Provencio v. Stark
| Decision Date | 19 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 09-cv-02329-WJM-KLM |
| Parties | ERIC CHRISTOPHER PROVENCIO, Plaintiff, v. C. STARK, and D. RODENBECK, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Plaintiff, an federal prisoner, brings this action against Defendants, two correctional officers, alleging that Defendants used excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 134.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
The following undisputed facts are taken from the record:1
Plaintiff Eric Christopher Provencio has been a federal prisoner at the United States Penitentiary-Administrative Maximum facility ("ADX") since August 11, 2006. (Schaffer Decl. ¶ 9, attached to Defs' Motion, Ex. 1.) Defendants David Rodenbeck and Chad Stark serve as correctional officers and as General Maintenance Worker Supervisors at the ADX.2 (Stark Decl. ¶¶ 9, 10, attached to Defs' Motion, Ex. 3; Rodenbeck Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5, attached to Defs' Motion, Ex. 2.) Both Defendants do general maintenance and supervise prisoner work crews in the ADX. (Id.) Both Defendants also regularly perform correctional officer duties, including, but not limited to, escorting prisoners, conducting searches, completing prisoner population counts, and delivering meals. (Id.)
The Special Housing Unit ("SHU") is a specialized housing unit at ADX where two categories of inmates are typically housed: (1) inmates who are subject to administrative detention; and (2) inmates who are subject to disciplinary segregation. (Schaffer Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 10.) Since Plaintiff was transferred to the ADX, he has been housed primarily in the SHU. (Id. ¶ 10.)
At the time of the events in question, October 10, 2007, Plaintiff was housed in the SHU on disciplinary segregation. (Id. ¶¶ 18-20.) On that day, the ADX Warden ordered a mass search of the cells in the SHU. (Rodenbeck Decl. ¶ 6; Stark Decl. ¶ 11.) Each inmate was escorted to individual recreational cells on the range to wait until the search of his cell was completed. (Stark Decl. ¶ 13.) After correctional officerscompleted searching the cell level where Plaintiff was housed, Defendants were directed to escort Plaintiff back to his cell from the recreation area. (Stark Decl. ¶ 14; Rodenbeck Decl. ¶ 9.)
At approximately 9:40 a.m., Defendants arrived at the recreational holding cell where Plaintiff was being held. (Id. ¶ 18; Id. ¶ 12.) Defendant Stark then placed Plaintiff's wrists in hand restraints, and Plaintiff and Defendants proceeded down the range back to Plaintiff's cell.
Immediately after Plaintiff and Defendants entered the sallyport3 area of Plaintiff's cell, there was a verbal exchange between Plaintiff and Defendant Stark that lasted a few seconds. (Dep. of E. Provencio, 26:24-27:9.) After this verbal exchange, a physical altercation ensured between Plaintiff and Defendants. (Stark Decl. ¶¶ 21-24; Dep. of E. Provencio, 26:24-29:24.) There is a dispute of fact as to whether Defendants or Plaintiff initiated this physical altercation. (Id.)
According to Wilmer Haygood, a Correctional Counselor at the ADX, he ran into Plaintiff's cell after he observed Plaintiff attempting to kick and head butt Defendant Stark. (Haygood Decl. ¶ 10, attached to Defs' Motion, Ex. 24.) Counselor Haygood ran into the cell while Plaintiff and Defendant Stark were falling to the ground. (Id.)
A videotape from a stationary camera in the SHU hallway shows that Plaintiff and Defendants entered the sallyport of Plaintiff's cell at 9:42:57 a.m. (Schaffer Decl. ¶ 41.) The videotape then shows Counselor Haygood entering the cell five seconds later at 9:43:02 a.m. (Id. ¶ 42.) According to Plaintiff, there was no unlawful or excessiveforce used against Plaintiff after Counselor Haygood entered the cell. (Dep. of C. Provencio, 31:21-25, 32:1-2, 33:3-18.)
Jose Arroyo, another Correctional Counselor at the ADX, entered the cell after Counselor Haygood. (Arroyo Decl. ¶¶ 10-11, attached to Defs' Motion, Ex. 25.) Counselor Arroyo observed Plaintiff yelling and trying to kick and roll. (Id.) It appeared to Arroyo that Plaintiff was attempting to get out of the hold the correctional officers had on him, and wanted to kick Defendant Stark. (Id.)
After Plaintiff was placed in leg restraints, Defendant Stark left the cell and Plaintiff was assisted in standing up. (Rodenbeck Decl. ¶ 18.) Defendant Rodenbeck, along with other correctional officers, then escorted Plaintiff to the medical station in the SHU to be evaluated. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff was treated for minor contusions and a 1.5-inch to 2-inch laceration on his upper head, which was cleaned and closed with seven staples by BOP medical personnel. (Dep. of E. Provencio, 43:1-44:9; HealthServices 000065, 000230, attached to Pl's Resp., Ex. B.) Plaintiff also sustained a sprained medial collateral ligament in his left knee. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this action on September 30, 2009. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff brings one claim against Defendants, in their individual capacities, for use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id.)
On November 18, 2011, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on Plaintiff's excessive force claim. (ECF No. 134.) In addition to arguing the lack of a genuine issue of materialfacts and entitlement to judgment in their favor as a matter of law, in this filing Defendants also assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id.) On January 2, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion (ECF No. 145), and on January 26, 2012, Defendants filed a Reply in Support of their Motion (ECF No. 150).
The Motion is now ripe for resolution.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1994). Whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact depends upon whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or, conversely, is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986); Carey v. U.S. Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir. 1987).
A fact is "material" if it pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable juror could return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The Court must resolve factual ambiguities against the moving party, thus favoring the right to a trial. Quaker State Mini-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 52 F.3d 1522, 1527 (10th Cir. 1995); Houston v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., 817 F.2d 83, 85 (10th Cir. 1987).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing an absence of evidence tosupport the nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the non-movant must then point to specific evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact with regard to each challenged element. See Reed v. Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2002); In re Ribozyme Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1111 (D. Colo. 2002).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because the force they used on Plaintiff was not excessive and did not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Excessive force claims in the prison setting are generally analyzed under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Smith v. Cochran, 339 F.3d 1205, 1210 n.2 (10th Cir. 2003). The Eighth Amendment encompasses an inmate's "constitutional right to be secure in her [or his] bodily integrity and free from attack by prison guards." Id. at 1212 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To assert an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must satisfy a two-prong test: (1) that the deprivation suffered or the conduct challenged was "objectively 'sufficiently serious,'" and (2) that the defendant had a sufficiently culpable state of mind or was "deliberately indifferent" to the inmate's safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994).
Under the objective component of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that he was subjected to official conduct or physical force that rose to the level of crueland unusual punishment because "not . . . every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action." Martin v. Creek Cnty. Jail, No. 10-cv-0699, 2010 WL 4683852, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 12, 2010) ().
To satisfy the subjective component of the Eighth Amendment test, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that a defendant had the culpable state of mind known as "deliberate indifference," which requires a higher degree of fault than negligence or gross negligence. See Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1495-96 (10th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). "When no legitimate law enforcement or penological purpose can be inferred from the defendant's alleged conduct, the abuse itself may, in some circumstances, be sufficient evidence of a culpable state of mind." Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997).
In the excessive force context, the first,...
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