Providence, F.R. & N. Steamboat Co. v. City of Fall River

• Decision Date: 18 June 1903
• Citation: Providence, F.R. & N. Steamboat Co. v. City of Fall River, 183 Mass. 535, 67 N.E. 647 (Mass. 1903)
• Parties: PROVIDENCE, F. R. & N. STEAMBOAT CO. SAME v. CITY OF FALL RIVER. SAME v. OLD COLONY R. CO. et al.
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

183 Mass. 535

67 N.E. 647

PROVIDENCE, F. R. & N. STEAMBOAT CO. SAME v. CITY OF FALL RIVER. SAME v. OLD COLONY R. CO. et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

June 18, 1903

COUNSELJennings, Morton & Brayton, for plaintiff.

Hugo A Dubuque, for defendantcity of Fall River.

F. S Hall, for defendantOld Colony R. Co.

D. F Slade, for defendantsBlakeslee & Sons.

OPINION

KNOWLTON C.J.

The most important question in this case is whether St. 1900, p. 471, c. 472, is constitutional.The first section of this act is as follows: 'The report of the commissioners appointed by the superior court for the county of Bristol, to consider the abolition of the grade crossings of Brownell street and other streets and ways and the road of the Old Colony Railroad Company in the city of Fall River, filed in said court on the 16th day of July of the current year, is hereby confirmed; the Old Colony Railroad Company and the city of Fall River shall make the alterations prescribed in said report as therein specified; the commonwealth and said city and railroad company shall pay the cost of said alterations and of the hearing, in the proportions prescribed in said report and all the provisions of chapter 428 of the Acts of the year 1890 and all acts in amendment or addition thereto, not inconsistent with this act, shall apply to and govern the proceedings in connection with the abolition of said crossings, in the same manner as if the decision and report of said commission had been confirmed by the court.Provided, however, that there shall be filed in the registry of deeds for the county of Bristol, a plan signed by the mayor of said city and the engineer of the railroad company, showing the lands and rights specified in said report to be taken; and to take otherwise than by purchase any such lands or rights, there shall be recorded in said rigistry of deeds a statement that the lands and rights specified therein are taken for highway purposes or for railroad purposes, as the case may be, for the purpose of abolishing said crossings, and the recording of any such statement shall constitute a taking of lands and rights specified therein.Every such statement shall be signed by the mayor of the city and the engineer of the railroad company.'At the time of its enactment the report referred to had been filed in the superior court for the county of Bristol, providing for the abolition of certain grade crossings in Fall River, and for changes in streets and ways incidental thereto.The total estimated cost of carrying out the work recommended in this report is from $1,500,000 to $2,000,000.At the time of the hearing before the single justice, between $350,000 and $400,000 had been expended for the work, and for the purchase of land.The report fills 77 printed quarto pages, and it calls for extensive changes, which are stated in detail.

It is contended that this statute is void because it is an exercise of judicial power, in violation of article 30 of the Declaration of Rights in the Constitution of this commonwealth.If it is to be treated, in substance and effect, as a usurpation of the powers of the court in the exercise of judicial functions under existing statutes, rather than as a new enactment for special purposes within the legitimate field of legislation, the objection is well founded.If it means that the report is confirmed, treating it as made and to be dealt with solely under the authority of existing legislation, it is a declaration of a decision which could be made or refused only by the court acting judicially under the statute, and it is therefore unconstitutional and void.But if it is to be treated as special legislation prescribing new rules and additional provisions for making a public improvement in substitution for those under which the court and commissioners had been acting, it was within the power of the Legislature to enact it.

