Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 43068,43068
• Citation: 343 S.E.2d 680,256 Ga. 27
• Parties: PROPHECY CORPORATION v. CHARLES ROSSIGNOL, INC. et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 680

343 S.E.2d 680

256 Ga. 27

PROPHECY CORPORATION v. CHARLES ROSSIGNOL, INC. et al.

No. 43068.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 28, 1986.

Gene A. Major, Mark D. Belcher, Fain, Major, Wiley & Tinkler, Atlanta, for Charles Rossignol, Inc., et al.

Edwin L. Hoffman, Redfern, Green & Hoffman, Atlanta, for Prophecy Corp.

GREGORY, Justice.

Charles Rossignol and Charles Rossignol, Inc., former manufacturer's representatives for Prophecy Corporation, sued Prophecy for compensation allegedly due under an employment contract. Rossignol maintained that after Prophecy terminated its business relationship with him, Prophecy mailed him a check purporting to represent final commissions owed him from which Rossignol claimed excessive deductions had been made. Prophecy raised the defense of accord and satisfaction in that Rossignol had cashed the check. The dispositive issue before the trial court was whether a conversation between Rossignol and the President of Prophecy, in which the two allegedly agreed to further negotiate the deductions, occurred prior to the time Rossignol cashed the check. The trial court granted summary judgment to Prophecy, finding that Rossignol's affidavit intentionally contradicted his deposition testimony with respect to this crucial time frame. A majority of the Court of Appeals reversed, Charles Rossignol, Inc. v. Prophecy Corp., 177 Ga.App. 245, 339 S.E.2d 288 (1985), concluding that under King v. Brasington, 252 Ga. 109, 312 S.E.2d 111 (1984), only intentionally contradictory testimony of a respondent will be construed against him on motion for summary judgment. The majority determined that Rossignol's testimony did not "rise to the level of an 'intentional' " contradiction, and therefore the trial court erred in construing the favorable portions of his testimony against him. 177 Ga.App. at 247, 339 S.E.2d 288. The dissent maintained that where there is a direct contradiction of a material fact in the respondent's testimony the favorable portions of his contradictory testimony must be construed against him on motion for summary judgment, citing Tri-Cities Hosp. Auth. v. Sheats, 247 Ga. 713, 279 S.E.2d 210 (1981). The dissenters found that since Rossignol's deposition directly contradicted his affidavit, the trial court was correct in construing the more favorable portion of Rossignol's testimony against him.

We granted certiorari to clarify the circumstances under which the testimony of a respondent to a motion for summary judgment will be construed against him.

1. The rule in Georgia is that the testimony of a party who offers himself as a witness in his own behalf at trial " 'is to be construed most strongly against him when it is self-contradictory, vague or equivocal.' " Douglas v. Sumner, 213 Ga. 82, 85, 97 S.E.2d 122 (1957); W & A Railroad Co. v. Evans, 96 Ga. 481, 23 S.E. 494 (1895). Where the favorable portion of a party's self-contradictory testimony is the only evidence of his right to recover or of his defense, the opposing party is entitled to a directed verdict. Douglas v. Sumner, supra.

Following the enactment of The Civil Practice Act, the courts were confronted with the analogous situation of construing a party's self-contradictory testimony on motion for summary judgment. Early on the courts determined that if on motion for summary judgment a party offered self-contradictory testimony on the dispositive issue in the case, and the more favorable portion of his testimony was the only evidence of his right to a verdict in his favor, the trial court must construe the contradictory testimony against him. This being so, the opposing party would be entitled to summary judgment. The courts reasoned that this is the correct result because if the case went to trial under the same evidence, the party offering self-contradictory testimony would have a verdict directed against him. Dykes v. Hammock, 116 Ga.App. 389, 157 S.E.2d 524 (1967). Once the trial court has eliminated the favorable portions of the contraditory testimony, ¹ it must take all testimony on motion for summary judgment "as it then stands, and construe it in favor of the party opposing the motion in determining whether a summary judgment should be granted." Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga.App. 513, 514, 167 S.E.2d 697 (1969). The courts concluded that this rule must necessarily be applied to summary judgment proceedings, otherwise, "any opposing party may, by the simple device of filing conflicting affidavits, get the motion denied. The temptations to perjury are greater in this situation than in a jury trial.... The conflict can easily be avoided. A party knows what he has sworn. If he has discovered error, it can be explained in his affidavit." Chandler, at 523, 167 S.E.2d 697.

It is essential to note that this is a rule for construing testimony separate from those rules allocating burdens of proof at trial and on motion for summary judgment. That the rule of summary judgment places on the movant the burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law while providing that the party opposing the motion is entitled to all favorable inferences from the evidence does not suspend the application of this rule for construing testimony to summary judgment proceedings. See Chandler, at 522, 167 S.E.2d 697.

Some confusion in this area has resulted from a question certified to this court by the Court of Appeals, and this court's answer to it in Burnette Ford Inc. v. Hayes, 227 Ga. 551, 181 S.E.2d 866 (1971). The question certified was "where a party to a case, upon whom the burden of proof upon the trial of the case does not lie, makes a motion for summary judgment, is all of the evidence adduced on said motion, including the testimony of the party opposing the motion, construed most strongly against the movant?" This court correctly answered the question in the affirmative.

In a number of subsequent cases the Court of Appeals held this court's ruling in Burnette Ford had modified the rule requiring that a party's self-conflicting testimony be construed against him on motion for summary judgment. These cases interpreted Burnette Ford to mean that where there are contradictions in the testimony of a respondent to a motion for summary judgment, the contradiction will not be construed against him; rather, all the evidence, even his own self-contradictory testimony, will be construed in the respondent's favor. See, e.g., Whittle v. Johnston, 124 Ga.App. 785, 186 S.E.2d 129 (1971); Mathis v. R.H. Smallings & Sons, 125 Ga.App. 810, 189 S.E.2d 122 (1972); Browder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 126 Ga.App. 140, 190 S.E.2d 110 (1972); Columbia Drug Co. v. Cook, 127 Ga.App. 490, 194 S.E.2d 286 (1972); State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v Tucker, 130 Ga.App. 187, 202 S.E.2d 551 (1973); Applegarth Supply Co. v. Schaffer, 130 Ga.App. 353, 203 S.E.2d 277 (1973); Ramsey v. Thomas, 133 Ga.App. 869, 212 S.E.2d 444 (1975). This interpretation was incorrect. Burnette Ford v. Hayes, 227 Ga. 551, 181 S.E.2d 866 (1971), states the general rule that on motion for summary judgment all evidence is to be construed against the movant. Neither the facts in Burnette Ford v. Hayes ² nor the question certified by the Court of Appeals involved the rule governing a party-witness's self-contradictory testimony.

In answering the certified question in Burnette Ford, this court made reference to Ryder v. Schreeder, 224 Ga. 382, 386, 162 S.E.2d 375 (1968), in which the court applied to a motion for summary judgment the rule that the testimony of a party who offers himself as a witness in his own behalf is to be construed most strongly against him when it is "contradictory, vague or...