Prosdocimo v. Sec'y, Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 17 January 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-1034,11-1034 |
| Parties | WILLIAM PROSDOCIMO, Appellant v. *SECRETARY, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
SECRETARY, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
William Prosdocimo appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denying his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for habeas relief from a state murder conviction. Prosdocimo argues that his petition should have been granted because his constitutional right to due process was violated when the prosecutor at his trial failed to correct a witness's allegedly false testimony. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
Prosdocimo was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Thomas Sacco, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. At his trial, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania called Charles Kellington to testify that Prosdocimo had arranged for Miles Gabler to shoot Sacco. To discredit Kellington, Prosdocimo called Gabler as a witness. Gabler admitted to killing Sacco, but claimed that he had been paid to kill Sacco by Kellington and that he did not know Prosdocimo at the time. Gabler further testified that he had apprised Charles Rossi of his plan to kill Sacco, and arranged for Rossi to drive him to the location where he shot Sacco. Seeking to refute Gabler's testimony, the Commonwealth called Rossi as a witness on rebuttal. Contradicting Gabler, Rossi testified that he had no advance knowledge that Sacco was to be killed and that he did not serve as Gabler's driver on the night in question.
On direct examination, Rossi stated that he had entered into a "plea bargain with the District Attorney's Office of Pennsylvania and the United States Government." (J.A. at 435.) Among other things, the agreement required Rossi to provide information concerning the deaths of Sacco, Norman McGregor, and Melvin Pike, and to plead guilty to violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statute, for which he would serve a 20-year term of incarceration. In exchange for Rossi's cooperation, the plea bargain stated that the information Rossi provided would not be used against him by the United States or the Commonwealth "in any prosecution relating to any matters," other than the RICO charge. (J.A. at 65.)
During direct examination, the Commonwealth asked Rossi about his involvement in the McGregor and Pike murders:
(J.A. at 436-37.) On cross-examination, Prosdocimo asked Rossi to elaborate on his acknowledged involvement in the McGregor and Pike murders, seeking to ascertain whether Rossi was immune from prosecution for those murders:
(J.A. at 440-43.) The Commonwealth did not, at any point, clarify that the plea agreement in fact immunized Rossi from a Commonwealth prosecution for the McGregor and Pike murders, and the jury ultimately returned a guilty verdict against Prosdocimo.
After his trial concluded, Prosdocimo filed post-verdict motions challenging his conviction. By then, a copy of Rossi's plea agreement had come to light,1 and, in the briefing in support of the post-trial motions, Prosdocimo argued that his conviction should be reversed because the prosecutor failed to correct Rossi's "deliberate[ ] ... lie" regarding the scope of his plea agreement. (J.A. at 82.) The trial court rejected that argument, reasoning that Prosdocimo had waived it by raising it only in his briefing and not in the post-verdict motions themselves. Prosdocimo appealed to the Superior Court, which likewise deemed the issue waived. He then raised the argument a final time ondirect appeal, in an unsuccessful petition for discretionary review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Thereafter, Prosdocimo collaterally attacked his conviction in state court by filing a petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act ("PCHA"). Among other claims, Prosdocimo's petition alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly raise the claim concerning Rossi's allegedly false testimony in a post-verdict motion. The PCHA court rejected that claim, cursorily stating that the allegedly false statements were "accepted by the jury after thorough cross-examination" and that the claim was meritless because "[n]o independent evidence of perjury [was] offered ... ." (J.A. at 315.) Prosdocimo appealed that decision to the Superior Court, which agreed with the PCHA Court that "all of the issues which had not been finally litigated on their merits plainly lack merit, and so counsel could not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise them." (J.A. at 369.) Prosdocimo's ensuing petition for discretionary review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was denied without explanation.
Prosdocimo next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. His petition was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who recommended that it be dismissed. On December 14, 2010, the District Court accepted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, over Prosdocimo's objections. The Court dismissed Prosdocimo's petition and declined to issue a certificate of appealability.
This timely appeal followed. We granted a certificate of appealability as to the sole issue of whether Prosdocimo's constitutional right to due process was violated by theCommonwealth's use of, and failure to correct, the testimony of Charles Rossi relating to an immunity agreement.
Prosdocimo argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because the prosecutor's failure to correct Rossi's testimony violated his right to due process.
Although the parties contest whether Prosdocimo properly exhausted that claim in state court,3 they agree that, to the extent he did, review in this Court is limited by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). They further agree that, employing the standard articulated in AEDPA, we should assess whether the PCHA court's determination that Prosdocimo's due process claim is meritless "was contrary to,or ... an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). It is undisputed that the PCHA court's determination is the relevant decision for AEDPA purposes, see Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289-90 (3d Cir. 2008) (...
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