Prout v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't
| Decision Date | 11 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | 1:14-cv-00486-SEB-DKL |
| Parties | DONALD A. PROUT, Plaintiff, v. MARION COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, MICHAEL HUBBS, WAYNE SHARP, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
This cause is before the Court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. On March 28, 2014, Plaintiff Donald Prout filed suit against Defendants Michael Hubbs, Wayne Sharp, and the Marion County Sheriff's Department alleging unreasonable seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as well as negligence, false arrest, malicious prosecution, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, in violation of Indiana common law. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 35-37. On May 1, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment seeking judgment on a theory of res judicata. [Docket No. 43]. That same day, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the defenses of probable cause for the arrest at issue and qualified immunity. [Docket No. 41]. For the reasons detailed herein, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff Donald Prout served as a deputy with the Marion County Sheriff's Department from January 2006 until March 2012. Dkt. 41-3 at 19. To supplement his income, Dep. Prout also worked as a part-time security officer for Kroger, Greyhound Bus, and an apartment complex located on Indiana Avenue in Indianapolis. Id. at 25. On January 29, 2012, a student living in that apartment complex reported to the Indiana Metro Police Department that Dep. Prout had raped her. Dkt. 41-1. Det. Daniel Smith of the IMPD Sex Offense Unit launched an investigation into the claim which was concluded after the student ceased cooperating with law enforcement. Id. at 9.
Det. Smith passed along the information he had obtained in his investigation Internal Affairs Captain Michael Hubbs, who, with Col. Byron Grandy, thereafter, informed Lt. Wayne Sharp, an investigator in the internal criminal investigations unit, of the investigation of Dep. Prout for the alleged rape, and the subsequent termination of the investigation prior to any charges being preferred or an arrest. Sharp Dep. 19:12-21:4. They further informed Sharp of possible discrepancies in Dep. Prout's timekeeping records regarding his part-time employment, which warranted further investigation as "ghost employment." Id.
Lt. Sharp uncovered, through his investigation, four discrepancies in Dep. Prout's timecards: he had clocked-in to work for the Sherriff's Department at the same time as hehad clocked-in to work at one of his part-time jobs.1 After discovering these discrepancies, when Lt. Sharp attempted to speak with him about his timekeeping, Dep. Prout declined to be interviewed. Dkt. 41-3 at 190-91. Lt. Sharp prepared an Affidavit of Probable Cause averring that Dep. Prout had received double-pay and was thus engaged in unlawful "ghost employment," in violation of Indiana Code § 35-43-4-2. Dkt. 41-10. Lt. Sharp presented the affidavit to Capt. Hubbs for review, after which it was attached to a charging information and filed with the Marion Superior Court. A warrant ensued for Dep. Prout's arrest. Id. On April 4, 2012, three days after being terminated from his employment with the Sherriff's Department, Dep. Prout was arrested and booked in the Marion County Jail on charges of ghost employment. Sharp Dep. Ex. 3; Hubbs Dep. at 86.
Shortly thereafter, a number of Dep. Prout's former colleagues contacted Lt. Sharp to report that Dep. Prout had attended a training session on October 27, 2011 and thus had not received double-pay for that day. Dkt. 41-3 at 207-08. The training session had been a monthly "STAR Team" program that certain officers are permitted to attend in place of working their normal shifts. Dkt. 41-3 at 20-25. Thus, although his timecards did not reflect it, Dep. Prout was entitled to and did attend the training session, which extended over that work day from 8:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m., after which he worked a shiftat Kroger from 4:53 p.m. to 12:02 a.m. Id. Several STAR Team members also spoke with Lt. Sharp and Capt. Hubbs to confirm Dep. Prout's attendance at the training session and to reminded Capt. Hubbs, who had attended the training himself, that he had, in fact, spoken to Dep. Prout during that session. Hubbs Dep. at 80; Sharp Dep. at 28. The one-hour overlaps on Dep. Prout's timecards for February 6, 7, and 27, 2012 were also eventually explained by Dep. Prout's supervisor at Greyhound Bus, who reported that Prout's practice was to leave his shifts at Greyhound early in order to report for work as a deputy, which time he would make up at some later date without revising his timecards. Dkts. 41-3, 41-8. Presumably on the basis of this post arrest information, the prosecutor responsible for the case dismissed the charges against Dep. Prout citing "Evidentiary Problems." Dkt. 41-11.
Following the dismissal of this case, Dep. Prout filed a Verified Petition for Expungement in the Marion Superior Court. Dkt. 41-13. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition and, on March 19, 2013, granted the requested expungement, concluding "that there was no offense actually committed by Donald Prout and that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the warrant and the prosecution of theft against Donald A. Prout." Dkt. 41-13. The IMPD appealed the order to the Indiana Court of Appeals. See Indiana Metropolitan Police Department v. Prout, 10 N.E.3d 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied, 23 N.E.3d 680 (Ind. 2015). In its decision, the Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that no crime hadactually been committed, but explicitly declined to opine on the trial court's finding of probable cause. Id. at 567 n.4.
On March 28, 2014, Dep. Prout filed suit against Defendants Michael Hubbs, Wayne Sharp and the Marion County Sheriff's Department alleging unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as negligence, false arrest, malicious prosecution, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional. Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 35-37. On May 5, 2015, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Dkts. 41, 43.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment should be granted when the evidence establishes that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). The purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See id. at 255. However, neither the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between theparties," id., 477 U.S. at 247, nor the existence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, will defeat a motion for summary judgment. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000).
Courts often confront cross motions for summary judgment because Rules 56(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow both plaintiffs and defendants to move for such relief. In such situations, courts must consider each party's motion individually to determine if that party has satisfied the summary judgment standard. Kohl v. Ass'n. of Trial Lawyers of Am., 183 F.R.D. 475 (D. Md. 1998). Here, the Court has considered the parties' respective memoranda and the exhibits attached thereto and has construed all facts and drawn all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the respective nonmovant. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 574. The parties before us, by filing cross motions, stipulate that there are no material facts in controversy and that their dispute is ripe for decision on summary judgment.
Plaintiff argues in his Motion for Summary Judgment that he is entitled to have the issue of probable cause resolved in his favor under the doctrine of res judicata. Dkt. 43. Defendants argue in their Motion for Summary Judgment that they are entitled to judgment in their favor because probable cause existed for Dep. Prout's arrest and because in any event, the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Dkt. 41. We address each of these contentions below.
The doctrine of res judicata embraces two forms: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Biggs v. Marsh, 446 N.E.2d 977, 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). Claim preclusion applies where there has been a final judgment on the merits and acts as a complete bar to a subsequent action on the same claim between the same parties and their privies. Kieler v. C.A.T. by Trammel, 616 N.E.2d 34, 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied. When claim preclusion applies, all matters that were or might have been litigated are deemed conclusively decided by the judgment in the prior action. Id.
Issue preclusion, often referred to as collateral estoppel, bars the subsequent relitigation of a fact or issue where it was necessarily adjudicated in a former suit. Kieler, 616 N.E.2d at 36; Sullivan v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa., 605 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Ind. 1992). When issue preclusion applies only those issues that were actually litigated and necessary to the result of...
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