Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. v. McMorris
| Decision Date | 28 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 20-2590 (DWF/KMM) |
| Citation | 563 F.Supp.3d 971 |
| Parties | PROGRESSIVE PREFERRED INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff/Counter Defendant, v. Trevon MCMORRIS, Defendant, and Martha Perea de Madrid, as Trustee for the Heirs and Next of Kin of Jose Angel Madrid Salcido, Defendant/Counter Claimant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Beth A. Jenson Prouty, Esq., and Stephen M. Warner, Esq., Arthur, Chapman, Kettering, Smetak & Pikala P.A., counsel for Plaintiff.
Isaac I. Tyroler, Esq., Tyroler Injury Law; and Rachel S. Leonard, Esq., Martineau Leonard PLLC, counsel for Martha Perea de Madrid.
This matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment brought by Plaintiff Progressive Preferred Insurance Company ("Progressive") (Doc. No. 18) and Defendant Martha Perea de Madrid ("Perea de Madrid"), as the Trustee for the Heirs and Next of Kin of Jose Angel Madrid Salcido ("Madrid Salcido") (Doc. No. 20).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Progressive's motion and denies Perea de Madrid's motion.
On May 1, 2019, McMorris was parked in a 2005 Dodge Durango (the "Durango") in Minneapolis. Police approached McMorris based on a report of a suspicious vehicle in the area. McMorris fled the police in the Durango. Soon after, McMorris crashed the Durango into a vehicle driven by Madrid Salcido (the "Crash"). (Plea Hr'g Trans. at 10-11.) Sadly, the Crash killed Madrid Salcido.
McMorris pleaded guilty to and was convicted of a felony level offense for fleeing the police in a motor vehicle which resulted in the death of another, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 4.2
At the time of the Crash, McMorris was a named insured under an auto insurance policy issued by Progressive.3 (Jensen Prouty Aff. ¶ 7, Ex. F (the "Policy").) The Policy contains a section titled "Part I–Liability to Others," which provides that Progressive "will pay damages for bodily injury and property damage for which an insured person becomes legally responsible because of an accident." (Policy at 4.) The Policy also includes the following exclusion:
Following the Crash, Perea de Madrid, as Trustee for the Heirs and Next of Kin of Madrid Salcido, made a limits demand for the liability coverage available under the Policy. (Compl. ¶ 20; Answer ¶ 2.) Progressive later filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Criminal Act Exclusion bars any coverage for the Crash. (Compl. at 6.) Perea de Madrid counterclaimed for a declaration of coverage, claiming in part that the Criminal Act Exclusion conflicts with the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 65B.41 et seq . ("No-fault Act"). (Answer at 2-4.) Both parties moved for summary judgment. (See Doc. Nos. 18, 20.)
Progressive argues that the Criminal Act Exclusion unambiguously precludes liability coverage to McMorris because the bodily injury to Madrid Salcido was caused by McMorris's criminal act of fleeing the police. (Doc. No. 22 ("Progressive Memo.") at 7-10.) Perea de Madrid contends that the Criminal Act Exclusion is void and unenforceable because it conflicts with the No-Fault Act. (Def. Memo. at 4-10; Doc. No. 29 ("Def. Opp.") at 2-7; Doc. No. 34 ("Def. Reply") at 2-3.) She further argues that even if the Criminal Act Exclusion is not void, it does not apply because traffic violations are exempt and McMorris caused the crash because he was speeding.4 (Def. Memo. at 10-13; Def. Opp. at 7-9; Reply at 6-9.) She also contends that the Criminal Act Exclusion is ambiguous because it does not address what happens when a criminal act leads to a traffic violation that actually causes an accident. (Def. Memo. at 13-14; Def. Opp. at 9-10; Def. Reply at 7.) Finally, Perea de Madrid argues that public policy favors coverage. (Def. Memo. at 5-9; Reply at 5-7.)
I. Legal Standards
Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Weitz Co. v. Lloyd's of London , 574 F.3d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 2009). However, as the Supreme Court has stated, "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’ " Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 ).
This Court will consider the cross-motions drawing inferences against each movant as warranted. See, e.g. , Wermager v. Cormorant Twp. Bd. , 716 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1983). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank of Mo. , 92 F.3d at 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik v. Cty. of Le Sueur , 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Because this case is before the Court based on diversity jurisdiction, Minnesota's substantive law controls the analysis. Kozlov v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. , 818 F.3d 380, 388 (8th Cir. 2016) ; Babinski v. Am. Fam. Ins. Grp. , 569 F.3d 349, 351–52 (8th Cir. 2009). With respect to Minnesota state law, a district court is bound by the decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Qwest Corp. v. City of Des Moines, Iowa , 896 F.3d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 2018).
Where there is no Supreme Court opinion directly on point, a district court may consider relevant state precedent, analogous decisions, considered dicta, and any other reliable data to determine how the state's highest court would decide. Qwest Corp , 896 F.3d at 845. When a state's high court has not decided an issue, it is "a well-recognized rule that federal courts may not reject a state court of appeals decision" solely for that reason, and where the appeals court "rests its considered judgment upon the rule of law which it announces, that is a datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise." Wong v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. , 789 F.3d 889, 897 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. , 311 U.S. 223, 237, 61 S.Ct. 179, 85 L.Ed. 139 (1940) ).
"Under Minnesota law, interpretation of an insurance policy, including whether an exclusion is valid and enforceable, is a question of law to be decided by the court." Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Schwieger , 685 F.3d 697, 701 (8th Cir. 2012) (collecting Minnesota cases). Interpretation of insurance contracts follows "the general rules of contract law, giving terms their plain and ordinary meaning to honor the intent of the parties." Econ. Premier Assur. Co. v. W. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co. , 839 N.W.2d 749, 752 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013).
Whether the language of an insurance policy is ambiguous is also a question of law.
Columbia Heights Motors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 275 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn. 1979). Id. Where there is no ambiguity, "the language used must be given its usual and accepted meaning." Bobich v. Oja , 258 Minn. 287, 294, 104 N.W.2d 19 (1960). When policy language is ambiguous, it "will be construed against the insurer according to the reasonable expectations of the insured." Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Wozniak Travel, Inc., 762 N.W.2d 572, 575 (Minn. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Insurance policy exclusions must be given the same consideration as any other part of the contract in determining the scope of coverage. Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins. Co. , 641 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn. 2002). Courts are required to read policies in favor of finding coverage, construing words of inclusion broadly, but words of exclusion narrowly, and looking past the words used by the parties to the underlying allegations. Westfield Ins. Co. v. Robinson Outdoors Inc. , 700 F.3d 1172, 1174 (8th Cir. 2012) (applying Minnesota law). The language of an exclusion is to be interpreted in accordance with the expectations of the insured. Thommes , 641 N.W.2d at...
To continue reading
Request your trial