Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Leclaire ex rel. Gilliland, Civil Action No.: 7:17-cv-00628-AMQ
| Decision Date | 02 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 7:17-cv-00628-AMQ |
| Parties | Protective Life Insurance Company, Plaintiff, v. Deborah LeClaire, an individual, and Carrie Thomas, Administratrix on Behalf of the Estate of Robert Eugene Gilliland, Deceased, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Before this Court is Defendant Carrie Thomas, Administratrix on Behalf of the Estate of Robert Eugene Gilliland, Deceased's ("Thomas") Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 33), Defendant Deborah LeClaire's ("LeClaire") Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 35), Defendant Thomas's Motion to Strike from Defendant LeClaire's Second Affidavit on Summary Judgment Motion (ECF No. 42) and LeClaire's Motion to Amend her Answer, Counterclaim, and Cross Claim. (ECF No. 43.) The Court held a hearing on these motions on May 31, 2018, and has considered the arguments of the parties, as well as the briefing submitted and the entire record in this case. For the reasons set forth herein, this Court DENIES Thomas's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, DENIES LeClaire's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, DENIES Thomas's Motion to Strike and DENIES LeClaire's Motion to Amend without prejudice.
The motions before the Court arise out of an interpleader action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335 (a) and 2361, and based on diversity of citizenship and the assertion of adverse claims to the death benefit of a life insurance policy that is in excess of $500. (ECF No. 1.) As alleged in the complaint, on or about November 26, 2001, Protective Life Insurance Company ("Protective") issued a term life insurance policy (No. DT0084888) (the "Policy") to Robert Gilliland (the "Insured" or the "Decedent") in the face amount of $200,000 (the "Death Benefit"). (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 7.) An amendment to the application was incorporated and made a part of the Policy and listed the Insured's then wife, LeClaire, as primary beneficiary of the Policy proceeds. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 7.) The Insured and LeClaire were married on December 2, 2000, but separated and later divorced on August 20, 2003. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 8.) In 2013, the South Carolina Legislature amended Title 62, Article 2, Part 5 of the South Carolina Code such that the divorce or annulment of marriage revokes any revocable disposition or appointment of property or beneficiary designation made by a divorced individual to the divorced individual's former spouse in a governing document, except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument. S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-507(c). (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9.) The Insured died on July 18, 2016. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10.) LeClaire, the named beneficiary in the Policy, and Thomas, the Administratrix of the Estate have asserted competing claims to the Death Benefit. Thus, Protective sought to deposit the Death Benefit from the Policy with the Clerk of Court so that the defendants could resolve their rights to the Policy before this Court. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 11, 14, 20-22.) This Court previous granted Protective Life's motion for interpleader deposit (ECF No. 20) and for release of funds (ECF No. 23 in accordance with the relevant statutes.
Thomas filed her Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on January 26, 2018 (ECF No. 33); LeClaire filed her Amended Motion for Summary Judgment on the same day. (ECF No. 35.) Thomas moved to strike several assertions ofLeClaire's Second Affidavit in Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment on February 22, 2018. (ECF No. 42.) On February 26, 2018, LeClaire filed her Motion to Amend her Answer, Counterclaim, and Cross Claim was filed on February 26, 2018. (ECF No. 43.) Replies and responses have been filed and the motions are ripe for review.
A court shall grant summary judgment if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in her favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate.
Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). A litigant "cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another." Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir.1985). Therefore, "[m]ere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion." Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995). At the summary judgment stage, the judge is not to weigh the evidence, but rather to determine if there is a genuine issue of fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). "[T]he pertinent inquiry is whether there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they mayreasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 17-1503, 2018 WL 1916320, at *3 (4th Cir. Apr. 24, 2018)(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is assessed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 115 (4th Cir. 2013). Such a motion "does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal citation and quotations omitted). The Court must treat as true all well-pleaded allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the pleading part. Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). "A judgment on the pleadings is only warranted if the moving party has clearly established that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Thomas Daniels Agency, Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., 122 F. Supp. 3d 448, 450 (D.S.C. 2015) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the Court to strike "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "Rule 12(f) motions are generally viewed with disfavor 'because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy and because it is often sought by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic.'" Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting 5A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1380, 647 (2d ed.1990)).
"Generally, motions to amend a pleading are governed by Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Jones v. Luthi, 586 F. Supp. 2d 595, 611 (D.S.C. 2008). Ordinarily, "the court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). However, "after the deadlines provided by a scheduling order have passed, the good cause standard [of Rule 16] must be satisfied to justify leave to amend the pleadings." Nourison Rug Corp. v. Parvizian, 535 F.3d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 2008). The movant must first establish it has "good cause" for the amendment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). See Dilmar Oil Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 986 F. Supp. 959, 980 (D.S.C. 1997). If the movant satisfies this initial step, "it must then pass the requirements for amendment under Rule 15(a)." Id.; see Vercon Construction, Inc. v. Highland Mortgage Co., 187 Fed. Appx. 264, 2006 WL 1747115, at *1 (4th Cir. June 20, 2006) (unpublished) ( ).
An interpleader action involves two steps or stages. See Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 672 F.Supp.2d 714, 717 (D.Md. 2009). During the first stage, the Court must determine if interpleader is proper and will direct that funds plus interest be deposited with the Clerk. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Eastham, No. CV DKC 16-0386, 2016 WL 2625281, at *2-3 (D. Md. May 9, 2016). During the second stage, a scheduling order is issued and the case continues between the claimants as to their respective rights. Id.; see also Leventis v. First Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am., No. 3:09-1561-JFA, 2010 WL 2595305, at *2 (D.S.C. June 23, 2010). "[T]he court determines the respective rights of the claimants to the fund or property at stake via normallitigation processes, including pleading, discovery, motions, and trial." United States v. High Tech. Prod., Inc., 497 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2007). The second stage is "ultimately resolved by the entry of a judgment in favor of the claimant who is lawfully entitled to the stake." NYLife Distributors, Inc. v. Adherence Grp., Inc., 72 F.3d 371, 375 (3d Cir. 1995). If there is no genuine issue of material fact, this stage of the matter may be resolved by summary judgment. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Tien, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1284-85 (S.D. Fla. 2007). If the material facts are disputed, each claimant must prove its right to the fund by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1285. The Court...
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