Progressive Gulf Ins. Co. v. Reynolds
| Decision Date | 08 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 5:21-cv-00056 |
| Citation | 597 F.Supp.3d 925 |
| Parties | PROGRESSIVE GULF INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Matthew REYNOLDS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
John Stanfield Buford, Lindsay Lankford Rollins, Hancock, Daniel & Johnson, PC, Glen Allen, VA, for Plaintiff.
Emily P. Bishop, McAngus Goudelock and Courie, Richmond, VA, for Defendant CCBCC Operations, LLC.
In February 2020, Jonathan Allen Wilson grabbed the wheel of the Buick LeSabre that Matthew Reynolds was driving and crashed the car into the side of a Coca-Cola bottling plant. Virginia police investigated the accident and cited Wilson for reckless driving. Wilson was later convicted of improper driving.
CCBCC Operations, LLC ("CCBCC"), which owns the bottling plant has sued Wilson and Reynolds for the property damage in the Circuit Court for the County of Augusta. Reynolds's insurer, Plaintiff Progressive Gulf Insurance Company ("Progressive"), brings this suit seeking a declaratory judgment that its policy excludes Wilson from coverage. Progressive has moved for summary judgment, and the court will grant that motion.
In February 2020, Reynolds was driving his friend Wilson through Fishersville, Virginia. (Dep. of Matthew Reynolds 6:3–18, Jan. 28, 2022 [ECF No. 24-2].) Reynolds had picked Wilson up on their way to visit Reynolds's brother. (Id. at 6:19–23.) The two carpooled, in part, because Wilson did not have—and has never had—a driver's license. (Dep. of Jonathan Wilson 14:1–5, Jan. 28, 2022 [ECF No. 24-1].). Wilson rode in the front passenger seat. (Id. at 11:24–25:1.)
The parties dispute some of what happened on that drive. Wilson testified that Reynolds intentionally swerved between lanes and that the two of them were "goofing around in the car just like teenagers." (Trial Tr., Commonwealth v. Wilson , Case No. GT20003322-00, at 4:3–5:12, Aug. 6, 2020 [ECF No. 22-3].) Reynolds was not asked about this during his deposition; all he said was that he and Wilson discussed go-carting before the accident. (Reynolds Dep. at 8:4–7.) On the other hand, Reynolds testified that Wilson, unprovoked and unencouraged, had grabbed the steering wheel about two minutes before the crash. (Id. at 7:24–8:21, 9:20–10:18.) Reynolds admonished Wilson, who released the steering wheel. (Id. at 10:22–11:9.) Wilson denies that this happened. (Wilson Dep. at 10:12–16, 10:23–11:4, 20:24–21:11.) But the parties agree that Reynolds never gave Wilson explicit permission to touch the steering wheel. (Reynolds Dep. at 14:7–16; Wilson Dep. at 12:25–13:16.)
In any event, there is no dispute about the cause of the crash itself. Wilson reached his right hand across his body to grab and jerk the wheel. (Wilson Dep. at 11:10–12:10.) The LeSabre left the road, struck a pole, jumped a curb, and hit a parked car. (See Reynolds Dep. at 8:12–17; cf. Wilson Dep. at 8:12–9:11, 10:12–16 ().) Attempting to control the vehicle, Reynolds stretched for the brake. (Reynolds Dep. at 8:14–17.) But his foot found the accelerator instead, sending the car into CCBCC's building. (Id. at 8:14–17; 13:2–12) Reynolds testified that Wilson apologized to him as they were crashing. (Id. at 8:18–21.) Wilson does not remember doing so. (Wilson Dep. at 17:22–18:12.)
After a police investigation into the crash, Virginia authorities cited Wilson for reckless driving. (See Trial Tr. at 2:12–14.) Wilson was later convicted for the lesser offense of improper driving. (Id. at 8:4–7.) Reynolds received a warning. (Reynolds Dep. at 30:21–31:7.) CCBCC has filed a lawsuit against the two men for the damage to its building. (See ECF No. 1-2.)
