Protestant Hospital Builders Club, Inc. v. Goedde
| Decision Date | 04 August 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-38,80-38 |
| Citation | 98 Ill.App.3d 1028,424 N.E.2d 1302,54 Ill.Dec. 399 |
| Parties | , 54 Ill.Dec. 399 PROTESTANT HOSPITAL BUILDERS CLUB, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Florence GOEDDE and Albert Goedde, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
John P. Long, Lebanon, for defendants-appellants.
Pope & Driemeyer, William A. Schmitt, Belleville, for plaintiff-appellee.
Plaintiff, Protestant Hospital Builders Club, Inc., brought an action in the circuit court of St. Clair County against Florence and Albert Goedde, defendants, to recover the costs of materials and services which it furnished to Albert Goedde while he was a patient at its convalescent home. The cause was tried without a jury, and judgment in the amount of $24,863.40 was entered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants on all four counts of the amended complaint. Defendants appeal from this judgment, contending that plaintiff has failed to prove that its charges reflect a reasonable price for the goods delivered and services rendered.
The first three counts of the amended complaint, which was filed January 12, 1979, pertain exclusively to Florence Goedde. Count I alleges that from August, 1977, through November, 1978, certain materials and services worth $13,479.45 were supplied to Florence and Albert Goedde by plaintiff. It is further alleged that Florence Goedde has refused to pay this sum and that, pursuant to section 15 of "An Act to revise the law in relation to husband and wife" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 40, par. 1015), she is indebted to plaintiff for the aforementioned amount. Count II alleges that Florence Goedde entered into a written agreement whereby she obligated herself to remunerate plaintiff for the costs of materials and services which it supplied to Albert Goedde; that plaintiff has not been compensated for goods and services provided from August, 1977, through November, 1978; that the unpaid balance for this period equals $13,479.45; and that pursuant to the written agreement, this amount is due and owing from Florence Goedde to plaintiff. Count III seeks the same measure of damages from Florence Goedde under the theory of unjust enrichment and alleges that Mrs. Goedde received a benefit in not having to furnish care and treatment for her husband while he was a non-paying resident at plaintiff's convalescent home. Count IV, subsequently added to the amended complaint by leave of court, is a forcible entry and detainer action against Albert Goedde, alleging that he unlawfully held a part of plaintiff's premises and that he is indebted to plaintiff in the amount of $18,337.20. Plaintiff successfully moved to amend its prayer for relief in all four counts to $19,459.30 prior to trial.
The case was tried and all evidence was introduced by stipulation of the parties at a hearing conducted on May 10, 1979. Admitted into evidence was Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, which consisted of monthly statements of account sent to Florence Goedde for the months of August 1, 1977, through April 24, 1979. The statements are itemized bills totalling $19,459.30 for the materials and services supplied to Albert Goedde. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2, a written agreement allegedly executed by Florence Goedde on January 25, 1965, was also admitted into evidence by stipulation. The agreement is an application for admission of Albert Goedde to the Memorial Nursing Home, Belleville, Illinois, and obligated Florence Goedde to obey certain terms and conditions, including the following:
"1. That the parties are entering into a contractual relationship for supplying service and care as a chronically ill person to Albert Goedde.
7. Patient agrees to pay the charges for service, care and facilities furnished in advance at least monthly and further agrees that such charges may be altered by the Home at its discretion.
I, Florence Goedde, who have (sic) executed the above and foregoing application of Albert Goedde for admission to the Memorial Nursing Home, acknowledge that I agree to be bound by the terms and condition (sic) of this application.
The record is not clear as to plaintiff's rights under the agreement since it apparently was not an original party to it. However, since plaintiff's standing to prosecute its claim under the agreement is not challenged by defendants on appeal, we will assume that plaintiff lawfully acquired the rights of the Memorial Nursing Home under the agreement and will treat plaintiff as if it were a party to the agreement. At the hearing, the parties further stipulated that had Pat Adams testified, she would have stated that she was an employee of plaintiff and that the bills grouped as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 were accurately compiled. Expressly excluded from the stipulation was any acknowledgement that the bills were fair, proper, or reasonable.
The case was taken under advisement; and judgment was entered on September 25, 1979, in plaintiff's favor as to all counts in the amount of $24,863.40. Defendants appeal from this judgment, contending that plaintiff failed to prove the damages sought either under the written agreement or on the theory of quantum meruit. Defendants in their brief do not formally challenge the validity of the agreement, nor do they offer any grounds as to why it should not be enforced. Their only quarrel is that plaintiff failed to establish at trial the amount of its damages. Therefore, the agreement between Florence Goedde and the Memorial Nursing Home has been established to be an enforcible express contract; and consequently plaintiff may not recover on the basis of quantum meruit. See Wolf v. Booker (4th Dist. 1901), 97 Ill.App. 139, Rev'd, 195 Ill. 365, 63 N.E. 265; Anderson v. Biesman & Carrick Co. (1st Dist. 1936), 287 Ill.App. 507, 4 N.E.2d 639.
Defendants urge that the judgment be reversed due to plaintiff's failure to offer proof that the charges listed in the monthly statements of account were reasonable. Defendants contend that such proof is necessary because the agreement does not specify a definite price to be charged for the materials and services. Plaintiff argues that paragraph 7 of the agreement expressly provides what price is to be charged. Therefore, it contends that proof as to the reasonableness of the bills is immaterial and that the judgment should be affirmed.
In Illinois in situations where there is a contract, express or implied, under which one party supplies articles or services to another and there is no provision setting out the amount the supplier is to be compensated, the law implies that there is an agreement to pay a reasonable price for the goods and services. (Wingler v. Niblack (4th Dist. 1978), 58 Ill.App.3d 287, 15 Ill.Dec. 817, 374 N.E.2d 252; Wing v. Lederer (2d Dist. 1966), 77 Ill.App.2d 413, 222 N.E.2d 535; Fehr Const. Co. v. Postl System of Health Building (1919), 288 Ill. 634, 124 N.E. 315.) To recover under a contract of this nature, the supplier has the burden of proving that his charges for materials and services rendered are reasonable. A statement of account, standing alone, is not proof of the reasonableness of a supplier's charges. Wing v. Lederer.
Initially, we must determine whether the agreement executed by Florence Goedde is indefinite with respect to price so as to require proof of the reasonableness of plaintiff's charges. We hold that it is. The only reference to compensation under the contract is paragraph 7, which states:
"Patient agrees to pay for Service, care and facilities furnished in advance at least monthly and further agrees that such charges may be altered by the Home at its discretion."
Paragraph 7, in essence, vests in plaintiff unrestricted discretion in determining what price it will charge for its materials and services. It can hardly be said that this paragraph provides for a definite price where it offers no formula for computing prices other than the discretion of the supplier. Therefore, this paragraph does not rid plaintiff of its burden of establishing the reasonableness of its charges.
The only evidence pertaining to plaintiff's charges for the materials and services furnished to...
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