSION

This case turns on whether Harrison's injuries arose out of the "use" of an uninsured vehicle. Progressive contends the court of appeals erred in finding a causal connection between Harrison's fatal injuries and the use of Redman's motor vehicle. Specifically, it asserts Groves cannot show that Redman's vehicle was an "active accessory" to her injuries or more broadly that gunshot injuries are "foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of [an] automobile." Bookert, 337 S.C. at 293, 523 S.E.2d at 182. Progressive discounts Howser and Towe, contending because neither decision incorporated the foreseeability component subsequently adopted in Aytes and Bookert, the court of appeals erred in relying on them. We agree with Progressive.

To recover under an automobile insurance policy, the insured's damages must "arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use" of the uninsured motor vehicle. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-140 (2015). A three-prong test is used to determine whether an insured meets that requirement: (1) the party seeking coverage must establish a causal connection between the injury and the uninsured vehicle, (2) there is no act of independent significance which breaks the chain of causation, and (3) the uninsured vehicle must have been used for transportation at the time. Aytes, 332 S.C. at 33, 503 S.E.2d at 745. "No distinction is made as to whether the injury resulted from a negligent, reckless, or intentional act." Towe, 314 S.C. at 107, 441 S.E.2d at 827.

Under the first prong, the insured must also show three subparts: "a) the vehicle was an 'active accessory' to the assault; and b) something less than proximate cause but more than mere site of the injury; and c) that the 'injury must be foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the automobile.'" Bookert, 337 S.C. at 293, 523 S.E.2d at 182. The parties agree Redman's vehicle was being used for transportation at the time, so the inquiry focuses on the three subparts under the first element, and whether the act of firing a rifle breaks the chain of causation.

Although in early cases this Court seemed to favor coverage when injuries were caused by an armed motorist, it later retreated from this position. In Howser, we answered a certified question asking whether an insured's injuries arose out of the operation of a motor vehicle where an unknown assailant pulled up next to the victim's car and fired a gunshot as she attempted to flee. 309 S.C. at 271, 422 S.E.2d at 107. The Court explained that the assailant was only able to carry out the shooting by using his vehicle to "closely pursue" Howser. The Court also characterized the shooting as part of an "ongoing assault, in which the vehicle played an essential and integral part." Id. at 273, 422 S.E.2d at 108.

Approximately two years later, this Court decided Towe, holding a tractor driver's injuries were causally connected to the perpetrator's vehicle where a passenger attempted to throw a bottle at a street sign, instead striking the tractor's vehicle and severely injuring him. 314 S.C. at 107-08, 441 S.E.2d at 827. The Court concluded, "The use of the automobile placed Alexander in the position to throw the bottle at the sign and the vehicle's speed contributed to the velocity of the bottle increasing the seriousness of McClaskey's injuries." Id. at 107, 441 S.E.2d at 827. Further, the Court noted the act of throwing the bottle did not break the chain of causation because it was "inextricably linked" to the use of the automobile. Id. at 108, 441 S.E.2d at 827.

While the insureds in Howser and Towe were able to establish that their injuries arose out of the use of the tortfeasor's vehicle, those decisions appear to be an aberration in our jurisprudence. In Aytes, the Court answered a certified...