The question of construction is difficult.If the statute stopped with the word 'confirmed,' in the first sentence, we should have little hesitation in declaring it unconstitutional.On the other hand, if in substitution for the language of this sentence we found in the act a statement that St. 1890, p. 463, c. 428, was repealed in its application to the grade crossings, streets, and ways referred to in the report, and that the report should be adopted as a statement of a scheme for changes, and that changes should be made accordingly, and that the provisions following in the act should be applicable, there would be no doubt of its constitutionality.The Legislature has the power, by a special act, to make any reasonable provision in regard to railroad crossings, streets, and ways in a city or town.In re Mayor of Northampton,158 Mass. 299, 33 N.E. 568, and cases cited;Scituate v. Weymouth,108 Mass. 128;Brighton v. Wilkinson, 2 Allen, 27;Brayton v. Fall River,124 Mass. 95;Old Colony Railroad Company, Petitioner, 163 Mass. 356, 40 N.E. 198.The Legislature, while proceedings were pending under St. 1890, c. 428, might pass an act terminating those proceedings, and establishing a scheme for changes and improvements, however elaborate, and might prescribe the method for carrying out the scheme.Instead of stating the particulars of the scheme in the statute, it might refer to a report on file in any depositary of public records which contained the statement.Special statutes in regard to particular railroad crossings, railroad stations, and streets and ways are very numerous.SeeSt. 1892, pp. 70, 390, 536, cc. 70, 373, 433.There are several special statutes relating to reports or decrees under St. 1890, p. 463, c. 428.SeeSt. 1892, p. 264, c. 311;St. 1901, p. 392, c. 460;St. 1899, p. 444, c. 421;St. 1900, pp. 137, 441, 468, cc. 193, 453, 471;St. 1897, p. 550, c. 519.

Returning now to the language of the act in question, after the first statement already referred to we find provisions imposing on the railroad company, the city of Fall River, and the commonwealth, respectively, obligations like those imposed by St. 1890, c. 428, followed by a general statement that the proceedings in connection with the abolition of crossings shall be governed by this statute and the acts in amendment or addition thereto, as if the decision and report of the commission had been confirmed by the court.Then follows a provision requiring a plan signed by the mayor of the city and the engineer of the railroad company to be filed in the registry of deeds, showing the lands and rights specified in the report to be taken, and a statement signed in like manner to be recorded in the registry, to constitute a taking of lands or rights otherwise than by purchase.This is an independent provision not found in the previous statute.Inasmuch as it was in the power of the Legislature to suspend the proceedings in court under the statute, and to adopt independently as its own the scheme found in the report, and as this is what it did, in substance, we think that we ought to consider the statute as wholly legislative, and to consider that part which purports to confirm the report as not referring to a confirmation in the case as a part of the judicial proceedings, but as referring, rather, to an independent adoption of the report as a part of a legislative act establishing a scheme for changes in Fall River.To hold otherwise would be to give effect to the form of the first part of the act, rather than to the substance of its later provisions.It is to be regretted that the language chosen was such as to occasion a serious doubt in regard to the legislative intention.But it is our duty to assume that the Legislature intended to act within its constitutional authority, and to treat the words of the statute, if possible, in such a way as to give them legal effect.In Re Mayor, etc., of Northampton,158 Mass. 299, 33 N.E. 568, a similar construction was put upon a statute to which there were similar objections.The title to the present act, although not very significant, tends somewhat to confirm our conclusion.

St. 1890, p. 463, c. 428, was held to be constitutional by this court in Norwood v. New York & New England Railroad Company,161 Mass. 259, 37 N.E. 199, and in Gately v. Old Colony Railroad Company,171 Mass. 494, 51 N.E. 5.See, also, New York & New England Railroad Company v. Bristol,151 U.S. 556, 14 S.Ct. 437, 38 L.Ed. 269;Chicago, etc., Railroad Company v. Nebraska,170 U.S. 74, 18 S.Ct. 513, 42 L.Ed. 948;Wheeler v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad,178 U.S. 321, 20 S.Ct. 949, 44 L.Ed. 1085;Appleton v. Newton,178 Mass. 276, 59 N.E. 648.If, by reason of provisions in the scheme of the commissioners broader than are authorized under St. 1890, p. 463, c. 428, the railroad company might raise questions of constitutionality beyond those covered by the decisions already referred to, they are not open to this plaintiff, and the consent of the railroad company will be presumed.Hingham & Quincy Bridge & Turnpike Corporation v. Norfolk County, 6 Allen, 353.But it does not appear upon the record that there are other questions involving principles different from those applicable to the earlier statute.We are of opinion that St. 1900, p. 471, c. 472, including the provisions adopted from the previous act, is constitutional.

It follows that the prayer for an injunction against continuing the work under the statute, and making changes in Central street as prescribed in the report, must be denied.

It appears that the defendants, in prosecuting the work, have committed certain trespasses, and are threatening to commit trespasses, by occupying portions of the plaintiff's land and keeping structures upon it.No provision for such an occupation is made, in terms, in the report of the...