Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Davenport
| Decision Date | 01 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5:11–cv–118. |
| Citation | 907 F.Supp.2d 561 |
| Parties | PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, Plaintiff, v. James DAVENPORT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Vermont |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Andrew C. Boxer, Esq., Ellis Boxer & Blake, Springfield, VT, for Plaintiff.
Michael S. Brow, Sylvester & Maley, Inc., Burlington, VT, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Property and Casualty Insurance Company of Hartford (“Hartford”) brings this action against Defendant James Davenport seeking a declaratory judgment that it has no obligation under a homeowner's insurance policy (the “Policy”) issued to Mr. Davenport for claims arising out of the loss that occurred on May 28, 2009. Presently before the court is Hartford's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 28.) Mr. Davenport opposes the motion. The court heard oral argument on July 10, 2012.
Hartford is represented by Andrew C. Boxer, Esq. Mr. Davenport is represented by Michael S. Brow, Esq.
At all times relevant to this dispute, Mr. Davenport resided at 1021 VT Route 105, Sheldon, Vermont, 05483 (the “Insured Property”). Between July 24, 2008 and July 24, 2009, the Policy provided coverage for the Insured Property subject to, among other things, the following exclusion: (Doc. 27 at ¶ 5.) On May 28, 2009, Mr. Davenport set fire to the Insured Property. Following the fire, Mr. Davenport submitted a claim for coverage, which Hartford denied based on the intentional loss exclusion.
At the time of the fire, Mr. Davenport was sixty-eight years old and lived on a fixed income, totaling approximately $3,000 per month. On July 4, 2008, Sally Boudreau, Mr. Davenport's wife, passed away. Following his wife's death, Mr. Davenport purchased a new Ford pick-up truck, Corvette, RV camper, and motorcycle, financing each of these vehicles. He intended to sell the Insured Property, move into the RV camper, and travel. In furtherance of this plan, Mr. Davenport moved most of his belongings out of the Insured Property to make it more marketable for sale. The only belongings Mr. Davenport kept on the Insured Property were a recliner chair, a television, and a couch that his dogs slept on.
By May 2009, Mr. Davenport had fallen into a severe depression. His depression coincided with accusations by his stepdaughter that he had molested her when she was a child. He had also begun to appreciate the tremendous debt that he had incurred, which left him barely able to feed himself and his dogs. Throughout May 2009, Mr. Davenport contemplated ways to commit suicide, considering alternatives such as consuming medication and alcohol for “courage,” shooting himself, and crashing his car. Three days before the fire, he ultimately decided upon setting fire to his house while he was inside.
On May 28, 2009, Mr. Davenport fed his dogs and let them out into a fenced yard so that they would not be harmed. He also drank some alcohol and ingested pills. Thereafter, Mr. Davenport sprayed lighter fluid on a number of cardboard boxes and lit them on fire, which led to the destruction of the Insured Property. Fire department personnel rescued Mr. Davenport from the fire, but he attempted to regain entry into the burning house.
Following his attempt to reenter, Trooper Jacob Metayer took Mr. Davenport into protective custody and placed him in handcuffs in the back of a police cruiser. After Mr. Davenport complained of shoulder pain, Trooper Metayer removed the handcuffs. Once removed, Mr. Davenport attempted to cut his wrist using his watch. In response to this second suicide attempt, he was taken to Northwestern Medical Center for emergency treatment. The “Crisis Evaluation/Counseling Report” from Northwestern Medical Center (“Northwestern”) indicates that Mr. Davenport's “Speech” was “Normal[;]” his “Behavior” and “Attention” were both “Unremarkable[;]” his “Thought Process” was “Goal Directed[;]” his “Perception” was “Not Impaired[;]” and he was “Fully oriented [.]” (Doc. 29–4 at 4.)
Mr. Davenport was subsequently transferred to the Vermont State Hospital (“VSH”) where he was evaluated that same day. An “Integrated Admission Assessment and Physician Certification” indicated that his “Behavior Toward the Examiner” was “Calm and cooperative[;]” his “Attention” was “Alert[;]” his “Thought Process/Associations” were “Logical, associations tight[;]” and his “Insight” was “Good[.]” Id. at 11–12.
On June 2, 2009, Paul G. Cotton, M.D., a board-certified psychiatrist, performed a court-ordered examination to assess Mr. Davenport's competency to stand trial for first degree arson. Dr. Cotton determined that he was competent to stand trial. On June 26, 2009, Dr. Cotton performed a second court-ordered evaluation to determine whether Mr. Davenport had the mental capacity to form the requisite criminal intent necessary for first degree arson.1 Dr. Cotton concluded that while Mr. Davenport did not lack the capability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act, he “did not have the mental state required for the offense charged ... and would be considered insane at the time of the alleged offense.” Id. at 29.2 Dr. Cotton explained that Mr. Davenport Id. at 28.
On July 9, 2009, the State of Vermont stipulated to the dismissal without prejudice of the first degree arson charge against Mr. Davenport, conditioned upon his compliance with an aftercare plan.
In opposing summary judgment, Mr. Davenport has submitted the following additionalfacts, which Hartford has not responded to, nor sought to strike. For the purposes of this motion for summary judgment, the court will consider these facts disputed, see Local Rule 56(b), although it notes that Hartford appears to contend that even if these facts are considered, summary judgment in its favor remains appropriate.
Mr. Davenport asserts that he had been taking Prozac for anxiety and depression since the 1990s and was prescribed Lithium in 1999, which he took periodically. He further asserts that he ceased taking both his Prozac and Lithium around the time of his wife's death in July 2008, and he began to feel depressed in late 2008, which worsened through the early part of 2009. He notes that he has been diagnosed as having bipolar disorder.
Mr. Davenport also claims that he was mentally incapable of controlling his actions and impulses at the time of the fire because “[h]e had lost his capacity for rational thought,” and “the intensity of the despair that he showed by his actions was the mental equivalent of the irrationality that is expressed in a delusional belief[.]” (Doc. 32–11 at 14.) When setting the fire, Mr. Davenport asserts he did not intend to burn down the house and was not even thinking of the house. Instead, he contends that he started the fire with the specific purpose of ending his life.
The court has diversity jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) and is thus required to apply Vermont law to the substantive issues. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); In re Coudert Bros. LLP, 673 F.3d 180, 186 (2d Cir.2012).
Summary judgment must be granted when the record shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotations marks omitted). In deciding the motion, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and deny the motion if a rational juror could decide in favor of the nonmoving party under the applicable law. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). “There is no material fact issue only when reasonable minds cannot differ as to the import of the evidence before the court.” Commander Oil Corp. v. Advance Food Serv. Equip., 991 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir.1993).
To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must offer more than “mere speculation and conjecture[,]” Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir.2001), as the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In other words, Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Because the Policy excludes coverage “arising out of any act an ‘insured’ commits or conspires to commit with the intent to cause a loss” (Doc. 27 at ¶ 5), coverage is not available if Mr. Davenport started the fire with the requisite intent. The parties agree that...
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...declines to dismiss at this stage potentially valid claims that depend on Smith's state of mind. See Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Davenport, 907 F. Supp. 2d 561, 567 (D. Vt. 2012) ("Whether a person is capable of acting with a particular mental state is typically a question of fact ......