Reynolds owns a drivers insurance policy on his LeSabre through Progressive (Policy Number: 935449202) ("the Policy"). (Policy at 2 [ECF No. 1-3].) The Policy provides Reynolds with coverage for " ‘property damage’ for which any ‘insured’ becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident." (Id. at 10.) It defines "insured" as "[a]ny person using or responsible for the use of ‘your covered auto.’ " (Id. ) By statute, this coverage reaches those using the car "with the expressed or implied consent of [Reynolds]." See Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-2204(D) ; Palmer v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. , No. 2:19CV403, 2021 WL 4157734, *5–6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2021), appeal filed. The operative exclusion, however, denies coverage to anyone "[u]sing a vehicle without a reasonable belief that [he] is entitled to do so." (Policy, at 11.)
On August 20, 2021, Progressive filed a complaint in this court seeking a declaratory judgment against Reynolds, Wilson, and CCBCC (collectively, "Defendants"). (Compl. [ECF No. 1].) Progressive asks the court to preemptively resolve whether "Wilson is entitled to insurance coverage under the Policy with respect to the Accident and Underlying Lawsuit" by entering a declaratory judgment confirming that Wilson is excluded from such coverage. (Id. ¶ 20–23.)
CCBCC filed an answer on October 20, 2021. (ECF No. 9.) Both Reynolds and Wilson were served with copies of the complaint in September 2021, but neither has appeared in this action. (See ECF Nos. 11, 12.) The clerk entered entries of default against Reynolds and Wilson in February 2022. (ECF No. 19.) Progressive moved for summary judgment on March 11, 2022. (ECF No. 22.)
Under Rule 56(a), the court must "grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Glynn v. EDO Corp. , 710 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2013). When making this determination, the court should consider "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with ... [any] affidavits" filed by the parties. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Whether a fact is material depends on the relevant substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Id. (citation omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the moving party meets that burden, the nonmoving party must then come forward and establish the specific material facts in dispute to survive summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court views the facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Glynn , 710 F.3d at 213 (citing Bonds v. Leavitt , 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011) ). Indeed, "[i]t is an ‘axiom that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’ " McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. , 756 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal alteration omitted) (quoting Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 651, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam)). Moreover, "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The nonmoving party must, however, "set forth specific facts that go beyond the ‘mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.’ " Glynn , 710 F.3d at 213 (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). The nonmoving party must show that "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "In other words, to grant summary judgment the [c]ourt must determine that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party on the evidence before it." Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc. , 915 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). Even when facts are not in dispute, the court cannot grant summary judgment unless there is "no genuine issue as to the inferences to be drawn from" those facts. World-Wide Rights Ltd. P'ship v. Combe, Inc. , 955 F.2d 242, 244 (4th Cir. 1992).
This case boils down to whether CCBCC has established a genuine issue of material fact that Wilson reasonably believed that he had Reynolds's permission to grab the wheel. The parties agree that a reasonable belief, in this circumstance, requires permission from the vehicle owner. (See Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 9–10 [ECF No. 23]; Def.'s Br. Opp'n Mot. Summ. J. at 4–6 [ECF No. 24].) And the parties agree that reasonable belief is an objective standard. (Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 9; see Def.'s Br. Opp'n Mot. Summ. J. at 2–6 ().)
But no accounting of the facts creates a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Wilson (who has never possessed a driver's license) reasonably believed that he had Reynolds's permission to grab and yank the steering wheel from the front passenger seat. CCBCC points to Wilson's deposition testimony that, at some point prior to his grabbing the steering wheel and causing the accident, Reynolds had been swerving between lanes, to suggest that by "goofing" off, Reynolds implicitly gave Wilson permission to do the same. Although Reynolds denies that this happened, the court must accept Wilson's testimony as true for purposes of summary...
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